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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two main arguments are developed in this thesis: first is the claim that our 
ability to make and understand representational pictures has a natural basis in our 
capacity to see. In this respect, I have drawn on the ideas of the visual scientist, 
David Marr and on the theory of representation expounded by John Willats. 
Second, I argue that the view articulated by these theorists forms a theoretical 
backdrop for, but does not satisfactorily explain, how pictures may heighten our 
sense of bodily presence. A central aim of this thesis is therefore to show how 
this mode of expression is also non-arbitrarily linked to the process of seeing by 
virtue of its relationship with our visuomotor capacities. In order to give 
substance to these ideas, I have attempted to weave together knowledge of art 
history with neuropsychological evidence and phenomenological philosophy. 
  
 
In applying this view to the work of particular artists, I have largely 
focussed on the oeuvre of Cézanne and the Cubists. However, the general form 
of this argument is intended to have wider implications, indicating the 
development of a stylistic tendency in modern art and showing how it differs 
from that of the Renaissance tradition. In conclusion, my thesis expresses the 
view that vision – and hence representation – can be divided along two separate 
lines: one related to a conceptual form of seeing and the other related to a bodily 
form of perception. The „crisis of representation‟ in the late nineteenth century is 
therefore considered indicative of a rejection of the former mode of visuality. 
Instead, modern artists are said to re-structure the viewing experience so that it 
shows the reliance of sight on the body, thus permitting the beholder a more 
active and constitutive role in the perception of art. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
Vision, History and Style 
 
 
 
 
Every artist finds certain visual possibilities before him, to which he is bound. 
Not everything is possible at all times. Vision itself has its history, and the 
revelation of these visual strata must be regarded as the primary task of art 
history. 
 
 – Heinrich Wölfflin1 
 
 
i) WHAT IS SPECIFICALLY ‘VISUAL’ ABOUT PICTURES? 
 
One of the most common assumptions we make about pictures is that they are 
„visual‟ artefacts pure and simple. Or, to put this another way, we tend to think 
that their interest lies exclusively in an experience of seeing and that they have 
little truck with the other sensory modalities such as hearing, smell or touch. This 
does not mean, of course, that we do not speak of pictures as appealing to our 
other sensory faculties; we might say, for instance, that Kandinsky‟s works call 
to mind the harmonies and dissonances of music. But we tend to relate these non-
visual experiences to a process of mental association – or as Nelson Goodman 
                                               
1 Heinrich Wölfflin, Principles of Art History, trans. M. D. Hottinger (London: G. Bell & Sons, 
Ltd, 1932), p. 11. 
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has put it, to a process of metaphorical extension
2
 – and not to a sensation that is 
directly produced by the work. Therefore, since we decipher pictures by 
employing our visual capacities, it seems profoundly intuitive to treat them as 
objects of sight. 
 
 But what should we say of pictorial art more specifically? Does this 
generate some particular visual interest? And if so, what should we understand 
the source of this to be? If we trace it to some objective aspect of the picture‟s 
appearance – to something about the way it looks qua itself – then how are we 
supposed to quantify this? Clearly we cannot pin our hopes on an impartial 
judgement for, as Hume was to point out, we each bring something different to 
the work of art (and of course, this includes myriad factors such as our 
competencies, prejudices, cultural background, race, class, gender and so on and 
so forth).
3
 But equally, if we understand pictorial art as something which is 
distinctively visual, then we cannot say that this relates only to our own activity 
of seeing, for then we might as well look at anything else. Thus the „visuality‟ of 
a picture must connect these two senses of looking – what a picture looks like (its 
objective appearance) and how we look at it (the visual capacities that we 
deploy). It might therefore be said that certain pictures are classified as art 
because they educe, and thus make us aware of, a particularly rich or distinctive 
experience of sight. 
 
                                               
2 See Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art, (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc: 1976), Part II „The Sound of Pictures‟, pp. 45 – 98.  
3 David Hume, „Of the Standard of Taste‟ (1757) reprinted in Philosophy: Basic Readings, ed. 
Nigel Warburton (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 493 – 507. 
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 But can deepening our understanding of pictorial seeing extend our 
knowledge of the history of art? In our discipline we tend to assume that it is 
enough to say that pictures are visual without considering the particular nature of 
the relationships and perceptual processes this experience entails. And more 
explicitly, we tend not to consider how vision connects the way that a picture 
looks, the way that a spectator views it and the original way that the artist saw. 
Of course, this is not to say that we do not acknowledge different categories of 
visual interest; for instance, we might be concerned with how a picture by 
Courbet implies multiple viewing positions, or how one by Mark Rothko induces 
a sense of dread. But in general we explain these phenomena by referring to the 
formal qualities of the picture rather than considering the way that these express 
the artist‟s perception or modulates the spectator‟s experience of sight. If we 
wanted explanations at this level, we assume that science and psychology would 
fill in the gaps. But since we suppose that the processes revealed would only tell 
us about states of the brain, we fail to see how they could illuminate the 
connection between the look of a picture and the concerns of an age. In short, 
this approach is not seen as fitting for art history for it is considered to relate to 
the study of vision and not to the study of pictures per se. 
 
In this thesis I wish to propose that this approach is wrongheaded and 
that, instead of being inconsequential to the project of art history, the study of 
perception can further its means. This is because any history of pictures which 
respects what they fundamentally are must begin by considering the way that 
they „look‟. Or to put this differently, since the primary condition of a picture is 
that it is made to be seen, the initial shape which this appearance takes will 
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condition any more complex experience that follows. Therefore, before we 
decipher a narrative, grasp a particular iconographical content, or understand a 
social or ideological message, we must first visually experience a work and treat 
its meaning as something visually conveyed. In the following sections let me 
further outline this approach to pictures by showing how it connects the triple 
concerns of vision, history and art.  
 
 
ii) NATURE AND NURTURE 
 
One well-known approach to the problem of how seeing, picturing and style 
interrelate is Wölfflin‟s notion that „vision itself has a history‟. Thus according to 
the theorist, the way that seeing changes over the course of history determines 
the direction of changes in style.
 4
 Now, what I believe needs to be made explicit 
in this connection is that the notion of „vision itself‟ proposed by Wölfflin is 
nothing less than the idea that seeing has its own evolutionary history. Thus, 
while it might seem doubtful that this fluctuates around two poles of perception – 
the tendencies the author identifies with the Classic and the Baroque – we cannot 
quarrel with the notion that human sight is subject to certain evolutionary laws 
and that, at this naturally determined level, the specificities of culture have no 
particular effect. What is therefore valuable about Wölfflin‟s argument is its 
insight that there is a natural basis to vision and that to a certain extent our shared 
heredity will determine the way that we see. 
                                               
4 This idea is outline in the introduction to the Principles of Art History and later expanded in its 
conclusion.  
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Where Wölfflin errs is not so much in his acknowledgement of this 
universal axis of vision, but in citing it as the causal mechanism for stylistic 
change. For clearly, the course of evolution – whatever its nature – is too slow 
and too undifferentiated to ever account sufficiently for the diversity of style. 
Accordingly, it seems that when he identifies the Classic and the Baroque with 
two discrete modes of perception, he attributes to nature what in reality is a 
product of culture. To be more specific, what the Principles fails to adequately 
account for is the whole range of human activities and forms of exchange which 
distinguish the practice of art making in the Renaissance from its later 
incarnation in the Baroque.
5
 The lesson we therefore learn from the shortcomings 
of this explanation is that, if we are to speak of a „history of vision‟ in relation to 
art, we must conceive of one that is socially constructed and not one that 
autonomously and instinctively unfolds. 
 
Wölfflin nevertheless does make provisions for the material contexts in 
which seeing occurs. „Not everything‟, he says, „is possible at all times‟ and what 
makes these things possible and determines their development is „external‟ 
factors or „outward circumstances‟.6 In short, vision – whatever natural capacities 
it supplies – is always born into culture, and it is the admixture of these factors 
                                               
5 Indeed, many contemporary theorists would claim that this period is too wide for the whole 
complex of social factors to ever be explored in an illuminating way. For this reason, recent 
studies of style – when this is even entertained as a meaningful concept – tend to be much more 
historically specific. Witness, for example, T. J. Clark‟s pioneering work Image of the People: 
Gustave Courbet and the Revolution of 1848 which concentrates exclusively on a three year 
period as does The Absolute Bourgeois: Artists and Politics in France, 1848 – 1851 (both 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1973).  
6 Wölfflin considers the relationship between the (supposedly) inexorable laws of art and the 
influence of contingent historical factors in his conclusion to the Principles, and particularly in 
the section entitled „External and Internal History of Art‟. He also frequently refers to the contrast 
between the „inward‟ progress and the „outward‟ circumstances of seeing, giving primacy to the 
former in the movement from Classic to Baroque and emphasising the latter when it comes to the 
recommencement of this cycle. See ibid, pp. 226 – 237. 
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which throws up certain possibilities for art. And so, even if we deny the 
plausibility of Wölfflin‟s „history of seeing‟, can we at least agree with his 
conciliatory approach to nature and nurture?  
 
If we survey the contemporary literature on art the answer would seem to 
be „no‟. And yet, interestingly, this is not so much owing to a resistance to this 
approach, but rather because the strategies our promiscuous discipline adopts 
have served to drive a wedge between each of these aspects. And so, what we 
now face is a growing divide between two incompatible positions: those, on the 
one hand, who overstate the providence of nature by describing pictorial meaning 
as if it were reducible to neural events and those, on the other hand, who amplify 
the effects of culture by treating pictures as if they communicated by way of 
purely arbitrary conventions. 
 
In the first camp there are authors like Semir Zeki and Vilayanur 
Ramachandran – mainly neuroscientists by profession7 – who seem to think that 
the formal language of pictures has been purposefully developed to stimulate 
certain groups of cells in the brain.
8
 As Zeki and his colleagues therefore 
conceive it, the job of artists is like that of neurologists
9
 – they probe the visual 
                                               
7 One of the few art historians who has adopted this approach is John Onians. See his recent work 
Neuroarthistory: From Aristotle and Pliny to Baxandall and Zeki (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2007). 
8 A prime example of this is Ramachandran‟s „Eight Laws of Artistic Experience‟ which claim to 
relate aesthetic responses to the evolutionary development of specific neural mechanisms in the 
brain. See Ramachandran and William Hirstein, „The Science of Art: A Neurological Theory of 
Aesthetic Experience‟, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, nos. 6 – 7 (1999), pp. 15 – 51.See 
also Semir Zeki, Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) and Margaret Livingstone, Vision and Art: The Biology of Seeing (New York: Harry 
N. Abrams Inc, 2002).  
9 This is Zeki‟s analogy which he uses throughout the course of his book Inner Vision. However, 
while other writers of this ilk do not explicitly make this connection, it seems unavoidable that 
their studies will demand the assumption that the artist is unwittingly exploring the neural 
 22 
brain in specific ways with their styles in order to produce particular aesthetic 
effects.  And yet – even though this discipline of „neuroaesthetics‟ is still in its 
infancy – it is clear to those of us who wish to know this subject intimately that it 
can never do justice to the subtlety of art. While it may tell us something about 
the neural correlates of aesthetic experience, what can it tell us about the rest of 
art making? For instance, what can it say about the ways in which several kinds 
of content – say, visual, narrative and metaphorical – are put into complex and 
dense relationships and which sustain our interest through their very repleteness? 
And more particularly, what can it say about the specificity of an object which 
emerges from and is launched into a particular culture and which accrues its 
meanings as a result? The hardwired structures of vision are everything to these 
writers, but since they are also all that there is, their approach reveals more about 
physiology than it says (or ever will say) about the experience of art.  
 
But while we may wish to make a much larger concession to culture, 
should we therefore subscribe to the alternative view and say that, whatever 
visual impact it has, representation itself is never drawn directly from perceptual 
material, but only from socially constructed conventions and arbitrary signs. In 
this camp we find writers such as Norman Bryson, Rosalind Krauss and Yve-
Alain Bois, all of whom have appealed to the model of Saussurian linguistics in 
order to describe the formal organisation of art.
10
 
                                                                                                                               
structures of sight. See Semir Zeki, Inner Vision: An Exploration of Art and the Brain (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) and Margaret Livingstone, Vision and Art: The Biology of Seeing 
(New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc, 2002). 
10 See, for instance, Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (London: 
Macmillan, 1983), Rosalind Krauss, „The Motivation of the Sign‟ in W. Rubin, K. Varnedoe and 
L. Zelevansky, Picasso and Braque: A Symposium (New York: Museum of Modern Art / 
Abrams, 1992), pp. 261 – 287 and Yve-Alain Bois, „Kahnweiler‟s Lesson‟, Representations, no. 
18 (Spring 1987), pp. 33 – 68. 
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According to Saussure‟s theory, language is conceived as a „system of 
differences‟ in which verbal signification relies not on the signifier‟s phonetic 
substance – which is arbitrary – but on its difference from surrounding signs. For 
instance, there is no inherent reason why the word „dog‟ refers to the concept it 
does; this is simply a convention of the English language. What actually gives 
the word meaning is its difference from „cat‟ and „Chihuahua‟ and all other terms 
in the system. Thus by applying semiological principles to pictures, theorists 
have argued that pictorial signs are aligned with the arbitrary nature of the 
signifier so that any inherent connection between depicta and referent is severed. 
On this analysis, then, representation does not function through resemblance but 
through the formal relations between the signs in a system and the viewer can 
„read‟ these through his or her familiarity with a pictorial tradition. Accordingly, 
in the same way that the English word „dove‟ and the French word „colombe‟ 
bear no inherent relation to the species they signify and yet serve equally well in 
their own contexts of use, so too, on this understanding, does Picasso‟s Colombe 
de la Paix (fig. 1) signify this animal for anyone versed in the codes of Western 
art. 
 
 
iii) REPRESENTATION AND RECOGNITION 
 
In recent years, this semiological approach has had a decisive impact on art 
history, and in a later chapter I shall examine its claims in a more thoroughgoing 
way. For the moment, however, let us simply note that the staunch anti-realism 
of this view often seems counterintuitive and difficult to reconcile with our own 
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experience of pictures. Consider, for instance, the Palaeolithic cave paintings 
found at Lascaux (fig. 2). Now, even though these may be up to 17,000 years old, 
no Rosetta stone was needed to decipher their content – the fact that this was a 
bison or that was a horse, was simply recognised without further ado. How 
would this be explained by the semiological argument? If pictures are in any way 
like conventional languages, surely a period of 17,000 years would transform 
their depicta in unrecognisable ways? Confronted with such cases, commonsense 
therefore suggests an alternative view: namely, that representation depends not 
merely on cultural convention, but also on our ability to visually identify things 
in the world. And so, if we assume that we see in the same way as our ancestors, 
it becomes comprehensible why we are still able to recognise their pictures 
today. 
 
 Of course, this does not imply that the original audience of these 
paintings would not have conceptualised their meanings differently. Clearly sight 
is inextricably related to systems of knowledge and by way of these to the values 
and the beliefs of a particular society. Therefore, in looking at the paintings at 
Lascaux we may not be able to recover this kind of second-order seeing which 
Michael Baxandall has dubbed the „period eye‟.11 Nevertheless, since we still see 
according to neural wiring that was established millions of years ago, the 
denotative content of a picture that was painted thousands of years ago may still 
be interpreted with relative ease. 
 
                                               
11 Michael Baxandall, Painting and Experience in Fifteenth-Century Italy (Oxford University 
Press, 1988, 2nd Edition, first published 1972), esp. pp. 29 – 39. 
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Evidence to back up this idea seems to come from the way that children 
learn to make and interpret representational pictures. In particular, research on 
this subject suggest two principles of drawing development which ostensibly cut 
against the anti-realism of the semiologist‟s claims. First, it appears that this 
capacity is generative in the sense that it requires minimal instruction. In other 
words, once a child has understood the rules that govern representation in one 
particular instance, they are able to apply them to a much wider range of 
examples without having to start from scratch with each new picture they see. 
And while the child‟s capacity to produce representational pictures develops 
more slowly due to the mastery of the motor skills it requires, it seems that from 
a purely psychological viewpoint this skill is acquired in a similar, generative 
way. 
 
  The second piece of evidence comes from studies which track the 
particular path of this development. What these seem to show is that there is a 
sequential pattern to the representational systems which children deploy as they 
get older. This does not mean that children born into different cultures pass 
through each stage of drawing development until they reach an equivalent point. 
Rather, this pattern is sequential in the sense that when similar representational 
systems are present in different cultures, children will move from one stage to 
the next in a comparable way.
12
 
 
 
 
                                               
12 John Willats, Art and Representation: New Principles in the Analysis of Pictures (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 317 – 319. 
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iv) THE PATTERN OF DRAWING DEVELOPMENT 
 
In order to understand these changes and their ramifications in this thesis, I shall 
appeal to the theory of depiction set forth by John Willats in his pioneering 1997 
work, Art and Representation. Therefore, to introduce these ideas, let me begin 
by discussing the path of drawing development Willats identifies and then briefly 
outline his explanation of this. 
 
In Art and Representation, Willats proposes that there are five possible 
phases of drawing development and that to pass from one phase to the next the 
child must employ an increasingly complex set of rules. Consider, for example, 
this experiment devised by the author in which English children of different ages 
were asked to draw a view of a table (fig. A).
 13
 According to the author, these 
results show a significant correlation between the child‟s age and the projection 
system used.  
 
In this proposed sequence of drawing development, the first stage in 
children‟s drawing is topological, which is to say that it maps only the most 
elementary spatial relations such as touching, separation, spatial order and 
enclosure (b). The second stage is marked by the use of orthogonal projection, in 
which the front face of an object is drawn as a true shape and the other sides are 
obscured (c). Next comes vertical oblique projection (d), here the top face of an 
object is added to the front face. Slightly older children use oblique projection (e) 
whereby the front face is drawn as a true shape and the orthogonals are 
                                               
13 These results were originally published in 1977 in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology but are reproduced in Art and Representation, p. 11.This experiment tested 108 
English children aged 5 to 17.  
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represented by oblique lines. At the end of this sequence are naïve and true 
perspective. In the former system (f) the orthogonals converge, but not in a 
regular way and in the latter system (g) they converge towards a central 
vanishing point. 
 
 
Figure A. Children‟s drawings of a table: typical drawings in each class. (a) The child‟s view of 
the table. (b) Class 1, no projection system, no overlap, mean age 7.4. (c) Class 2, orthogonal 
projection, overlap score 0, mean age 9.7. (d) Class 3, vertical oblique projection, overlap score 
0,  mean age 11.9. (e) Class 4, oblique projection, overlap score 3, mean age 13.6. (f) Class 5, 
naïve perspective, overlap score 4, mean age 14.3. (g) Class 6, perspective, overlap score 6, mean 
age 13.7. From Willats (1977a), reproduced  in Art and Representation (1997). 
 
 
According to Willats this experiment demonstrates two basic principles 
of drawing development. First, it indicates that children produce more effective 
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representations as they get older since they become more adept at depicting the 
properties of shape. And second, it suggests that this sequence depends on the 
complexity of the mapping rules which the child must use in order to represent 
spatial relations on the picture surface. Put plainly, younger children will espouse 
simpler rules and older children will employ more complex ones. Thus, taken 
together with studies which track the drawing development of children from non-
Western societies, it would seem that up to and including the use of vertical 
oblique projection, the same pattern occurs regardless of where the child is from. 
So how are we to explain, on the one hand, the child‟s generative ability to 
produce pictures and, on the other hand, the universal sequence in which this 
pattern occurs?  The explanation Willats offers in Art and Representation is both 
complex and far-reaching and I shall keep returning to it over the course of this 
thesis. For the moment, let me simply outline the basic tenets of this account. 
 
According to Willats, pictures are „parasitic‟ on visual experiences.14 
However, he does not take this to mean that they open out transparently onto an 
already constituted reality. Rather, by appealing to the pioneering work of the 
visual scientist David Marr, he understands seeing as a process which draws 
meaningful features from chaos of light. These „meaningful features‟ on Marr‟s 
account are precisely those which help us to recognise objects according to their 
three-dimensional shapes. But as he points out, these cannot be perspectival 
profiles we see from a viewpoint, since it would put an intolerable strain on 
memory to have to record every slight change in the angle of sight. Accordingly, 
Marr proposes that the main task of the visual system is to extract a constant or 
                                               
14 Art and Representation, p.23. 
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„object-centred description‟ of shape from the viewer-centred description of light 
on the retina. These representations are therefore said to be like rotatable, three-
dimensional models: they are schemata which can manipulated and compared to 
the contents of memory until a match is found and the process of object 
recognition is rendered complete. 
 
Willats draws two basic ideas from this theory. First, by referring to the 
computational stages identified by Marr, he suggests that distinct modes of 
representation can be produced in accordance with these different levels of sight. 
This therefore lays the foundation for his second basic claim: the idea that if a 
representational system is to be naturally generated, it must draw its structural 
components from object-centred descriptions and be mapped according to rules 
which relate to the two-dimensional geometry of the picture surface. On this 
understanding, then, the rules that determine the child‟s ability to generate 
drawing systems up to and including vertical oblique projection may all be based 
on transformations of this final, identificatory stage of vision. What fuels their 
progressive complexity, however, is the child‟s desire to produce more and more 
effective representations, that is, descriptions of form that preserve the non-
accidental conjunctions of edges and surfaces in a scene. Eventually, however, 
this basic prerogative will lead to a dissatisfaction with object-centred 
transformations for, in not taking into account the viewer‟s position, they will 
often lead to ambiguous representations of space and shape.  
 
Accordingly, this is what distinguishes the earlier drawing systems from 
more complex systems such as oblique projection and linear perspective: these 
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last two systems make specific concessions to the viewer‟s position and in doing 
so they require more than what our naturally generative abilities supply. In other 
words, these are modes of mapping space that have to be learned through 
repeated exposure to examples and through a conscious attempt to seek out their 
rules. Indeed, if these models are not already present within a culture then people 
are unlikely to adopt these systems. And conversely, if these models do exist, 
then they will most likely be produced by way of the rules for mapping object-
centred descriptions. This may then explain why perspective was not consistently 
adopted until the Renaissance – comparatively late in the history of art and in a 
culturally specific context – and why it forms the final stage of a child‟s drawing 
development (and then arguably only as the result of formal training.)
15
 
 
 
v) WAYS OF PICTURING AND WAYS OF SEEING 
 
The value of Willats‟s theory in light of the concerns introduced at the beginning 
of this chapter is that it manages to negotiate between determinist naturalism and 
conventionality while marrying the intuitive sense of both. On the one hand, this 
explanation allows the neuropsychological processes of vision to have a real and 
substantial bearing on picture perception. In other words, this is not simply a 
matter of reducing style to synaptic activity; rather, it is a plausible explanation 
of how the brain may coordinate recognition and representation by giving each a 
shared heritage in our capacity to see. And on the other hand, this theory allows 
                                               
15 In an experiment carried out with schooled and unschooled adults in Ghana (Jahoda, 1981), it 
was shown that university students were much more likely to use oblique projection and 
perspective than other adults. Jahoda therefore concluded that “the boundary between [vertical 
oblique projection and oblique projection] represents a critical divide; in the absence of an 
environment rich in perspective drawings, it is not crossed.” Cited in Ibid. 
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culture and convention to have their impact on art without surrendering to the 
relativism of the semiological view. Therefore it might suggest a method for 
discriminating aspects of a pictorial language that are symbolic and arbitrary 
from those that are iconic and motivated. Or to put this another way, it might 
help us to better understand and trace the influences of style. 
 
  For the purposes of my account, I shall therefore draw two lessons from 
Willats‟s theory with the intention of developing them in a new direction. The 
first of these is the notion that perception can be understood at a number of 
levels. What this means, in other words, is that visual experience is always 
already differentiated: it is constituted of processes that are both concurrent and 
distinct and which can differently inflect seeing at any one time. And so, contrary 
to what many contemporary theorists believe, the variance of appearance which 
is traceable in both seeing and picturing does not simply relate to the objects 
encountered or the cultural contexts in which they are seen. In addition, we might 
attribute this to the different ways that sight can structure the visible world. To 
therefore build on this idea, a central aim of my thesis is to introduce a new way 
of thinking about vision which I hope will illuminate a tendency in modern art. 
 
The second aspect of Willats‟s theory which I wish to adopt is the idea 
that there is a deeply rooted pictorial grammar which underpins and unifies the 
various representational systems. However, in developing this argument I shall 
claim that when new non-naturally generated systems are brought into the world, 
if they are to have longevity and establish their own tradition, they must give 
public expression to a universally experienced but heretofore unarticulated mode 
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of perception. This might therefore be considered in light of what Ludwig 
Wittgenstein called a „criterion‟, that is, an expression which describes what 
something is like and therefore makes it available for others to see.
16
 Thus, while 
few individuals can develop these systems, they will be recognised as exemplary 
since they clarify the nature of, and receive their justification from, visual 
phenomena that can be experienced by all. 
 
It therefore seems to me that the truth touched on by Wöllflin is not so 
much evinced by the dictum that „vision itself has a history‟, but rather rests on 
the idea that „not everything is possible at all times‟. What I mean by this is that 
beneath the surface of the visible world lie certain deeply embedded structures 
and while these may remain unexpressed or unnoticed for many hundreds of 
years, certain pressures in the social world may cause artists to bring them to the 
fore. Thus, I hope to show that the history of pictorial art can be understood in 
relation to the dominance of distinct modes of vision since the artist‟s choice to 
thematise an aspect of sight is shaped in significant ways by the demands of an 
age. I shall begin this discussion by considering the relationship between nature 
and convention in Cézanne‟s practice for this shall help to shed light on many of 
these themes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
16 Wittgenstein uses this term in many different passages in his work. For a detailed discussion of 
its meaning see Carl Wellman, „Wittgenstein‟s Conception of a Criterion‟, The Philosophical 
Review, 71, no. 4 (October 1962), pp. 433 – 447. 
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  CHAPTER 1 
 
  
 
 
 
Cézanne, Poussin and the Dual Meaning of 
Classicism 
 
 
 
 
One must become classical again by way of nature, that is, by way of sensation. 
 
 – Cézanne‟s words as reported by Émile Bernard, 190417 
 
 
The Louvre is the book in which we learn to read. We must not, however, be 
satisfied with memorising the attractive formulas of our predecessors. We must 
leave the museum to study nature in all its beauty. We must try to grasp its spirit; 
we must seek to express ourselves according to our personal temperament. 
 
– Cézanne, Letter to Émile Bernard, 190518 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17
 Émile Bernard, „Paul Cézanne,‟ L’Occident 6 (July 1904), p. 24. This is Richard Shiff‟s 
translation in Cézanne and the End of Impressionism (Chicago, 1984), p. 124. The original quote 
is: „Il faut redevenir classique par la nature, c‟est-à-dire par la sensation‟. 
18 Reprinted in Conversations with Cézanne, ed. Michael Doran, trans. Julie Lawrence Cochran 
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2001), p. 47.  
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1.1 THE PARADOX OF CÉZANNE’S CLASSICISM 
 
In an article published the year after Cézanne died, Émile Bernard recalled the 
artist telling him „Imagine Poussin redone entirely after nature, there‟s the 
classical that I intend.‟ 19 Taken at face value, these words may strike the reader 
as paradoxical. To do something „after‟ nature surely implies that it is done in a 
natural manner – that is, spontaneously rather than in, say, a stylised or 
derivative way. And, what is more, to strive to make paintings „entirely after 
nature‟ would appear to suggest – particularly in light of Cézanne‟s adherence to 
certain contemporary theories of perception
20
 – that the artist was trying to 
circumvent the influences of culture in order to recover a childlike or 
uncorrupted view of the world. For instance, this latter interpretation might seem 
to accord with the artist‟s avowed aim to capture his immediate „sensations‟21 or 
his advice to Jules Borély to „See like a man who has just been born‟.22 
                                               
19 Bernard, „Souvenirs sur Paul Cézanne et letters inédites‟, Mercure de France, n.s., 69 (1 
October and 16 October 1907), p. 627. Shiff‟s translation in Cézanne and the End of 
Impressionism, p. 13. Original quote: „Imaginez Poussin refait entièrement sur nature, voilà le 
classique que j'entends.‟ 
20 Particularly important in this respect are the ideas of Hippolyte Taine, especially those 
expressed in his 1870 work De l'intelligence. That Cézanne was sympathetic to Taine‟s views is 
suggested by his statement to Joachim Gasquet: „I like muscles, beautiful colours, blood. I am 
like Taine and what‟s more I am a painter. I am a sensualist.‟ Joachim Gasquet’s Cézanne: A 
Memoir with Conversations, trans. Christopher Pemberton (London: Thames and Hudson, 1991), 
p. 133.  
21 Like many of the Impressionists, Cézanne often claimed that the task of painting was to 
represent sensations, for example, he spoke of his „opinion on painting as a means of expressing 
sensation‟ (Letter to Émile Zola, 20 November 1878. Cited in Paul Smith, Interpreting Cézanne 
(London: Tate, 1996), p. 49.) According to Taine and many other nineteenth century 
psychologists, sensations formed the raw material of perception – in the case of vision, variously 
coloured patches of light on the retina. Knowledge of spatial depth and volumetric shape were 
therefore considered external to vision, being attributed to tactile experience instead. As several 
authors have proposed, this atomistic view of perception is therefore a plausible source for the 
loose brushwork and unmixed colours that were typical of the Impressionist style. See for 
example Paul Smith, Impressionism: Beneath the Surface (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1995) pp. 19 – 31 and Charles F. Stuckey, „Monet‟s art and the act of vision‟ in Aspects of 
Monet: A Symposium on the Artist’s Life and Times, ed. John Rewald and Frances Weitzenhoffer 
(New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1984), pp. 106 – 121.    
22 Jules Borély, „Cézanne à Aix‟, L’art vivant, 2, no. 37 (1st July 1926), p. 491. Cited in Smith, 
Interpreting Cézanne, p. 48. This fantasy of returning to a naïve form of vision seems to have 
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Now, what seems strange about Cézanne‟s formulation is not that he 
wished to capture an unmediated or „primitive‟ vision23 – an idea which has 
many precursors in the nineteenth century
24
 – but that he relates this to the art of 
Poussin and thus simultaneously invokes the tradition associated with his name. 
Start by considering the opening clause: „Imagine Poussin redone entirely after 
nature…‟ The verb that Bernard uses in French is „refaire‟ and so the translation 
„redone‟ or „remade‟ would seem to be appropriate.25 But then it sounds like 
Cézanne wished to adapt Poussin‟s art so that it looked like the world as 
„naturally‟ perceived – a project which seems difficult to fathom due to the 
irreducibility of its individual components, namely, the conjunction of the 
painter‟s craft with a direct vision. Indeed, this statement would appear to 
compound several antipodal notions: cultural expression and individual 
experience, active design and passive perception, artifice and nature, tradition 
                                                                                                                               
been shared by other of the Impressionists. For example, Lilla Cabot Perry recalls Monet telling 
her that he „wished he had been born blind and then suddenly gained his sight so that he could 
have begun to paint in this way without knowing what the objects were that he saw before him.‟ 
See „Reminisces of Claude Monet from 1889 to 1909‟, The American Magazine of Art, March 
1927; reprinted in Monet: a retrospective, ed. Charles Stuckey (New York, 1985), p. 183. 
23 For Cézanne‟s use of the term „primitive‟ see Paul Smith, „Cézanne‟s primitive self and related 
fictions‟ in C. Salas (ed) The Life and the Work: Art and Biography (Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
24 Most notably, John Ruskin‟s concept of the „innocent eye‟ advanced in the Elements of 
Drawing of 1857. See The Works of John Ruskin, ed. E. T. Cook and Alexander Wedderburn 
(London, 1904) XV, p. 27. Ruskin‟s advice to painters to recover the „childish perception of these 
flat stains of colour, merely as such, without consciousness of what they signify‟ was widely 
discussed in the later nineteenth century and would almost certainly have been familiar to 
Cézanne and the Impressionists. It is known, for example, that Monet admired Ruskin and 
advised the painter Wynford Dewhurst to refer to his work. See Stuckey „Monet‟s art and the act 
of vision‟, p. 108. 
25 While Bernard‟s reported statement by Cézanne is the one that is referred to most often, there 
is an earlier published source for this dictum in which the artist is said to desire to „vivifier 
Poussin sur nature‟. This characterisation is made by Charles Camoin who visited the artist in 
1901 and who later wrote this in response to a questionnaire about the painter‟s work in the 
Mercure de France. See Charles Morice, Enquête sur les tendances actuelles des arts plastiques‟, 
Mercure de France, n.s., 56 (1 August 1905), pp. 353 – 54. Cited in Shiff, Cézanne and the End 
of Impressionism, p. 181 and note 31, p. 288. I shall return to Camoin‟s statement and its slightly 
different inflection later. 
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and originality – or as Richard Shiff has aptly summarised it, making and 
finding.
26
   
 
What further adds to the ambiguity of this statement is Cézanne‟s use of 
the word „Poussin‟. For notice he does not ask Bernard to imagine a Poussin 
redone „entirely after nature‟. Rather, he uses this word as if it were nominating a 
more general set of characteristics – presumably those interrelated features that 
we refer to as the artist‟s style. But this then poses a further problem for 
interpretation, for given the academic co-option of Poussin‟s classical manner, 
we might understand Cézanne‟s statement to mean one of two things. On the one 
hand, he might be speaking about the individual style of Poussin, that is, the 
unique manner of painting which the master brought into being and not the 
imitations it subsequently spawned. In this sense Cézanne might be saying that 
natural perception can somehow revise (and possibly extend or amplify) the 
classical values that his forebear originally brought to the landscape, that is, the 
exemplary compositional techniques that were born with his art and which were 
to be the source of a new tradition.  
 
However, to turn this idea on its head, we might think that Cézanne‟s 
intention was to target the „Poussinesque‟ tradition, 27 that is, the general style 
derived from – and particularly the Academic corrosion of – the master‟s 
                                               
26 Shiff discusses „finding‟ as an authentic but unreflective process of creation which expresses 
the artist‟s original contact with the world. Conversely, making is a more sophisticated or 
controlled process of design which is guided by knowledge of previous art. The former is 
therefore original but runs the risk of being overly subjective, while the latter is conventional but 
has the advantage of being readily understood. See Shiff, Cézanne and the End of Impressionism, 
esp. pp. 68 – 69 & pp. 223 – 230. 
27 I borrow the terms „individual‟ and „general style‟ from Richard Wollheim. See Painting as an 
Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987), pp. 26 – 36. 
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technique.
 28
 The implication might then be that Cézanne wished to restore the 
authenticity of Poussin‟s original vision by seeking its source in the world rather 
than by studying his art or its subsequent formalisation. Thus, by taking his cues 
directly from nature, Cézanne‟s concern might have been to remake Poussin‟s 
Classicism from scratch, that is, to discover his techniques anew without being 
taught these or absorbing them from „the book‟ of the Louvre.  
 
But what precisely is the role of nature in this connection? How would 
this guarantee an authentic revival of style? What this seems to imply is a view 
of Poussin‟s art as itself informed by the study of nature, a notion (or perhaps a 
myth) that was indeed prevalent in Cézanne‟s own day. 29 Cézanne may therefore 
have thought that his forebear‟s Classicism could be retrieved from his own 
vision providing that he was similarly attentive to the look of the world. In this 
sense, then, he would be genuinely repeating Poussin‟s project by avoiding the 
shortcuts that convention made possible and merely adopting the means available 
to the master himself. However, this might also hint at another interpretation, one 
                                               
28 The absorption of Poussin into the Academic tradition was largely due to the influence of 
Charles Le Brun. Le Brun had been a student of the painter and later lectured on his artistic 
methods and theories while he was director of the Académie from 1663 – 1683.  His widely read 
treatise, Méthode pour apprendre à dessiner les passions (1698) further disseminated and 
codified Poussin‟s techniques. However, Poussin‟s achievements as a landscape painter were not 
fully recognised until the mid-nineteenth century when the hierarchy of genres began to collapse. 
See Richard Verdi, „The Reputation of Poussin‟s Landscape Paintings in France from Félibien to 
Cézanne‟ in Cézanne and Poussin: A Symposium (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 
pp. 13 – 29. And for an assessment of the critical reception of Poussin‟s work in the nineteenth 
century see Shiff, Cézanne and the End of Impressionism, pp. 175 – 184. 
29 It was not thought, of course, that Poussin art was wholly without stylistic precursors. Indeed, it 
was part of the appeal of his Classicism – and particularly important for its Academic 
endorsement – that it was modelled on Antique statuary and the art of Raphael. However, since 
these earlier Classicists had almost exclusively concerned themselves with the human form or 
figural compositions, it was in applying these values to the landscape that the artist‟s originality 
was said to emerge. His most elevated works in this vein were painted between 1648 and 1651 
and, while these are evidently idealised views, they were purportedly based on a close study of 
nature. From today‟s perspective, however, there is little hard evidence to support this claim. See 
Verdi, „The Reputation of Poussin‟s Landscape Paintings in France from Félibien to Cézanne‟, p. 
24 and Cézanne and Poussin: The Classical Vision of Landscape (Edinburgh: National Galleries 
of Scotland in association with Lund Humphries Publishers Ltd, 1990), pp. 42 – 3. 
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in which a parallel procedure leads to a different result. On this view, Cézanne 
may have wished that his painting was founded on the same general principles 
and was thus possessed of the same merits as the work of his forebear. 
Accordingly, this would entail confronting nature with the stoicism of Poussin 
and thus developing a similarly original and influential style.
30
 
 
Let us set this last suggestion aside for the moment, and simply note that 
the first two hypotheses seem problematic, for how are we to understand either as 
leading to an art that is at once reminiscent of Poussin whilst also being faithful 
to a spontaneous sight? On the former view, we might think of Poussin‟s 
landscapes as the artist‟s stylistic model and therefore view the observed world 
as offering a kind of corrective, an idea that recalls Gombrich‟s notion of 
„schema and correction.‟31 But, of course, since this would imply the repetition 
of certain established formulae, to remake Poussin „entirely after nature‟ would 
seem to involve a contradiction in terms. Put another way, if Poussin‟s style was 
reworked in light of sensory experience, this could only temper it and not render 
it „entirely‟ natural. To take the other route, however, and posit nature as the only 
source (as the word „entirely‟ implies) would not seem to improve the matter.  If 
by this we are to envisage an artist attempting to realise his pure sensations, then 
culture – and particularly the sway of artistic tradition – is precisely what stands 
                                               
30 Cézanne‟s identification with Poussin in light of his commitment to his own personal vision is 
noted by Paul Smith in „Cézanne‟s primitive self and related fictions‟,  p.8. Smith cites Cézanne‟s 
Mont Sainte-Victoire with Large Pine (c. 1885 – 87) as a painting in which the artist pays tribute 
to the stoicism of Poussin by echoing his Landscape with the body of Phocion carried out of 
Athens (1648). Since Phocion was regarded as a stoic, the iconography of this painting might 
serve as the middle term connecting the attitude of the two painters. 
31 On this view, tradition supplies the artists with a set of readymade templates for composing 
pictures; these are then adjusted to account for visual features that the artist actually observes but 
which fail to be comprehended by the existing schemata. For Gombrich‟s argument see Art and 
Illusion (London: Phaidon, 1977, orig. ed., 1960), esp. Ch. V „Formula and Experience‟, pp. 126 
– 152. 
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in the way. Since Cézanne would therefore have to forget all he knew about 
Poussin, why speak of his name in this connection at all?
32
 Are we to assume that 
naive vision is the true source of Classicism? And if not, how can Cézanne wish 
to obtain the same results as his predecessor while simultaneously avoiding the 
influence of his work? Would this not then be the root of the dilemma that 
Bernard referred to as „Cézanne‟s suicide‟ – „aiming at reality while denying 
himself the means to obtain it‟?33 In sum, since art is eo ipso an institutional and 
cultural activity, it cannot acquire a purely natural form. 
 
And indeed, we may think that the same thing can be said of vision itself. 
For, as ambiguous figures such as Jastrow‟s duck-rabbit make clear, we organise 
what we see by appealing to knowledge and previous experience, that is, by 
bringing concepts to bear on the sensory data (fig. C).
34
 Thus, if I had never seen 
a duck before but was familiar with rabbits, Jastrow‟s figure would remain 
stubbornly orientated towards the right with ears pointing to the left. But given 
that I can bring either interpretation to bear on the image, it can be resolved in 
either direction. Since vision therefore interfaces with our conceptual abilities – 
                                               
32 Indeed, in a letter to Bernard, Cézanne proposes that „the principle to develop…is to give the 
image of what we see, forgetting everything that has appeared before us‟. 23 October 1905, letter 
translated by John House and reproduced in The Courtauld Cézannes, ed. Stephanie Buck, John 
House, Ernst Vegelin Van Claerbergen & Barnaby Wright (London: Paul Holberton Publishing, 
2008), p. 163. 
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty attributes this comment to Bernard in „Cézanne‟s Doubt‟. See The 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting, ed Galen A. Johnson 
(Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993), p. 63. However, since no published source can be 
found for this statement, it seems to be apocryphal.   
34 This image was first reproduced in Joseph Jastrow, „The Mind‟s Eye‟ Popular Science Monthly 
54, 299-312, 1899. For a further discussion which explores the difference between seeing and 
interpreting see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), pp. 193 – 206e.Wittgenstein calls this type of seeing in 
which there exists an ambiguity between two (or more) readings „seeing as‟. He contends that the 
difference between seeing Jastrow‟s figure as a duck or a rabbit is not a matter of interpreting it 
differently, but rather is a difference in what we actually perceive. This is captured in the way we 
respond to the image, for example, in the distinct way we would describe it upon seeing a rabbit 
or seeing a duck. 
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with knowledge, memory and reasoning – it will also turn out to be inflected by 
the contingencies of culture and subject to the ideological pressures it exerts. In 
this respect, then, there can be no question of an „innocent eye‟ or a wholly 
naturalised vision and it would seem that Cézanne‟s project to paint his pure 
„sensations‟ was doomed (or at least, theoretically flawed) from the start.  
 
 
Figure C. Duck-Rabbit Illusion. 
 
 And yet, even if his statement seems incoherent, many have spoken of 
Cézanne‟s mature work as if it does in fact achieve such a reconciliation – that it 
at once nods at Poussin while also being true to a more naturalistic sight. For 
example, Maurice Denis dubbed him „the Poussin of still life and green 
landscape‟, „the Poussin of Impressionism‟ and described him as „so 
spontaneously classical‟35. While Bernard – despite the scepticism evidenced by 
his later remark – emphasised similar ideas when he reflected on his 
                                               
35 All cited in Shiff, Cézanne and the End of Impressionism, p. 135, p. 166, p. 246 respectively. 
The first statement comes from Denis‟s review of the Salon d‟Automne of 1905, the second and 
third are from „Cézanne‟ first published in l’Occident, Sept. 1907, reprinted in Denis, Theories, 
1890 – 1910: Du symbolisme et de Gauguin vers un nouvel ordre classique (Paris: 1920; orig. 
ed., 1912), p. 210. 
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conversations with the artist in 1907.
36
 Thanks to the influence of these symbolist 
critics, it was therefore fairly commonplace by 1910 to hear Cézanne 
characterised as a „modern day Poussin‟37 or – by way of this connection – as a 
modern Classicist.  Indeed, it is testament to the force of this analogy that it still 
persists in art historical thought today.
38
  
 
 But while this idea is now comfortably ensconced in the discourse of art 
history, have we yet solved the paradox which Cézanne‟s words suggest?  More 
specifically, do we think Cézanne developed his Classicism by using Poussin‟s 
work as a model? And do we therefore question his adherence to a primitive 
vision? Or do we think that he successfully avoided the lure of tradition and thus 
became „classical by way of nature‟, that is, by „learning‟ (somehow) to see in an 
unacculturalised way? In short, is his relation to Poussin a question of cultural 
mediation or of unmediated sight? Or indeed is this classical analogy itself 
fundamentally misleading? 
 
If this has been a long preamble, I hope it will prove worthwhile in 
helping to establish the concerns of this chapter. The first thing I wish to do in 
this respect is to examine how authors in the twentieth century have understood 
                                               
36 Bernard published two articles in this vein: „Paul Cézanne‟, L’Occident 6 (July 1904) and 
„Souvenirs sur Paul Cézanne et letters inédites‟, Mercure de France, n.s., 69 (1 October and 16 
October 1907). 
37 Denis was the first to christen Cézanne a „modern Poussin‟ in his article „De Gauguin, de 
Whistler et de l‟excès des théories‟ (1905) reprinted in Theories, pp. 204, 260.  
38 This is demonstrated by a relatively recent exhibition at the National Gallery of Scotland 
entitled Cézanne and Poussin: The Classical Vision of Landscape. This was held from the 9 
August to 21 October 1990 and brought together 22 works by Poussin and 47 by Cézanne, 
comparing these according to the early, mature and late phases of their art. Three years later a 
book based on a two-day symposium held to coincide with the exhibition was published: 
Cézanne and Poussin: A Symposium ed. Richard Verdi (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1993). Since their publication, the catalogue for the exhibition and the subsequent book have 
remained key points of reference in the literature on Cézanne. 
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Cézanne‟s dictum, or rather, how they have obscured it by allowing the 
interpretations suggested above to overlap. Their reason for doing so, perhaps, is 
that it is not necessary to match Cézanne‟s art against the logic (or the illogic) of 
his words. And yet, since these words have been considered vital to the 
explanation of his work, it is fair to say that we must either address their meaning 
or cast doubt on the stylistic assessments they have been used to support. It 
seems, however, that certain scholars have hit upon a way of understanding this 
dictum which alleviates its inconsistencies while also preserving some of its 
explanatory worth. This concerns the meaning of the word „Classicism‟ and how 
– given the interval of history – its understanding by Cézanne may differ from 
our own. Thus, I shall suggest that it is the very mutation of this term over the 
twentieth century which actually creates the conflict we find in Cézanne‟s words 
when initially – in the nineteenth century – there was perceived to be none. 
 
Yet, the main purpose of this chapter is not to make sense of Cézanne‟s 
phraseology or its subsequent obfuscation – a problem which others have already 
amply reviewed.
39
 Rather, it is to use this retrieval of meaning to open up a new 
space of inquiry – one which concerns not only the intention of Cézanne‟s 
project but also (I shall claim) its actual realisation, that is, his achievement of an 
original style which is nevertheless grounded in nature and thereby linked to 
Poussin‟s art. More specifically, I want to offer an explanation for why his 
pictures can both be said to coincide with and depart from those of his forebear – 
not simply in terms of style but also in terms of the visual engagement that they 
                                               
39 In particular, Shiff has illuminatingly discussed the interpretation of Cézanne‟s Classicism by 
Émile Bernard, Maurice Denis and Roger Fry and the way that this has contributed to a 
misunderstanding of the artist‟s theoretical commitments. See Cézanne and the End of 
Impressionism. 
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tend to inspire. What we witness here, I shall claim, is the birth of two novel 
modes of representation which are both parasitic on and productive of two 
fundamentally different ways of seeing. Consequently, my proposal is that each 
artist produces a „criterion‟ in the Wittgensteinian sense of the term, thus 
returning us to the original meaning of Classical art. 
 
 
1.2 WÖLLFLIN AND CLASSICAL ART 
 
Although the meaning of the word „classical‟ has changed over the course of the 
twentieth century, the two eras that it is most often used to refer to remain – as 
they would have been in Cézanne‟s own day – those of Ancient Greece and the 
High Renaissance.
40
 But while in the nineteenth century these periods were 
commonly understood as marking the high points of Western civilization – and 
were thus connected in terms of the quality of their artistic production – we tend 
to be more cautious about making these assertions today. What has been vacated 
from our judgement is therefore its evaluative dimension, and what remains is its 
linkage to style. Consequently, an art which is classical in the contemporary 
sense is one which exhibits qualities such as harmony, order, clarity and balance 
and not one in which these qualities are further aligned to some moral, social or 
aesthetic ideal (although a tacit connection to these virtues may still remain). 
 
While the symbolists prepared the ground for this new interpretation of 
Classicism by emphasising the autonomy of the formal qualities of art, the 
                                               
40 To avoid confusion, I shall capitalise the words „Classicism‟ and „Classical‟ when they are 
being used as proper nouns. 
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theorist who perhaps did most to consolidate this shift was Heinrich Wölfflin 
when he analysed this notion in canonical texts such as Classic Art (1898) and 
Principles of Art History (1915).
41
 Wölfflin‟s ruse in these works was to align the 
aesthetic qualities which had accompanied each independent manifestation of 
Classicism – although his examples are primarily taken from the Italian 
Renaissance
42
 – with the actual formal organisation of artworks. In other words, 
what had previously been an evaluative term (albeit one that that often picked out 
the effects of harmony, balance and so forth) becomes in his hands a more tightly 
constrained description of style, that is, a description of the artist‟s compositional 
technique.  
 
But having lost its evaluative sense, this classificatory term also becomes 
much looser since, instead of simply electing works of high quality, its features 
can now be seen to occur in historical constellations (or as Wölfflin would have 
had it, historical cycles). So, for example, while Botticelli or Raphael may have 
previously been designated „classical‟ due to the exemplary poise of their art – 
and indeed while there may have been said to be an abundance of such 
individuals in the High Renaissance – on Wölfflin‟s account these features are 
spread across the era itself and can be seen in the work of lesser masters too. In 
                                               
41 The German word Wölfflin uses in these works is „klassisch‟. But while this is translated in M. 
D. Hottinger‟s text as „classic‟ I shall continue to use „Classical‟ and „Classicism‟ for these 
preserve the sense of this term‟s linkage to style. 
42 According to Wölfflin, the Italian art of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries best illustrates 
the difference between Classical and Baroque styles since this provides a consistent backdrop of 
national temperament. He states „[The notion of a period style] is best to be obtained in Italy, 
because the development there fulfilled itself independently of outside influences and the general 
nature of the Italian character remains fully recognisable throughout.‟ Principles of Art History, 
trans. M. D. Hottinger (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd, 1932), p. 9. 
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short, the meaning of Classicism transfers from an individual sense to a period 
style.
43
 
 
Furthermore, the Classical in Wölfflin‟s mature work is not a term that 
stands on its own. Instead, its identity is rendered explicit through difference – 
specifically by being set in opposition to the art of the Baroque. This idea is of 
course most famously expressed in the Principles by Wölfflin‟s five pairs of 
formal contrasts: linear versus painterly, plane versus recession, closed versus 
open form, multiplicity versus unity and finally absolute versus relative clarity.
44
 
The „noble restraint and dignity‟ of a work such as Raphael‟s Sistine Madonna 
(fig. 4) might, for example, illustrate the first set of classical terms in this pairing, 
while the „sweeping gestures‟ of Guido Reni‟s Madonna Enthroned with the 
Holy City of Bologna (fig. 5) might express their antithetical counterparts in the 
style of the Baroque.
45
 But while sixteenth and seventeenth century Italian 
examples may show this stylistic division at its most conspicuous, the Classical 
and the Baroque are not understood to be confined to one single era in history. 
Instead, they are said to repeat in a cyclical fashion just as a pendulum swings 
from pole to pole.
46
 Thus, for any period in art which is deemed as „Classic‟ – be 
                                               
43 This idea is exemplified in Wölfflin‟s introduction to the Principles. Here the theorist selects 
pairs of images to suggest how the analysis of style can operate at different levels of 
magnification, proceeding from a consideration of individual style (Boticelli and Lorenzo di 
Credi) to national style (Dutch art and Flemish art) to period style (the Renaissance and the 
Baroque in Italy). This then paves the way for his claim that the Classical and Baroque are 
„modes of representation as such‟. See Ibid, pp. 1 – 17. 
44 For a summary of these see Ibid, pp. 13 – 16. 
45 While Wölfflin does not suggest this particular paring, he uses the phrases cited here to refer to 
the general approach of these artists. Ibid, p. 9.  
46 At one point Wölfflin describes this as a „spiral movement‟ because while the cycle repeats art 
does „not return to the point at which it once stood‟ (Ibid, p. 234). He furthermore speaks of this 
cycle as if it were governed both by a principle of exhaustion and reaction and by the possibilities 
suggested by the prevailing style itself: „What seems living today is not quite completely living 
tomorrow. This process is not only to be explained negatively by the theory of the palling of 
interest, but positively also by the fact that every form lives on, begetting, and every style calls to 
a new one‟ (Ibid, p. 230). 
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it the Golden Age in Greece, the High Renaissance in Europe, or the 
Neoclassical revival in revolutionary France – the pull of the Baroque is always 
impending, whatever its specific appellation turns out to be.
47
  
 
 
1.3 CLASSICISM AS STYLE 
 
Wölfflin‟s scholarship has fundamentally altered the practice of art history, but in 
doing so it would appear that it has also fundamentally altered its critical terms. 
If this is therefore not recognised – as seems to be frequently the case when it 
comes to discussions of Cézanne and Poussin‟s classical connection – then a 
distortion of meaning may sometimes occur. In particular, what we need to 
remember is that interpretations of Cézanne‟s work as Classical often take their 
point of departure from (or at least find themselves retrospectively justified by) 
the artist‟s use of the term. But since Cézanne was highly unlikely to have known 
Wölfflin‟s work (and indeed, could not have been familiar with his exposition in 
the Principles) it would be incoherent to think that his art was (or at least was 
intended to be) Classical in the theorist‟s sense – that is, in the sense of it being 
demonstrative of a Classical style. Let us therefore proceed by reviewing several 
interpretations which are based on this assumption and then consider how well 
they illuminate the look of Cézanne‟s art. 
 
                                               
47 For example, Wölfflin identifies the styles of late Antique, the late Gothic and the Rococo with 
the Baroque.  He also suggests a similar affiliation which he refers to „the impressionist painterly 
conception‟ (p. 227). However, it is not clear whether he has in mind the French nineteenth 
century movement or whether he intends this word to signal any art which exhibits a loose 
handling of paint. See Ibid, esp. pp. 231 – 235. 
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One example of this approach is provided by Roger Fry in his analysis of 
Still Life with a Cineraria (fig. 6), a work discussed in his important 1927 study 
of Cézanne. According to Fry this painting „indicates a return to Poussin, a 
renunciation of Delacroix and his Baroque antecedents‟, he then refers to its 
„balance‟, its „architectural rigour‟ and „primitive simplicity‟.48 Now, while it is 
evident that Fry develops his own approach to Cézanne‟s work in this book, the 
description he gives nevertheless appears to owe a debt to Wölfflin (whose works 
he had undoubtedly read) in two distinct ways. First, there seems to be the 
implication that Cézanne is faced with the choice between two alternative and 
mutually exclusive courses: Poussin or Delacroix and his Baroque antecedents. 
Thus, opting for the former he renounces the latter, as if Wölfflin‟s two poles of 
style are exerting their force upon the individual trajectory of the artist‟s career. 
Indeed, this implication is later made explicit when Fry pronounces that:  
 
Cézanne counts pre-eminently as a great classic master. We may also sum 
him up as the leader of the modern return to the Mediterranean 
conception of art…Cézanne… was a Classic artist, but perhaps all great 
Classics are made by the repression of a Romantic.
49
 
 
The idea that Cézanne repressed his early Romantic impulses (or more 
broadly, that he surmounted the pull of the Baroque
50
) is common enough in the 
literature and indeed would seem to be verified by the changing look of his art.
 51 
                                               
48 Roger Fry, Cézanne: A Study of his Development (London: Macmillan, 1927) pp. 53 – 54. 
49 Ibid, p. 87. 
50 Since Fry‟s use of the word „Romantic‟ seems to imply something broader than a period style, I 
shall take it to loosely overlap with Wölfflin‟s category of the Baroque.  
51 Cézanne‟s departure from the Romantic is often discussed in psychoanalytic terms. In this 
sense it is regarded as a process of sublimation whereby the artist displaces his sexual anxieties 
 48 
To illustrate this point we might compare, for example, the agitated technique 
and horizontal thrust of a work such as The Abduction of 1867 (fig. 7) with the 
centrally weighted composition of the Lac D’Annecy of 1896 (fig. 8). But what is 
at issue here is not whether his mature style departed from the dynamic and 
violently expressive idiom of his youth  – which evidently it does – but whether 
in doing so it becomes Classical in a way that stylistically aligns it with the art of 
Poussin.
52
 
 
 Furthermore, insofar as he applies the terms „architectural rigour‟ 
„primitive simplicity‟ Fry‟s method of pinpointing a formal source for Cézanne‟s 
classicism seems to be unmistakably Wölfflinian by birth. In other words, it is 
the very fact that Still Life with a Cineraria exhibits balance, rigour and 
simplicity that render it classical and nothing further to do with the aesthetic 
value or the originality of the work.
53
 And equally, when it comes to explaining 
how such effects are produced, Wölfflin‟s formal categories inevitably come into 
play. For example, when Fry claims that the composition is arranged around a 
central axis, that it possesses „strongly accented verticals‟ and that objects are 
aligned „parallel…to the picture plane‟ we are reminded of the „tectonic strength‟ 
                                                                                                                               
and inhibitions by giving them an outlet and hence transforming them through the activity of 
painting.  For two such reading see Theodore Reff, „Cézanne‟s “Dream of Hannibal”‟, Art 
Bulletin, 45, no. 2 (June, 1963), pp. 148 – 152 and Meyer Schapiro „The Apples of Cézanne: An 
Essay in the Meaning of Still Life‟ in Modern Art: 19th & 20th Centuries (New York : Braziller, 
1979). 
52 This Wölfflinian conception of the relation between Cézanne and Poussin seems to have 
continued well into the twentieth century. For example, in his catalogue essay for the 1990 
Cézanne and Poussin exhibition, Richard Verdi predominantly addresses their similarities in 
terms of their style and the parallelism of their phases of artistic development – from Romantic, 
to Classical and finally (back) to Baroque. Indeed, Verdi seems to want it both ways since while 
he at one point admits that theirs was more truly a „spiritual affinity‟ (p. 58), when considering 
the overlap between their „classical‟ periods he discusses this as a matter of formal design (see 
esp. pp. 48 – 51). 
53 Fry does not explicitly call this work „classic‟ but this is what he is evidently implying when he 
speaks of it as being „in direct opposition to all Baroque ideas‟ and compares it to the art of 
Poussin. See Fry, Cézanne, pp. 53 – 54. 
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of closed form, the coulisses of „plane style‟ and the articulation of parts which 
constitute the multiplicity of classical form.
54
  
 
 While contemporary assessments of Cézanne‟s and Poussin‟s classical 
affiliation rarely proceed along such narrowly formalistic lines, there still seems 
to be a tendency to understand their connection (or as some profess, their lack of 
one) as based upon a fundamentally Wölfflinian conception of style. This point 
can be drawn out negatively by considering the way that certain recent authors 
have cited Cézanne‟s copying practices as a reason for dismissing his link to 
Poussin and thus for doubting his Classicism tout court. This is an argument 
advanced, for example, by Katia Tsiakma and more recently by David Carrier. 
Here is how Tsiakma makes her point:  
 
Although criticism emphasises the restrained classical aspects of 
Cézanne‟s art, his studies after the old masters betray predominantly 
baroque and romantic tastes. There is an overwhelming number of 
drawings after Veronese, Rubens and Delacroix, but only a handful after 
Raphael. At present only four figures from Poussin, and all extracted 
from their contexts, have been identified.  Furthermore, no drawing after 
a Poussin landscape has been discovered. It thus becomes difficult to 
accept the prevalent notion the Cézanne attempted consciously to revive 
the structural methods and the architectonic compositions of Poussin‟s 
landscapes.
55
 
                                               
54 For Fry‟s full description see Ibid, pp. 53 – 54; compare to Wölfflin‟s summary of the formal 
oppositions in Principles of Art History, pp. 14 – 15. 
55 Katia Tsiakma, „Cézanne and Poussin‟s Nudes‟, Art Journal, 37, no. 2 (Winter, 1977 – 1978), 
p. 120. David Carrier similarly claims that „The idea that Cézanne had some special link with 
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 Logically speaking, this argument is not sufficient to rule out a 
connection between Cézanne and Poussin in terms of their style. First, it is not 
apparent why copying has to be a prerequisite for absorbing another artist‟s 
approach to form (for example, the act of looking might be considered enough). 
And second, even if Cézanne was drawn to Baroque or Romantic examples in the 
early stages of his career, this does not mean that he would remain bound to them 
for the rest of his life. In acknowledgement of this, authors have tended to 
identify Cézanne‟s classical phase with his later, more restrained and rigorously 
structured compositions which coincide with the introduction of his so-called 
„constructive brushstroke‟ – works which roughly span the period from 1878 - 
1890.
56
 This phase would therefore seem to coincide with the time when 
Cézanne made his few, fragmented studies after Poussin. For example, of the 
four copies Tsiakma cites three were produced in the late 1880s, two of them 
after The Arcadian Shepherds (fig. 9), a work which clearly fascinated Cézanne 
for he hung a reproduction of it in his studio at a similar time and had once 
copied it in the Louvre during his youth.
57
 
 
But whether or not we think that Cézanne‟s art was stylistically indebted 
to the work of Poussin (and this is surely a matter of degree rather than a straight 
                                                                                                                               
Poussin has not stood the test of time‟ referring to the following statement from Theodore Reff‟s 
study of the artist‟s sketchbooks: „The old masters Cézanne admired and copied most frequently 
were those of the Baroque period or the Baroque phase of an earlier period.‟ Carrier, Poussin’s 
Paintings, p. 50; Reff, „Introduction,‟ Paul Cézanne: Two Sketchbooks (Philadelphia, 1989), p. 
11.  
56 For instance, an early, pronounced example of the „constructive stoke‟ can be seen in Le 
Château de Medan of c. 1880. Cézanne‟s classical period supposedly terminates with the more 
dramatic landscapes he produced in the final years of his life such as his pictures of the Mont 
Sainte Victoire seen from Les Lauves (roughly late 1870s – 1890).  For Reff‟s discussion see 
„Cézanne‟s Constructive Stroke’, The Art Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Autumn 1962), pp. 214-227 and 
for a consideration of Cézanne‟s stylistic development see Verdi, Cézanne and Poussin, esp. pp. 
35 – 55. 
57 Cézanne made this early copy in 1864. See Theodore Reff, „Copyists in the Louvre, 1850 – 
1870‟, Art Bulletin, 46, no. 4 (Dec., 1964), p. 555 and Verdi, Cézanne and Poussin, pp. 44 – 47. 
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choice between one option or the other), the fate of their classical relation would 
still seem to be decided on the same basic principles, thus leading us back to the 
paradox we discussed earlier. On the one hand, if Cézanne was said to develop 
his Classicism by consulting the compositional techniques of his predecessor, the 
idea of his making art „entirely after nature‟ could not be sustained. But, on the 
other hand, if he was thought to be stylistically independent of Poussin (and the 
tradition he established), then he could not have produced an art which was 
similar to his forebear‟s and their classical relation would have to be dismissed.  
 
What of course ultimately seals the fate of this question is the degree to 
which their pictures actually look the same, or rather, whether they are 
sufficiently similar to support a comparison based on the Wölfflinian conception 
of form. So let us finally attempt to settle this matter by juxtaposing two works 
from the supposedly „classical‟ phase of each artist‟s oeuvre: Poussin‟s 
Landscape with the body of Phoicon carried out of Athens of 1648 (fig. 10) and 
Cézanne‟s Mont Sainte-Victoire with Large Pine of c. 1885 – 87 (fig. 11).58 
 
 Now, it might be said that there is a sense in which these two works are 
similar if we make them stand out against a background of difference. If, for 
example, we were to oppose the quiet harmony of Poussin to the sublime drama 
of Claude Joseph Vernet (fig. 12) or the taut structure of Cézanne to the 
shimmering surfaces of Monet (fig. 13), something of their alleged Classicism 
                                               
58 This pairing is suggested by Verdi in the catalogue to Cézanne and Poussin. However, Verdi 
only considers the basic parallelism of their formal design. He notes, for example, that the tree in 
each „crown[s] the contour of the distant mountain‟ (p.49 – 50).  While it is true that Cézanne‟s 
work echoes Poussin‟s in its basic ordering of the constituents of the scene, it is at a finer level of 
detail – and particularly in the modes of viewing experience that they structure – that the 
differences between these works become abundantly apparent. 
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would come to the fore. We might say, for example, that while in the latter two 
compositions in each pairing there is a resistance to gravity, Landscape with the 
body of Phoicon and Mont Sainte-Victoire seem stable and balanced. Instead of 
being slippery and mutable, their forms seem solid and substantial: they coexist 
in relation to one another and in concordance with the frame. „Balance‟, 
„architectural rigour‟ and „primitive simplicity‟ – these do not seem inappropriate 
terms to describe either of these works.  
 
But any more rigorous analysis of the paintings with respect to Wölfflin‟s 
categories of classical form would seem to betray notable differences. On the one 
hand, Poussin‟s painting could serve as an exemplary model for each of the 
qualities the theorist divines: hard-edged contours (linearity), clear divisions of 
space from foreground to background (planar), a compositional structure which 
reiterates the framing edge and which implies a centrally positioned point of 
view (closed form), discrete, separated forms (multiplicity) and a light that 
renders every detail optically precise (absolute clarity).  
 
But what are we to say, on the other hand, of Cézanne‟s Mont Sainte-
Victoire? True, his work has a definite sense on structure and exhibits none of the 
sweeping diagonals or plunging spaces so typical of the Baroque, but neither is 
there a hierarchy of clearly defined parts or a space that recedes evenly in a 
succession of planes. Instead, his coulisses – while they do exist – seem to push 
themselves forward and develop and disperse in front of our eyes. And what 
indeed are we to make of his so-called „architectural rigour‟? It seems to be 
there, but not divulged transparently: there is a sense that we are always catching 
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things „on the wing‟, as if form is still germinating and has not yet been rendered 
distinct. So, neither is this work of the order of Monet‟s unanchored and 
impalpable Impressionism, but nor does it manifest the degree of articulation of 
Poussin‟s archetypically classical work. Is it therefore in striking a balance 
between these two modes of representation that we grasp the sense of Cézanne‟s 
statement to Denis that he „wanted was to make of Impressionism something 
solid and durable, like the art of the museums‟?59 There is more than of a grain of 
truth here, but to identify this we need to embrace a radically different set of 
terms.  
 
 
1.4 THE DUAL MEANING OF CLASSICISM 
 
In order to understand how the classical linkage between Cézanne and Poussin 
obtained a footing in the first place, we cannot arrive at our conclusions ex post 
facto by appealing either directly or tacitly to Wölfflin. Instead, we need to trace 
this idea back to its original context and in particular, we must consider what 
Classicism would have meant in the late nineteenth century. In this sense, it is 
instructive to begin by reflecting on our own use of the word „classic‟ for this 
still possesses a residue of its earlier meaning and will thus help us to understand 
the significance of Cézanne‟s enigmatic phrase.60  
 
                                               
59 Maurice Denis, „Cézanne‟, trans. Roger Fry, Burlington Magazine, XVI, London, Jan – Feb 
1910; reprinted in Art in Theory 1900 – 2000, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2003), p. 42. Denis‟s article was originally published in L’Occident in September 
1907. 
60 The ideas in this section are largely indebted to Richard Shiff‟s discussion of Cézanne‟s 
Classicism in Cézanne and the End of Impressionism.  
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 Let us start with two examples – as culturally distinct as they may be – 
and analyse what unites them in terms of our use of this word: the first „Pac-man 
is a classic computer game‟ and the second „Ulysses is a classic work of modern 
literature‟. Now, we might initially think that this simply means that Pac-Man 
and Ulysses are both representative of a much wider genre. However, the very 
fact that they can function as bywords for a whole category implies that they 
possess some extra quality that makes them not just related to, but also distinct 
from, the other members of their class. What makes them able to carry this 
burden of meaning is the idea that they did not simply perpetuate a way of doing 
things that already existed. Rather, they are also the progenitors of a new method 
– Pac-man was the first example of a particular format of computer gaming, 
while Joyce‟s experimental use of language sets Ulysses apart from previous 
works of fiction. Consequently, they are „classics‟ in the sense that they are at 
once the originators and the paradigmatic examples of a new style.
61
 
 
Bearing this in mind, it is now possible to understand why nineteenth-
century designations of the Renaissance and Antiquity as classical had an 
evaluative dimension. What writers at this time would have meant is not that 
artists of these periods had adopted a particular mode of expression (although 
Classicism undoubtedly acquired this extra sense from a consensus about the 
nature of the style deemed exemplary). Rather, they would have conceived their 
works – and more particularly, the works of specific individuals – as standing as 
paragons. Lesser artists would therefore be bound to fall under the influence of 
                                               
61 For example, Maurice Beebe refers to Ulysses as „a demonstration and summation of [an] 
entire movement‟ in „Ulysses and the Age of Modernism‟, James Joyce Quarterly (University of 
Tulsa) 10, no. 2 (Fall 1972), p. 176. While, according to the Wikipedia entry on Pac-Man, it is 
„universally considered as one of the classics of the medium, virtually synonymous with video 
games…‟ See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pac-Man, accessed 8 July 2010. 
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such potent examples (and accordingly their style would be derivative) while 
ones of greater distinction would seek to recreate these conditions again 
(meaning that their style would be original and yet equally valid). In short, there 
was no requirement for two Classical styles to look the same.  
 
Nevertheless, there is – as Kant reminds us – such a thing as „original 
nonsense‟62 and therefore not everything is destined to be emulated just because 
it is new.  A classical style must consequently have a quality that makes it worthy 
of imitation – it must speak in voice that others will heed. Accordingly, the two 
ideas that are yoked by this earlier understanding of Classicism are originality 
and universal expression, that is, something that is at once new and capable of 
being grasped by all.
63
 
 
 This takes us part of the way to understanding the nature of Cézanne‟s 
and Poussin‟s classical affiliation, for what can be seen now is that there is no 
demand for a linkage that devolves on a particular style.
 64
 Cézanne could be 
classical without imitating Poussin, although he may have looked to his art when 
he was struggling to express the originality of his „sensations‟.65 This would 
therefore account for the fragmentary nature of his later copies after Poussin, 
since these seem to demonstrate that he was seeking to identify the formal struts 
that gave his predecessor‟s art its coherence rather than attempting to emulate its 
                                               
62 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1952) p. 168. 
63 See Shiff, Cézanne and the End of Impressionism, p, 125. The author refers to the combination 
of these two qualities as a „reasoned originality‟. 
64 Shiff notes that „the analogy drawn between Cézanne and Poussin…was never to any great 
extent a matter of imitable visual qualities‟. See Ibid, p. 184. 
65 There would be no paradox here, as Classicism exists in the end result and not in the means by 
which it is obtained, although slavish copying is obviously not going to be conductive to 
originality. See the second quote of my epigraph and also Shiff, Cézanne and the End of 
Impressionism, pp. 183 – 84.  
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general appearance.
66
 Nevertheless, since Cézanne did not devote much time to 
copying the work of Poussin this would still not seem sufficient justification for 
conjoining their names. If there is accordingly an overlap in terms of their art – 
as there would have to be for this analogy to take off – where are we to find it? Is 
it in their procedures, their independently gained styles, or is it somehow 
engendered by both? 
 
 As Richard Shiff‟s work has astutely shown, this conjunction was largely 
based on the idea of an intersection between Cézanne‟s and Poussin‟s practice 
and the „general principles‟ that I mentioned earlier – those of originality, 
stoicism and the direct confrontation of nature. In short, it depended on the 
notion that they avoided convention and put themselves in direct contact with an 
original source in the world. The integrity of this source was therefore 
understood to be the guarantor of an art that was at once innovative and 
universally expressive, which is to say that it guaranteed the idea of Cézanne‟s 
and Poussin‟s mutual Classicism. In this respect, our opening quotation would 
have been understood to shed light on the difference between the sources of their 
art and the verities that this supposedly led them to uncover. For while Poussin 
was said to rediscover the truth of the Ancients by studying their art in 
conjunction with nature, Cézanne was said to „redo‟ – in the sense of repeating 
                                               
66 I owe this observation to Richard Verdi who claims that „Cézanne explores the formal 
principles which unite the figures with their surroundings…as though seeking to lay bare the 
underlying order and armature of Poussin‟s monumental design.‟ See Cézanne and Poussin, p. 
45. Cézanne himself wrote to Bernard that „I believe in the logical development of what we see 
through the study of nature, even if this means concerning myself with technical questions 
afterwards; for us, technical questions are merely the means of making the public experience 
what we ourselves experience.‟ Letter to Bernard, 21 September 1906, reprinted in The 
Courtauld Cézannes, p. 165. What this therefore suggests is that Cézanne consulted the work of 
others when his own means were not adequate to the novelty of the experience he wanted to 
express. He would consequently be seeking devices that were congenial to his own idea of 
originality – that perhaps plugged a gap in his art – rather than deriving his style wholesale from 
others.  
 57 
and maybe even amplifying – the Classicism of Poussin by drawing the tenets of 
his art almost exclusively from his personal communion with nature.
67
 
 
However, there is one further point to be made here which Shiff does not 
acknowledge. This is that while the word „Classicism‟ may not necessarily have 
implied a connection based on visual similarities, some of Cézanne‟s critics 
nevertheless did seem to suggest that his style was in some way comparable to 
that of his forebear or, more broadly, to that of other illustrious artists from the 
past. And what is interesting about the formula of this style is that it is thought to 
be obtained precisely through Cézanne‟s strategy of returning to origins – of 
finding his means of expression in the privacy of a gaze directed out towards the 
world, or of remaining true to „nature and self‟ as Shiff himself puts it.68 Denis 
states, for example, that:   
 
What others have sought and sometimes found in imitating the ancients, 
the discipline that [Cézanne] himself in his first works asked of the great 
artists of his time or of the past, he discovers finally in himself…He is so 
naturally a painter and so spontaneously classical!
69
 
 
If we assume, therefore, that the discipline Cézanne „asked of the great artists‟ 
was related to their method of pictorial construction – in short, that it was a 
                                               
67 See Ibid, esp. pp. 180 – 84. 
68 See note 26. 
69 Denis, „Cézanne‟, L’Occident 12 (Sept. 1907), p. 123. Cited in Shiff, Cézanne and the End of 
Impressionism, p. 136. This echoes Cézanne‟s own remark to Bernard that, „Your need to find a 
moral and intellectual reference point in works of art which will surely never be surpassed…will 
surely lead you to experience your means of expression in front of nature; and rest assured that, 
the day that you find them, you will effortlessly rediscover in front of nature the methods that 
were used by the four or five great artists of Venice.‟ Letter, 23 December 1904, reprinted in The 
Courtauld Cézannes, p. 159. 
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matter of technique rather than a matter of procedure – then shouldn‟t we 
suppose what „he finally discovers in himself‟ is precisely a non-derivative 
source for their style? Or if this seems tenuous, let us consider the expanded 
statement in which our dictum is originally found. Bernard‟s pronunciation that:  
 
Classical means here: that which is in agreement with tradition. Thus 
Cézanne used to say: “Imagine Poussin redone entirely after nature, 
there‟s the classical that I intend.” It is not a matter, in effect, of casting 
out the romantics, but of rediscovering what the romantics themselves 
had: the solid rules of the great masters. Still the contribution to make is a 
more ample observation of nature and in some way to draw one’s 
classicism from it more than from studio recipes. Because if the laws of 
art are fecund, the recipes of the studio are deadly, and it is only in 
contact with nature, and with its constant observation, that the artist is a 
creator.
70
 
 
Unlike Denis, Bernard does not say the Cézanne discover a Classicism in 
himself; instead he claims that he finds it outwardly in the world. But 
nevertheless, this source also seems to guarantee his art‟s stylistic relation to „the 
solid rules of the great masters‟. Indeed, if – as Bernard implies – Classicism can 
be drawn authentically from nature or learned second hand in the studio, then the 
very fact that both routes can ensure its production must mean that it entails a set 
of visually identifiable features. What this therefore suggests is that Classicism is 
not only being understood as a procedure, but also as a procedure that yields 
                                               
70 Bernard, „Souvenirs,‟ Mercure de France, p. 627; cited in Ibid, p. 13. Emphasis added. 
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particular results – a style perhaps, or maybe something more basic (the 
romantics, Bernard says, possessed these laws too). But either way, this must 
exhibit some consistent quality which, for some to copy, others must first have 
wrested directly from the world.  
 
Therefore, to be „in agreement with tradition‟ one may either look back 
upon the history of art, or one may look outwards towards nature herself. And 
yet, it is only by doing the latter that the „artist is a creator‟. Or, to put it another 
way, while Classicism may have a typical, imitable appearance, a true Classicist 
reveals this in a new but objectively verifiable form.  Indeed, this interpretation 
would seem to fit better with a slightly earlier characterisation of Cézanne‟s 
dictum as „vivifier Poussin sur nature‟.71 For, insofar as the word „vivifier‟ 
implies a „quickening‟ or „enlivening‟, this seems to suggest that Cézanne 
animated qualities that were already present in his forebear‟s art but which were 
only disclosed through his close attention to the natural world. 
 
So it seems that although we have seen a way around the reductive 
interpretations of twentieth-century critics, there is still something faintly 
paradoxical about this use of the word „Classical‟. For how can Cézanne draw his 
classicism from nature in a way that ensures the continuity of tradition (the 
passing down of a style from one generation to the next) whist also guarding 
against „the recipes of the studio‟ (the transmission of a style through cultural 
institutions)? Can a direct communion between self and nature actually leak the 
secrets of a Classical art and does this thereby connect the work of Cézanne and 
                                               
71 See note 25. 
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Poussin stylistically? And finally, would this not suggest that the „universal 
expressiveness‟ of Classicism somehow consists in an Ur-language of 
representation? In the following section I shall investigate this idea by referring 
to Cézanne‟s own understanding of sight.  
 
 
 
 
1.5 NATURE AND SELF IN ‘PRIMORDIAL’ VISION 
 
Let me begin this discussion by drawing attention to one of the basic 
implications of the foregoing account: the idea that pictorial art can have a 
universal communicative power and that it obtains this by drawing its language 
from the material of vision. Of course, this is not made explicit in the statements 
by Denis and Bernard: here the Classicism of Poussin and Cézanne is supposedly 
a dividend of their devotion to nature (or perhaps of their fidelity to both nature 
and self). But let us nevertheless be more particular about what this actually 
means: since our awareness of the world is always mediated through the senses, 
these artists could not have wrested their means of expression directly from 
nature. Rather, they would have to derive them from the experience of sight. 
Consequently, if there is something about Cézanne‟s or Poussin‟s style which 
makes it non-arbitrary and thus universally legible then this would relate, not to 
nature itself, but to the aspects it revealed to the gaze of each painter.
  
 
 But if Bernard and Denis skirted around these issues, Cézanne and his 
Impressionist colleagues certainly did not. For them, instead, it was precisely a 
question of how to be true to their own unique „sensations‟ or how to capture in 
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paint their „impression‟ of a scene: ideas that evidently acknowledge the role of 
perception in their art.
72
 Therefore, it is useful to begin with a consideration of 
these terms in order to grasp how Cézanne would have conceptualised sight and 
how he would therefore have understood it as informing his practice. 
 
Let us start with the concept of the „impression‟ – an idea that became 
central to Cézanne‟s thinking in the 1870s due to his association with artists such 
as Monet, Renoir and Pissarro.
73
 First of all, it ought to be noted that this word 
had a double significance in the nineteenth century. On the one hand, it was used 
(as it still is today) to refer to an immediate form of sensory awareness, and in 
this respect it was taken to designate the initial visual impact of a scene. And on 
the other hand, it was used to denote a preliminary sketch for a composition, and 
in this sense it was compared to the finished work or tableau which was deemed 
suitable for exhibition. In this last respect, then, to call a group of artists 
„Impressionists‟ struck a derisory note for it suggested that they had not brought 
their work to an adequate state of completion.
74
 However, for those who were 
sympathetic to the movement it could also imply that the artists had captured an 
unmediated form of vision and had therefore expressed themselves in a non-
                                               
72 As Shiff points out, insofar as Cézanne claimed that his project was to paint his sensations, he 
remained committed to a theory of Impressionism until the end of his life. See Cézanne and the 
End of Impressionism, esp. pp. 187 – 196; for Bernard and Denis‟s disavowal of this aspect of his 
practice see pp. 125 – 140.  
73 In the 1870s Cézanne regarded Pissarro as his mentor and worked side by side with him on 
several occasions. For a consideration of this relationship see Cézanne and Pissarro: Pioneering 
Modern Painting (exh. cat. MoMA, 26 June – 12 September 1995) ed. Joachim Pissarro (New 
York: Museum of Modern Art, 2005) Cézanne also contributed to the first and third Impressionist 
group exhibitions in 1874 and 1877. 
74 For instance, this would seem to be the implication of Louis Leroy‟s sarcastic quip (spoken by 
his fictional character, the academic painter, M. Vincent) that „Wallpaper in its embryonic state is 
more finished than a seascape.‟ „Exhibition of the Impressionists‟, Le Charivari, 25 April 1874; 
quoted in Impressionism and Post Impressionism 1874 – 1904, ed. Linda Nochlin (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 13. 
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derivative way. Accordingly, this would be seen as a virtue given that mindless 
imitation was so often blamed for the stultification of French art. 
 
To further understand this last, positive connotation of the term 
„impression‟ it is useful to relate it to contemporary theories of perception.  The 
general consensus at this time was that visual processing consisted of two 
separate stages. At the first stage, raw sensations of light were said to be 
impressed on the retina, thus forming a shifting mosaic of patches of colour. And 
at the second stage it was claimed that knowledge and experience were brought 
to bear on this data so that meaningful objects were seen as occupying a three-
dimensional space. But what this further implied was that normal, adult vision 
could become laden with prejudices and prior assumptions, thus distancing the 
perceiver from the original look of the world. Accordingly, it would seem that 
the Impressionist project was to recover this primary form of vision, or as 
Cézanne had put it to „See like a man who has just been born‟. Thus in 
communing with nature directly they might hope to „forget‟ all they knew and 
return to the immediacy of spontaneous sight.
75
  
 
However, this should not be taken to mean that the artists wished to 
passively record visual appearances or that their aim was to produce a „retinal‟ 
art. Instead, it would seem that their use of the word „impression‟ implied 
something more complex for they often spoke of it as relating to subjective 
emotion as well as unmediated sight. As Richard Shiff has noted, this idea finds a 
source in the contemporary literature and in particular, it seems likely to have 
                                               
75 For a more in depth account of this aspect of Impressionist practice see Joel Isaacson, 
„Constable, Duranty, Mallarmé, Impressionism, Plein Air, and Forgetting‟, The Art Bulletin 76, 
no. 3 (September, 1994), pp. 427 – 450. For Cézanne‟s comments on „forgetting‟ see note 32. 
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been derived from the philosophical works of Emile Littré and Hippolyte 
Taine.
76
 According to Littré, for instance: 
 
Yes, there is something that is primordial, but it is neither the subject nor 
the object, neither the self not the nonself [non-moi]: it is the impression 
perceived [l’impression perçue]. A perceived impression does not in any 
sense constitute the idea of the subject or of the object, it is only the 
element of these ideas [which develop] only when the external impression 
and the internal impression are repeated a certain number of times.
77
 
 
According to this interpretation, the „perceived impression‟ is the product 
of the immediate interaction between subject and object, which only comes to 
constitute knowledge through repetition and association. This understanding 
therefore suggests how Cézanne could think it possible to produce an art that was 
both original and universal at one and the same time. For, insofar as he purported 
to paint his impressions, his art could claim „a double origin in both nature and 
self‟78 so that nature would guarantee a link with a publicly accessible realm of 
reality and the aspect of subjectivity would guarantee a link to his own individual 
experience of the world. Furthermore, this implies that if the artist entered a 
meditative state in front of nature by forgetting what he knew through experience 
and exposure to culture, then he might be able recover a form of vision in which 
                                               
76 Paul Smith and Charles Stuckey also stress the importance of Littré and Taine. See, for 
example, Smith Impressionism: Beneath the Surface (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995) 
pp. 19 – 31 and Stuckey, „Monet‟s art and the act of vision‟ in Aspects of Monet: A Symposium 
on the Artist’s Life and Times, ed. John Rewald and Frances Weitzenhoffer (New York: Harry N. 
Abrams, 1984), pp. 106 – 121. I will discuss Taine‟s connection to Cézanne in a later chapter. 
77 Émile Littré, „De quelques points de physiologie psychique‟ (1860), La Science du point de vue 
philosophique (Paris, 1876), p. 315; cited in Richard Shiff, Cézanne and the End of 
Impressionism (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 19. 
78 This is a phrase that Shiff uses several times over the course of his study. See, for instance, 
Ibid, pp. 108, 130, 166 & 192.  
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his personality was immediately intertwined with the world. In other words, he 
would become „one‟ with his motif or paint like a „primitive‟79. This therefore 
seems to be what Gasquet had in mind when he spoke of the artist‟s desire to 
„germinate‟ with nature.80 
 
The word „sensation‟ might be said to have similar connotations and 
indeed Cézanne and his contemporaries often used it interchangeably with the 
term „impression‟. However, there seems to have been a slight difference for 
while this latter expression was more often used to refer to the overall visual 
effect of a scene, the former seems to have been identified with the irreducible 
matter of perception itself, that is, with the patches of colour on the retinal tissue. 
Thus Cézanne‟s purported comment to Gasquet that „I see. In stains‟81 would 
seem to imply that he thought he had accessed this primary stratum of 
perception. And furthermore, as the dual meaning of the verb „sentir‟ makes 
apparent, the word sensation could equally suggest a personal feeling or a 
perceptual experience formed in contact with the world.  
 
 What could Cézanne be said to draw out of this „primordial‟ vision and 
how would this relate his art to Poussin‟s? Did his procedure of meditating on 
nature (and by implication, on seeing) somehow link his art substantively to that 
of his forebear while also ensuring that it was original and different at the same 
time? In the following sections I wish to propose that there is a grain of truth in 
                                               
79 According to Rivière and Schnerb, Cézanne pointed out a distortion in one of his paintings and 
claimed „I am a primitive, I have a lazy eye.‟ Cited in Smith, „Cézanne‟s primitive self and 
related fictions‟, p. 1. 
80 Joachim Gasquet, Cézanne, II Partie, Le Motif, pp. 81 – 3. Cited in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, translated by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), p. 152. 
81 Cited in Smith, Interpreting Cézanne, p. 48 
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this and that we might understand this better by turning to the work of John 
Willats.  
 
 
1.6 THE GRAMMAR OF REPRESENTATION 
 
Is there a sense in which the distal stimuli of vision are perceived in the same 
way by all human beings? And, if so, can a picture reproduce these cues so that 
they can be deciphered without reference to cultural convention? I would like to 
suggest that there is and I would further claim that this enables us to understand 
the denotative content of Cézanne‟s and Poussin‟s art, or indeed that of any 
picture considered effective as a representation. In short, I am proposing that 
representation is to be defined as the communicative language of pictures and 
that this language may be understood to convey meaning universally when it 
derives from generically human ways of seeing the world.    
 
Let us consider this in terms of the theory of picture perception proposed 
by John Willats which I earlier outlined in the introduction to this thesis. Now, as 
will be remembered the basic point of departure for Willats‟s account is the 
observation that children seem to possess a generative ability to perceive 
representational pictures. In other words, once they have grasped the basic 
conjunction between an image and what it signifies in the world, they can 
seemingly recognise any number of other examples without having to learn by 
rote and repetition. Of course, this does not mean that specific parts of the human 
brain have evolved for the purpose of picture perception. However, our ability to 
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recognise shapes – and thereby to recognise objects – does seem to be part of an 
innate endowment. Hence, if picture perception is partly parasitic on scene 
perception, our generative ability to produce and perceive representational 
pictures can be conceived as a by-product of our visual ability to recognise 
objects.  
 
To therefore put this in terms of Marr‟s theory, if the visual brain is 
hardwired to extract object-centred descriptions from the retinal image, and 
representational pictures are derived from, and therefore retain basic structural 
features of these percepts, then in theory people should be equipped with the 
same basic tools to decipher such images. Crudely put, the difference may be that 
in everyday perception the visual system detects the abrupt changes in luminosity 
which coincide with the occluding contours and edges of real objects, while in 
picture perception such discontinuities in luminosity are detected on the basis of 
lines or sharp changes in tone or hue. Of course, the information available in 
pictures is by definition much sparser: it cannot be confirmed, or reinforced by 
movement, or supplemented by depth clues from stereopsis. Nevertheless, it is 
arguably rich enough for the brain to extract a three-dimensional model of shape 
which, by being matched to a representation in memory, would theoretically 
enable the viewer to recognise the denotata of a picture. 
 
The question would therefore seem to be whether the modes of 
expression deployed by Cézanne and Poussin adequately contain the relevant 
cues, and whether in this sense they can be deemed „universally‟ communicative. 
We therefore need to know three basic things: first, what the structural 
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constituents of pictures actually are; second, what their relation to visual 
experience is; and third, how they are to be combined so that object perception 
can effectively take place.  
 
To answer these questions, it is useful to begin by appealing to the 
distinction Willats draws between the function of a „denotation system‟ and a 
„drawing system‟ in a picture. The former, he claims, maps „scene 
primitives…into corresponding picture primitives‟82.  The term „primitive‟ here 
refers to the most elementary units of shape available in a real scene or a picture. 
In a scene these can be defined in terms of three-dimensional volumes, two-
dimensional faces, one-dimensional edges or zero-dimensional points and in a 
picture as two-dimensional regions, one-dimensional lines and zero-dimensional 
points. Accordingly, Willats identifies three types of denotation system which 
employ regions, lines and points as picture primitives respectively. For instance, 
silhouettes in pictures are constituted by regions, line drawings by lines and 
photographs by points. In this respect, the distinction between the marks of a 
picture and its primitives is important: marks in themselves are not basic units of 
shape and although they may mould a primitive they can also serve other 
pictorial functions. 
 
In addition, Willats suggests a correspondence between the different 
denotation systems and Marr‟s stages of vision (fig. D).83 On this understanding, 
optical denotation systems such as Divisionist pictures and photographs which 
employ points as picture primitives are associated with the primal sketch since 
                                               
82 John Willats, Art and Representation: New Principles in the Analysis of Pictures (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 4.  
83 See especially Art and Representation, chapter 7: „Separate Systems?‟, pp. 149 – 167. 
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these primitives supposedly stand for the intercepts of small bundles of light rays 
reaching the retina (fig. 14). On the other hand, line drawings using 1-
dimensional primitives (lines) and 0-dimensional line junctions are related to the 
2 ½-D sketch since the former are conjectured to denote edges and contours in 
the scene while the latter denote corners and points of occlusion (fig. 15). Finally 
systems which employ regions or lines to denote three-dimensional volumes – 
which is what Willats thinks is intended in children‟s early drawings and certain 
Cubist pictures – are assumed to correspond to object-centred descriptions 
(fig.16). 
 
 
 
Figure D. The shape information represented at each stage of visual processing 
Adapted from Marr (1982). „Computing and the Arts‟, 
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~mas02fl/MSC101/Vision/Marr.html. 
 
The drawing system, on the other hand, „map[s] spatial relations in a 
scene into corresponding relations in the picture‟.84 Common types of drawing 
systems include perspective, oblique projection and orthogonal projection and 
these can either be described in terms of primary or secondary geometry. Primary 
geometry is based on the Renaissance theory of perspective in which light rays 
                                               
84 Willats, Art and Representation, p. 2. 
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projected from a scene intersect a picture plane at a point on the line of sight. 
Since in orthogonal projection and oblique projection the rays are parallel, both 
require a notional viewer situated at infinity. This in itself is dubious, but in 
addition primary geometry fails to explain drawing systems such as inverted 
perspective and systems based on topological geometry. In light of these 
anomalies Willats chooses instead to describe pictures in terms of secondary 
geometry, that is, in terms of the relationships between marks on the picture 
surface itself. Furthermore, this strategy seems better equipped to describe the 
psychology of depiction since the sequence of children‟s drawing development is 
correlated to the complexity of mapping rules in secondary geometry, while such 
a sequence cannot be explained by way of primary geometry. 
 
So, according to Willats, the denotation system says what the picture 
primitives stand for and the drawing system says where they go.
85
 But what we 
now need to know is how these elements are to be combined so that they yield a 
sufficiently coherent representation of shape: one, in other words, that is 
adequate for the purposes of object recognition. According to the author, a 
picture that is maximally efficient in this respect will fulfil two basic conditions. 
First, it will provide a possible view, meaning that it will employ a drawing 
system which preserves the geometry of light rays projected from a possible 
scene to the eye. In addition, however, its constituents should be organised so 
that they map a general view. A picture of this type avoids ambiguous 
conjunctions of edges, corners or contours – what are known as „accidental 
alignments‟ in scenes and „false attachments‟ in pictures. These criteria would 
                                               
85 Ibid, pp. 15 – 16. 
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therefore exclude systems such as vertical and horizontal oblique projection, 
since in the first case they do not provide a possible view and in the second they 
are likely to yield false attachments. 
 
What this implies, therefore, is that there are certain non-arbitrary, rule-
governed ways in which the components of a picture can be meaningfully 
concatenated. In order to justify this thesis, Willats further appeals to the work 
performed by the scientists Clowes and Huffman in the field of Artificial 
Intelligence.
86
 In particular, he refers to their research in the 1970s which showed 
that the all combinations of edges in rectilinear objects can be classified 
according to four basic categories: V-, W-, Y- and T-junctions. The further 
corollary to this is that these junctions have to be combined in ways that 
respected basic certain rules, the most important of which is the stipulation that  
„lines must have the same meaning along their whole length‟.87 
 
Having outlined this schema for understanding the representational 
language of pictures, what we now need to consider is the extent to which 
Cézanne‟s and Poussin‟s pictures abide by these rules. For the purposes of 
exposition, let us therefore compare two paintings which lend themselves easily 
to this kind of analysis
88: on the one hand, Poussin‟s Landscape with the 
                                               
86 See M. B Clowes, „On seeing things‟, Artificial Intelligence, 2, no. 1, pp. 76 – 116 and D. A. 
Huffman, „Impossible objects as nonsense sentences‟ in B. Metzler and D. Mitchie (ed.), 
Machine Intelligence, vol. 6 (Edinburgh University Press, 1971), pp. 295 – 323. 
87 Ibid, p. 117. 
88 I have chosen these works because they contain depictions of objects with plane faces and thus 
permit a relatively straightforward description of the artists‟ mapping space and shape. 
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Gathering of the Ashes of Phocion of 1648 (fig. 17)
89
 and on the other hand, 
Cézanne‟s The Gulf of Marseilles, seen from L’Estaque of c. 1886 – 90 (fig. 18).  
 
What first stands out about these two pictures is the distinct nature of the 
drawing systems which they employ. On the one hand, it seems that Poussin 
adopts a system based on linear perspective which ensures that his picture 
approximates to a possible view.  While it is not clear that the orthogonals 
converge to meet at a single, central vanishing point, the thrust of the road into 
the distance and the regular diminishment of elements – and particularly the 
figures – yield the impression of an isotropic, recessional space. What is more, 
the main architectural elements in the picture – the temple and the houses and 
fortifications that surround them – assertively face the viewer in a frontal 
position, therefore allowing their shapes to be easily read. The picture also fulfils 
Willats‟s criterion of a general view, for the edges of depicted objects do not 
align in ambiguous ways. And more precisely, there are plenty of examples of 
law-abiding line junctions to provide the picture with a basic structural cohesion. 
Indeed, it might be said that the optically precise denotation system that Poussin 
espouses renders the contours of surfaces with such clarity that they seem to 
announce their independence in an almost forcible way. 
 
Cézanne‟s picture, on the other hand, appears to be composed of two 
different systems: oblique and horizontal oblique projection. The former system 
is evident, for example, in the parallel, horizontal slant of the eaves and the peak 
of the roof in the centrally positioned house in the foreground. However, the 
                                               
89 This is the pendant to the Landscape with the Body of Phocion carried out of Athens earlier 
discussed. 
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houses that bracket it on either side appear to be rendered in horizontal oblique 
projection since their right sides align with the front view of their faces. But 
while we may suspect that this spatial incongruence exists, it is hard to be sure 
since Cézanne has obscured the crucial line junctions that would make it 
conspicuous – particularly the angle of the orthogonals at the bottom edge of 
these faces. There are also several instances of false attachment in this picture, 
most notably the alignment of the roof of the house in the left foreground with 
that of the factory which sits directly behind it. This therefore collapses the space 
in such a way as to bring it forward towards the viewer and creates a horizontal 
bar across the picture plane due to the parallel position of the roof on the right. 
And yet, even if Cézanne‟s painting possesses pockets of spatial inconsistency, 
the shapes of distinct elements in the picture are coherently preserved due to the 
way that they are (largely) built up out of salient conjunctions of lines which 
allow us to decipher the points at which edges meet and surfaces occlude one 
another.  
 
It seems therefore that both pictures adopt a grammar that makes their 
subject-matter legible by mapping space and shape in a way that sufficiently 
respects the rules of representation. Thus, if their adherence to these principles 
means that their formal language is derived non-arbitrarily from the material of 
vision – that is, from the way that we come to recognise objects in real scenes – 
we might say that each painting can be decoded by virtue of the visual capacities 
we innately possess. Perhaps then we might say that each artist fulfils the first 
criterion of Classicism: he produces an art which can communicate its meaning 
to one and to all.  
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Nevertheless, there is something fundamentally different about the 
representational styles of these artists which consists not only in their formal 
language but also in the kinds of viewing experience this seems to produce. On 
the one hand, the crystal-clear space of Poussin‟s work seems to induce a sense 
of stasis and contemplation and is accompanied by the feeling that objects have 
already yielded themselves wholly to our eyes. Therefore due to the ease with 
which we scan the scene, we feel hardly aware of the activity of looking. Rather, 
we invest our energies in reflecting on the poetry of the world behind the picture 
plane. Thus, to characterise this experience we might say that is one of 
meditation.  
 
 Cézanne‟s Gulf of Marseilles, on the other hand, seems to be caught in 
the very „process of becoming‟.90 Due to the elisions of space, our ability to 
recognise objects is not denied but nevertheless seems to have been slowed 
down. And indeed, as our gaze encircles the scene in an attempt to assimilate its 
total appearance, we find ourselves engaged in a more physical manner as if our 
whole bodies are attuned to the movements of our eyes. However, while the 
space is slippery, there is an also a sense that the houses in the foreground are 
solid and weighty in an almost tangible way. They act as anchors to our sight, as 
if we can grip them with our eyes. Therefore, unlike the still and contemplative 
mood of the Poussin, we might characterise Cézanne‟s work as heightening our 
sense of bodily presence. 
 
                                               
90 This is a phrase I borrow from George Heard Hamilton. See „Cézanne, Bergson and the Image 
of Time‟, College Art Journal, 16, no. 1 (Autumn 1956), pp.2 – 12. 
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I would claim that these are the original aspects that Cézanne and Poussin 
brought to the representation of the landscape and which finally secured their 
nomination as Classicists. On the one hand, Poussin adopted the figural style 
which was developed and perfected in the High Renaissance and transposed its 
harmony and balance onto an image of nature. However, the sense this brought 
to the panorama of this field was somehow an amplification of the effect it had 
previously had: it seemed to charge the scene with a stillness and a meditative 
quality. And on the other hand, I would suggest that Cézanne‟s pictorial style 
was almost opposite to this: it somehow implicated the body of the viewer and 
recruited it to be a partner in the constitution of meaning. My suggestion, then, is 
that Cézanne produced an altogether new „criterion‟ of sight and, as I hope to 
show in the remainder of this project, this may have been his most ample 
contribution to the history of art.  
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CHAPTER 2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Perceptual Regimes in Trompe l’ œil and Cubism: 
Deception and Evocation 
 
 
 
 
The artist, of necessity, will have the task of carefully avoiding this antinomy of 
all art: the concrete truth, the illusionism of trompe l‟œil, so that his picture will 
not give the false impression of nature which would act upon the spectator like 
nature herself, that is to say, without the possibility of suggestion. 
 
– Albert Aurier91 
 
 
2.1 FOOLING THE EYE OR FOOLING THE BODY? 
 
 
I wish to introduce this chapter by recounting one of the oldest and best-known 
stories from the history of art. In this tale, recorded in the Naturalis Historia, 
Pliny the Elder tells of a contest between two rival artists, Parrhasios and Zeuxis. 
In order to decide whose talent is greater, they agree to each paint a picture and 
compare the results. Zeuxis is first to unveil his canvas: a depiction of grapes so 
lifelike that birds descend from the sky to peck at their flesh. He then turns to 
Parrhasios‟s work and attempts to draw back the curtain. But since the curtain 
                                               
91 „Le Symbolisme en peinture‟, p. 162. Translation by Christine Poggi, In Defiance of Painting: 
Cubism, Futurism, and the Invention of Collage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 
1992), p. 96. 
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has been painted, Zeuxis must concede defeat, for while his own picture has 
merely succeeded in fooling the birds, Parrhasios‟s picture has deceived Zeuxis 
himself.
92
 
 
This story is usually used to illustrate the concept of trompe l‟œil, that is, 
the illustionistic capacity of pictures to „trick the eye‟. But perhaps this turn of 
phrase is slightly misleading, for notice that the pivotal moment in this story is 
when Zeuxis extends his arm to draw back the curtain. His error is not therefore a 
simple error of vision, since this ruse also implicates touch and indeed may be 
thought to involve the whole of the body in its capacity for movement and action. 
To put it another way, as soon as Zeuxis sees the painted surface as a curtain 
(rather than simply as a representation of one), his other senses are primed to 
accord with this reading. The object that is discriminated by the faculty of sight 
therefore acts as the catalyst for a particular bodily response: Zeuxis‟s 
movements prepare and anticipate his hand‟s contact with the fabric. So while 
we might say that his error is based on what his eye deciphers, his whole body 
resonates with this false visual judgement. Is this therefore a question of fooling 
the eye, or rather a question of fooling the body? Should we call it trompe l‟œil 
or „trompe le corps‟? 
 
In this chapter I shall suggest that this latter description is more accurate, 
or at least that this is the condition to which trompe l‟œil painting aspires. The 
reason for this is that the aim (or perhaps the game) of such vivid illusions is to 
coax the viewer into thinking that he or she confronts a real three-dimensional 
                                               
92 Pliny the Elder, Naturalis Historia, Book 35, Chapter 65, c. 77 - 79 AD. This story is recounted 
by Gombrich in Art and Illusion (London: Phaidon, 1977, orig. ed., 1960), p. 173. 
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space. Therefore, if touching and moving form a latent substratum of real scene 
perception – as many philosophers and visual scientists have argued93 – a 
successful trompe l‟œil will trigger and perhaps even heighten these kinds of 
perceptual effect. The main purpose of this chapter is therefore to examine this 
claim about the multisensory nature of vision
94
 and to relate it to the types of 
encounter structured by trompe l‟œil art. 
 
But if trompe l‟œil functions by fooling the eye (and perhaps, by 
implication, by fooling the body), what then is the modus operandi of Cubism? 
Clearly, a picture in this style bears a different relation to perceptual reality, 
especially if we limit our considerations to the more daring innovations of 
Picasso and Braque (which in this project I intend to do).
95
 For one thing, an 
object under the auspices of Cubism does not look much like its real life 
counterpart, while a successful trompe l‟œil should blur the distinction between 
artifice and life. And yet, it has often been remarked that certain Cubist works 
                                               
93 In the twentieth century this view was most notably articulated by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
whose work I shall consider later in this chapter. The problem concerning the interrelation 
between touch and vision has a long history, stretching back at least as far as Molyneaux‟s 
question about whether a man born blind who had regained his sight could distinguish a cube and 
a sphere on the basis of vision alone (See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1694), Book II, Chapter IX). However, the idea that touch and movement 
contribute directly to vision (that is, instead of informing it mediately by way of associative 
processes) only began to be seriously considered in the twentieth century, and in this regard it can 
be traced to the work of thinkers such as Henri Poincaré and Edmund Husserl. In visual science, 
this notion was first theorised by J.J. Gibson and is neatly summarised by his notion of 
„affordances‟ – the idea that objects are perceived in terms of the actions which they invite the 
subject to perform. For instance, to a human a newspaper affords reading while to a dog it affords 
chewing. See The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc., 1986, orig. ed., 1979), esp. Chap. 8 „The Theory of Affordances‟. 
94 By „multisensory‟ I mean that vision entails inputs from different sensory modalities rather 
than being exclusively related to the eye and its capacity to the encode properties of light.  For a 
discussion of this idea see Susanna Millar, Space and Sense (New York and East Sussex: 
Psychology Press, 2008), pp. 18 – 19. I shall also refer to this as „intersensory‟ perception, a term 
which I borrow from the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
95 In this respect, my claim is not so much that Picasso and Braque were alone in developing 
Cubism, for it is evident that this movement has many different strands. However, I think that 
their work is unique insofar as it manifests the concerns and phenomenological qualities that this 
chapter details. Of course, this is not to say that their individual styles are equivalent. I shall 
consider these differences in Chapter 5. 
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can give us a sense of the real physicality of objects through the way that they 
evoke sensations of movement and touch.
96
 Therefore, it would seem that, 
despite a difference in visual appearance, a comparison can be drawn between 
this style and Parrhasios‟s illusion insofar as each mode of painting elicits a 
motor response. Thus, in devoting this chapter to an assessment of trompe l‟œil, I 
wish to use it to shed light on this perceptual phenomenon and to indicate how 
Cubism achieves this effect by very different means. However, since only a foray 
into the philosophy and psychology of representation will give us the 
wherewithal to adequately address this question, it shall be a while before the 
riddle of the Cubist aesthetic is finally solved. This chapter shall serve as a 
preparatory step. 
 
 
2.2 THE DECEPTIVE DEVICES OF TROMPE L’ ŒIL ART 
 
First then, let us consider how trompe l‟œil „works‟. In this respect, it is 
important to note that we never normally confuse a picture with a real three-
dimensional scene, even if, as Willats argues, we draw on our perception of the 
latter to make sense of the former.  For the theorist, representational pictures 
instead constitute a „third domain‟, which means that they are neither perceived 
as fully flat nor as possessing the substantive spatial dimensionality seen in the 
                                               
96The claim that Cubism inspires a sense of movement has often been justified by referring to the 
artist‟s synthesis of multiple viewpoints. This interpretation was first advanced by Gleizes and 
Metzinger in their 1912 book Du Cubisme and has been common in the literature ever since. The 
theme of touch has also been invoked to support the claim that the Cubists picture the „idea‟ or 
the perceptual synthesis of the object instead of its partial visual appearance. For instance, 
Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler makes this suggestion in his 1920 book The Rise of Cubism (Der Weg 
zum Kubismus). For two accounts which are closer in spirit to the argument I develop see Edwin 
Mullins, Braque (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), esp. Chapter Four „Analytic Cubism‟, pp. 
52 – 71 and Paul Smith, „How a Cubist Picture Hangs Together‟ in Art of the Twentieth Century, 
ed Jason Gaiger and Paul Wood (London: Yale University Press/Open University, 2003), pp. 62 
– 89. 
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world.
 97
 The reason for this, or so he claims, is that the coherence of 
representation depends on a limited range of drawing and denotation systems 
which can only be combined in certain „grammatical‟ ways.98 Therefore, counter 
to the claim about „twofoldness‟ made by Richard Wollheim,99 Willats insists 
that we experience the third domain as a space that is sui generis since pictures 
are granted their own phenomenology by virtue of the artist‟s particular 
arrangement of marks. Or to put this another way, while a two-dimensional 
image may look to have depth, this differs from the experience of depth that we 
have in real life.
 
 
 
This third domain conspicuously announces its presence for several 
reasons. For one thing, the material qualities of the medium and the support are 
often visible – the texture of oil, for example, or the weave of the canvas – not to 
                                               
97 Willats refers to trompe l‟œil as an „exceptional case‟ and excludes it from consideration in his 
paper (p. 5). For full discussion see „The Third Domain: The Role of Pictorial Images in Picture 
Perception and Production‟, Axiomathes, 13 (2002), p. 1 – 15. To describe the third domain – 
which Willats refers to as the „pictorial image‟ – the author cites an earlier publication in which 
he and Fred Dubery claim that „pictures can be regarded as special cases of relief sculpture, 
compressed until they lie wholly within two-dimensional space‟, p. 5. See also Dubery and 
Willats, Perspective and Other Drawing Systems (London: The Herbert Press; New York: Van 
Nostrand Reinold,.1983), p. 19. 
98 While Willats does refer to a pictorial „grammar‟ several times in Art and Representation and 
also hints that this may be comparable to the universal grammar proposed by Chomsky, he is 
nevertheless cautious about expressing this analogy in unequivocal terms. In a forthcoming 
paper, 'Pictorial Grammar: Chomsky, John Willats, and the rules of representation' to be 
published in Art History in 2011, Paul Smith considers this association in a more explicit way. 
For Willats‟s discussion of the common pairings of drawing and denotation systems see Art and 
Representation, pp. 149 – 167.  
99 For Wollheim, „twofoldness‟ characterises the phenomenology of „seeing in‟ which 
representational pictures evoke and which is sometimes also produced by accidental 
configurations in nature. This experience is marked by a dualism since we can either attend to the 
marks on a surface or we can concentrate on the illusory forms to which they give rise. 
Accordingly, this is similar to Gombrich‟s concept of „projection‟. But while Gombrich claims 
that that we cannot see the picture surface and the depictive content at one and the same time, 
Wollheim claims that we see the depictive content in – and therefore, at the same time as – the 
marks. For Gombrich‟s account of projection see Art and Illusion, 5th ed. (London: Phaidon, 
1977), especially part three „The Beholder‟s Share‟, pp. 154 – 246. For Wollheim‟s account of 
seeing-in see „What the Spectator Sees‟ in Visual Theory: Painting and Interpretation, ed. 
Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly and Keith Moxley (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 101 – 150 
and Art and its objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1980), Essay V „Seeing-as, seeing-
in, and pictorial representation‟, pp. 205 – 226. 
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mention the way that the individual marks are applied – as strokes or blobs of 
paint, for instance. Of course, there are many cases when the artist effectively 
conceals his or her labour, as the immaculate finish of many Dutch still lifes like 
Jan de Heem‟s Still Life with Parrots exquisitely show (fig. 19).  But 
nonetheless, the frame that brackets the pictorial space from the surrounding 
environment usually advertises itself in obvious ways.
100
  
 
Subtract this frame and we would still be left with a space that was 
phenomenologically disjunctive from the space experienced in life, since the fact 
that we move about and possess two eyes will normally inform us when two-
dimensions are contrived to masquerade as three. If an artist represents 
volumetric objects close at hand, for example, a shift in position will not reveal a 
new perspective as it does in real life. And since there will be no difference 
between the views afforded by our left and right eyes – the cue known as 
binocular parallax – the depicted items will give away their flatness by yielding a 
single, monocular view. On the other hand, if a deeper space like a landscape is 
represented, unless all the items are sufficiently distant, the absence of motion 
parallax will instruct us as to the artificial nature of the scene.
101
 In sum, it seems 
                                               
100 For a discussion of the function of the frame in pictorial art see Meyer Schapiro, „On Some 
Problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs‟, Simiolus: 
Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art, 6, No. 1 (1972 - 1973), pp. 9-19. However, 
Schapiro‟s argument that the facility of artists in using linear perspective made the frame 
necessary to clarify the distinction between art and reality seems untenable due to the (normal) 
availability of perceptual cues.  
101 As we change position, motion parallax operates as a powerful depth cue by revealing that 
further away objects move more slowly across our visual field than ones which are closer. Other 
cues that could be cited in this connection include accommodation and convergence. The 
constraints of factors such as motion and binocular parallax on picture perception were first 
theorised by Hermann von Helmhotz in an essay entitled „On the relation of optics to painting‟ of 
1876. See Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects, trans. E. Atkinson (London: Longmans, Green 
and Co., 1891), pp. 73 – 138. 
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that the act of becoming immersed in a picture requires at least a partial 
suspension of disbelief.
102
 
 
But let us suppose for one moment that the story about Parrhasios and 
Zeuxis is true. What makes Parrhasios‟s picture the more successful illusion and 
what does this indicate about the nature of trompe l‟œil? Now, while we are only 
told that Zeuxis painted grapes, we may assume that but for their highly mimetic 
quality, in all other respects his picture was fairly conventional. That is, while the 
colours, shapes and play of light over the grapes were represented as faithfully as 
they could be and while Zeuxis suppressed all the evidence of his own 
craftsmanship, his work still contained all the other telltale signs that announced 
its separation from the space of the real. In other words, as a flat, delimited 
surface bounded by a frame or a noticeable edge, his picture – to paraphrase the 
words of Nelson Goodman – resembled other pictures to a much greater degree 
than it resembled real grapes.
 103
  
 
In comparison, Parrhasios wins, not as a consequence of his technical 
skill – although this must also come into play – but as a consequence of his 
strategic manoeuvring: through the fact that he tailors his picture so that it is 
maximally obscures the difference between the illusory and the real. Let us 
imagine that his picture is something akin to this trompe l‟œil by Adrian van der 
Spelt and Frans van Mieris (fig. 20). From this we may suppose that his decision 
                                               
102 By this I mean that we must ignore the cues which signal the picture‟s artefactual nature in 
order to fully engage with its referential content. This is different from – but is not incompatible 
with – Kendell Walton‟s claim that picture perception entails an act of make believe. See 
Mimesis as make-believe: on the foundations of the representational arts (Cambridge, Mass., & 
London: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
103 Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1976), p. 5. 
 82 
to represent curtains serves several roles at once. First, they toy with our 
expectations,
104
 for, on the one hand we would not expect them to be the 
exclusive subject of a painting and, on the other hand, we would not find it amiss 
to see them covering one – that is, they do not look out of place under the „reality 
guise‟ of protective or revelatory accoutrements.  
 
Second, the nature of the subject will act to selectively flout and exploit 
the perceptual laws governing the „third domain‟. In one respect, the chiaroscuro 
afforded by the folds in the curtains and the specular highlights evoked through 
the rendering of silk will be perceived as evidence of three-dimensional form.
105
 
While in another respect, since the shallow dips into depth of real curtains and 
their smooth curvature does not present much in the way of binocular or motion 
parallax, the fact that the picture does not yield these cues does not significantly 
alert Zeuxis to its virtual space. Indeed, if the strength of the first cue is played 
off against the unnoticed absence of the latter ones, it may appear that the 
curtains actually occupy a space in front of the picture plane.  
 
From the (presumed) character of Parrhasios‟s picture, we might 
therefore deduce a set of general criteria for producing a trompe l‟œil painting. 
First, the differences between the look of the picture and the look of a real scene 
must be kept to a minimum. So, for instance, the material qualities of the marks, 
the medium and the support must not be visible and depicted items must be 
                                               
104 Gombrich also makes this point in Art and Illusion when he claims that trompe l‟oeil painters 
rely „on the mutual reinforcement of illusion and expectation‟, p. 173. 
105 For an analysis of how the human visual system recovers shape from shading and surface 
reflectance see David Marr, Vision (New York: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1982) pp. 239 – 250. 
And for a discussion of how these factors relate to tonal modelling in pictures see Willats, Art 
and Representation, pp. 133 – 135 and Patrick Maynard, Drawing distinctions: the varieties of 
graphic expression (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 160 – 170. 
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rendered as naturalistically as possible.
106
 Second, the artists must choose to 
represent a scene which in reality would be lacking in cues that signal volume 
and which indicate the relative position of objects in depth – a distant view, for 
example, or something that is more or less flat. And finally, the pictorial space 
must seem coextensive with that of our own. This means two things. First, the 
projected sizes and shapes of depicted objects must be seen as in accordance with 
visual perspective, either seeming to recede behind or protrude in front of the 
plane of the picture.
107
 And second, the space that they occupy must be perceived 
as continuous with the surrounding environment; no borders or frames must 
mark it off, or if they do they must somehow ease rather than emphasise the 
transition between zones. Indeed, this latter strategy is perhaps more common 
since frames and architectural surroundings are highly amenable to illusionistic 
rendering and their materials tend to be less responsive to the contingencies of 
light and other environmental factors. For this reason, many (particularly 
Baroque) trompe l‟œils are site specific, drawing on the architectural vocabulary 
of the space. To cite a particularly spectacular example, consider Baldassare 
Peruzzi‟s Sala delle Prospettive in the Villa Farnesina in Rome (fig. 21).  
 
Consequently, we might end this section by saying that trompe l‟œil is 
like a sleight of hand or a conjuror‟s trick: it obscures, suppresses or diverts 
attention away from anything that speaks of the actual flatness of the picture 
                                               
106 However, this does not mean that represented objects have to have a real world counterpart – 
for example, it does not excluded the possibility of representing fictional entities such as cherubs 
– so long as their appearance conforms with the look of the real.  
107 In this respect, there would be no need for the artist to take into account the effects of 
perceptual constancy since if the projective geometry of the picture was sufficiently alike the 
projective geometry of a scene, then the viewer‟s visual system would compensate in the same 
way.  
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plane. For this reason, therefore, its representational strategy might be 
summarised as one that deceives. 
 
 
2.3 THE SPACES OF TROMPE L’ŒIL AND THEIR RELATION TO 
CUBISM 
 
These stipulations suggest that two types of space are likely to be typical of 
trompe l‟œil paintings. On the one hand, the viewing distance will be proximal, 
the pictorial space will be shallow and depicted items will be relatively flat or in 
some other way eclipse the cues of parallax that signal depth and volume. The 
best examples of this kind are to be found in the seventeenth-century Northern 
tradition, as this quodlibet by Cornelis Gijbrechts shows (fig. 22).
108
 In this vivid 
illusion we see notelets and various other items such as a quill and an hourglass 
fastened to a canvas with a network of ribbons. Either aligned with the support or 
at right angles to it (thus with their edges parallel to our line of sight), the paper 
scraps give us little reason to believe that a shift in position would substantially 
alter their appearance if this were an arrangement seen in real life. But this is not 
to say that they look completely flat to the surface; instead, their folds and the 
shadows they cast seem to project them forward into our space, and the same can 
be said of the curtain which pays tribute to the story of Parrhasios and Zeuxis. 
However, it is at the site where we normally suspend our judgement in order to 
enter the space of the artwork that the trompe l‟œil artist plays some of his most 
                                               
108 The term „quodlibet‟ (literally translating from Latin as „whatever pleases‟) is defined in 
James Stevens Curl‟s Dictionary of Architecture and Landscape Architecture as a „Fanciful type 
of trompe l'œil of oddments, often showing letters, paper-knives, playing-cards, ribbons, and 
scissors, in apparently accidental array, painted on walls, etc.‟ 2nd ed (Oxford University Press), 
p. 880. 
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powerful cards. For while he does in fact renounce the frame, he does not make 
us think that he does by substituting it for one that is illusionistically painted. In 
this way, the powerful depth cue of occlusion is brought into play,
109
 making it 
look as if the objects pinned to the board and the curtains overlap with – and are 
thus situated in front of – the frame.  
 
In the second type of trompe l‟œil space, the image will be at a far 
remove from the viewer and on a monumental scale or the scene itself will be 
represented as distant so that in neither case will the cues of parallax be 
conspicuously absent. This allows devices such as vanishing point perspective 
and foreshortening to give the semblance of depth without shifts in position 
giving the game away. These latter strategies are used to greatest effect in the 
illusionistic ceilings and wall paintings of the Italian Baroque, such as Andrea 
Pozzo‟s monumental ceiling fresco in the church of Sant‟Ignazio in Rome (fig. 
23). Pozzo‟s work depicts Christ flanked by a swirl of celestial bodies beckoning 
to the figure of Saint Ignatius as he ascends on a cloud. Viewed from the correct 
position (which is indicted by a mark on the floor) the depicted architecture 
appears to mesh with the church‟s real structure, thrusting it upwards by a further 
two elevations. Coupled with the centrifugal movement of the bodies, this 
vertical propulsion creates a kind of  „plughole perspective‟ which has no point 
of stability or definite closure. No vanishing point is indicated since the 
vertiginous plunge of the architecture opens directly out onto the sky, while this 
is blocked at its very nodal point – the implied point of convergence – by the 
figure of Christ. Since the space therefore remains forever unsealed, the viewer is 
                                               
109 Occlusion is the cue whereby a nearer object overlaps and thus partially hides one that is 
behind it. 
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made to feel weightless and disembodied as if gravity were counteracted by the 
lift of ascension, sucking us out of our physical flesh. 
 
Each mode of trompe l‟œil therefore seems to structure a distinct 
experience of space. On the one hand, the former might be said to evoke a 
proximal space suited to manual activity by appearing to place objects within 
reach of our hands. Conversely, the illusion of confronting infinite space can 
only serve to disembody the viewer for it dislocates – that is, it literally interferes 
with the ability to locate – objects with respect to the body. The perceptual effect 
of this is therefore one of disorientation and decentring – and perhaps, by 
implication, of oceanic feeling or dedifferentiation  – which thus lends it well to 
religious or spiritual themes.
110
  
 
Therefore, in light of the sensations which Cubism is said to evoke, it 
seems to be most closely related to the mode of trompe l‟œil which aims at the 
proximal encounter – the effect of the quodlibet, or (presumably) of Parrhasios‟s 
picture. In this respect, it is no coincidence that both of these styles tend to 
favour still life, for this genre treats objects that are eminently familiar and 
manipulable and thus can be easily related to our experience of touch. If we set 
aside the later concerns of collage, this overlap in subject matter is most apparent 
in Analytic Cubism. For this is not only the moment when Picasso and Braque 
turn their attention to still life, but also the time when the typical objects of the 
quodlibet – such as nails, curtains, picture frames and playing cards – enter their 
work. To illustrate this point we might usefully compare Gijbrechts‟s trompe 
                                               
110 I shall return to these ideas in the conclusion. The term „oceanic feeling‟ was popularised by 
Freud in his 1930 work Civilisation and its Discontents, however, my use of this word is not 
intended to have any psychoanalytic connotations. 
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l‟œil with Braque‟s Violin and Palette of 1909 (fig. 24). In Braque‟s picture, for 
example, a curtain similarly sweeps across to the right, pages of sheet music echo 
the flat frontality of the notelets and an illusionistic nail suspends a palette from 
the wall, just as scissors pin back the curtain in Gijbrechts‟s work. What is more, 
since the front face of the violin is aligned to the same plane as the palette and 
the score, it seems that Braque articulates a similarly shallow, „notice board‟ like 
space. And indeed, contemporary photographs indicate that the artists was 
seeking this kind of effect since he often arranged objects in this fashion on his 
studio walls (fig. 25). 
 
But if our response to such pictures is to imagine them as zones of 
potential activity, surely this loose correlation of space and subject is not 
sufficient to justify such a close similarity in their phenomenological mode. 
Many pictures depict objects that we might want to touch or have touched many 
times over and indeed, many present them as close at hand, but this does not 
mean that they evoke tactility in the same direct way. For example, while Gris‟s 
Fruit Dish and Glass (Still Life with Lemons) of 1923 (fig. 26) checks the 
appropriate boxes – plump grapes and waxy lemons might be thought of as 
eminently palpable, a glass might be considered eminently graspable and all are 
presented within a shallow, tilted up space – this work does not seem to possess 
the same magnetic draw for our hands. But neither can the similar effect of 
Gijbrechts‟s and Braque‟s compositions be attributed to a more specific overlap 
of spatial organisation or style. Braque‟s Cubist space – despite its loose 
correspondence – is fractured and ambiguous in ways that make it a far cry from 
the vivid illusionism of Gijbrechts‟s trompe l‟œil.  
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2.4 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION 
 
The question that we therefore need to ask is how the divergent styles of trompe 
l‟œil and Cubism are able to produce a similar effect. But in order to do this, I 
think it is necessary to separate out the issue of style from that of our visual 
experience, for even though a Cubist picture and a trompe l‟œil painting may 
have a very different compositional structure, this is not to say that their tactile 
effect does not arise from one and the same source. And more specifically, if we 
say that these styles are comparable in a phenomenological sense, this may be 
because – while they look very different – they nevertheless invite a similar type 
of visual engagement which is more deeply rooted in our capacity to see. This 
claim, insofar as it implies that our aesthetic responses derive their content from 
our broader perceptual abilities, is reminiscent of Willats‟ assertion that „picture 
perception [is] parasitic on real scene perception‟111. But it also suggests more. In 
other words, I am not simply arguing that our ability to understand pictures 
depends on our hard-wired capacity to interpret real views (as Willats is 
claiming). In addition I am proposing that the types of experience structured by 
representation can be continuous with – because they are arrived at in the same 
way as – the kinds of experience that we have when confronting real scenes. 
 
But this inevitably leads us to ask what our visual experiences are 
„normally‟ like and how, more specifically, they are able to evoke the sensation 
of movement and touch. One thing that philosophers have made apparent about 
seeing is that it has intentional content: we do not organise our sensations first 
                                               
111 John Willats, Art and Representation (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997) p. 23. 
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and then interpret their meaning second (or if we do, this does not become a 
conscious feature of perception). Rather, our visual experiences are always about 
something – they always hone in on meanings, objects and events – whether or 
not these are real or imaginary, lucid or confused. Thus, the visual field is always 
„pregnant with meaning,‟112 that is, we always anticipate a world full of 
significance because perception is primed to deliver salient configurations or 
„gestalt‟. And so, another way of expressing our earlier formulation is to say that 
the intentionality of pictures – what they are understood to be about and how 
they are experienced – is derived from the intentionality of real scene 
perception.
113
 
 
But in order to say how perception is intentional (and therefore how the 
experience of pictures may be too), it is useful to distinguish between two 
different interpretations of this notion by two important twentieth-century 
philosophers: Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I wish to focus more 
fully on the views of the latter, but it is instructive to preface this discussion by 
considering the ideas of Husserl, for it is to the gaps in his philosophy which 
Merleau-Ponty‟s theory responds.  
 
Husserl‟s major contribution to twentieth century thought was to develop 
the method of phenomenological reflection, a process whereby the philosopher 
                                               
112 I borrow this phrase from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who uses it many times over in his works. 
For example, in the Phenomenology of Perception he states that, „When we come back to 
phenomena we find, as a basic layer of experience, a whole already pregnant with an irreducible 
meaning: not sensations with gaps between them…but the layout of a landscape or a word, in 
spontaneous accord with the intentions of the moment…‟ Phenomenology of Perception 
translated by Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 25. This concept is undoubtedly derived 
from the philosopher‟s study of Gestalt psychology, an approach which he praised but felt had 
not adequately grasped its own results. 
113 This point is made, albeit in a somewhat different way, by Marc Jacob and Pierre Jeannerod in 
Ways of Seeing: The scope and limits of visual cognition (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 4.  
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brackets out prior assumptions and attempts to describe the nature of appearances 
as such. Thus, by adopting this procedure he drew attention to the intentional 
structure of perception and argued for its integration into the wider intentional 
network of all conscious experience.
114
 To use Sartre‟s phrase, his achievement 
was therefore to show that „all consciousness is consciousness of something‟.115 
Nevertheless, many of his followers found fault with this logic, and in particular, 
they saw in his philosophy a residual commitment to Kantian idealism
116
 which 
led him to erroneously equate perception with thought.
117
 Essentially, therefore, 
his system was condemned for subjugating the concrete world to the activities of 
the mind, confusing percepts with theoretical constructs and positing perception 
as a purely mental feat. 
 
For Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, perception is pre-eminently a 
bodily phenomenon and accordingly this forms the premise of his most famous 
                                               
114 However, the notion of intentionality was first revived from scholastic philosophy and 
reintroduced into modern thought by Franz Brentano, who discussed this concept in works such 
as Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkte (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint) of 
1874. 
115 Jean-Paul Sartre, „Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl‟s Phenomenology‟ (1939) 
reprinted in The Phenomenology Reader, ed. Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 389. 
116 Put crudely, this is the view that the mind actively constitutes the perceptual world rather than 
the external world simply supplying the contents of perception. This idea was expounded in the 
Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and is often referred to as „transcendental idealism‟. The first 
sustained critique of this notion – and by implication of Husserl‟s thought – from within the 
phenomenological tradition was advanced by Martin Heidegger in his 1927 lecture course, Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology. Heidegger‟s rejection of this facet of Husserl‟s thought is later 
echoed and expanded by important twentieth century thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-
Paul Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Jacques Derrida. For a summary of the views of these various 
philosophers see Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 2000). 
117 This more accurately describes the view developed in Husserl‟s early works such as Logical 
Investigations (1900 – 1901) and Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (1913). In 
his later works (and in particular his unpublished manuscripts which were a major source of 
inspiration to Merleau-Ponty) he began to reject this classical metaphysics of subjectivity. 
However, the extent to which he actually freed himself from the legacy of Kant is a point of 
contention in philosophical discourse. In Husserl’s Phenomenology, for example, Dan Zahavi 
argues against this „reductive‟ view of his work (California: Stanford University Press, 2003), 
while in his essay „The Flesh of Perception‟ A. D. Smith claims that Merleau-Ponty develops the 
implications of Husserl‟s thought rather than radically reworks its premises (as is commonly 
assumed), see Reading Merleau-Ponty, ed. Thomas Baldwin (London and New York: Routledge, 
2007), pp. 1 –22. 
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work, the Phenomenology of Perception (1945). The starting point of the 
Phenomenology is the contention that the mind/body problem generated by 
Cartesian thought creates two equally untenable philosophical positions. On the 
one hand, „Intellectualism‟ posits the subject as an absolute consciousness with 
the world as a merely contingent construct of mind; on the other hand, 
Empiricism posits a world of independent objects, accessible to the subject 
through the senses and imparted meaning by judgement and association. So, for 
the Intellectualist, a pure consciousness creates its own reality and presides over 
it like God; for the Empiricist the body is but one object among others and 
consciousness becomes an enigma buried under a causal chain of stimulus and 
reflex.  
 
Rallying against the reductions implicit in both positions, Merleau-Ponty 
attempts to return focus to the mutual dependencies of body and world – or of 
subject and object – which he claims are apparent in the pre-objective experience 
of phenomena, that is, before appearances are ascribed a determinate, conceptual 
meaning. To this end, his phenomenological project involves demonstrating the 
primacy of perception as opposed to the primacy of thought and describing its 
relation to a deeper, more primitive stratum of human experience. Therefore, 
pace Husserl, the guiding principle of the Phenomenology is that „all 
consciousness is perceptual‟118; in other words, perception precedes and 
underpins the organisation of experience into fixed categories and concepts. Thus 
the crucial corollary of this is that one‟s own body (le corps propre), insofar as it 
                                               
118 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, „The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences‟, in 
The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy 
of Art, History and Politics, ed James M. Edie (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), p. 
13. 
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is the subject of perception, is posited as the a priori ground of all conscious 
experience.
119
 Or, to put this more simply, every thought we think is made 
possible by our bodily insertion into, and sensory engagement with, the 
perceptual world. In short, consciousness is founded upon embodied perception.  
 
But what, then, is this „lived‟, or „phenomenal body‟? According to 
Merleau-Ponty, it cannot be the transcendental subject of Intellectualism as it 
only affords a „point of view upon the world‟120 and hence it cannot be that 
which fully constitutes the appearance of objects. But neither can it be the 
„collection of adjacent organs‟121 studied by science and posited by Empiricism 
for it is „that by which there are objects‟122 and must therefore be more than a 
sum of physical parts. Instead, the philosopher claims that the pre-objective body 
is essentially a „motor power‟ or „a „motor intentionality‟123 which carves out the 
phenomenal field in terms of its plans and activities. And furthermore, since the 
boundaries between body and world are blurred at this pre-objective level, 
familiar objects can become internally related to our bodies through the 
„intentional threads‟ woven around us by our habitual movements and gestures. 
Consequently, Merleau-Ponty claims that visual objects speak to us as „poles of 
action‟124 rather than merely as bits of visibilia or as abstract entities of 
conceptual thought. And so, to summarise these ideas with a phrase from the 
                                               
119 The body as an a priori principle of consciousness was replaced in later works such as The 
Visible and the Invisible with the notion of „Flesh‟. Merleau-Ponty performed this volte-face 
because he felt that the idea of the body formulated in his earlier work remained too closely tied 
to the consciousness / object distinction. Merleau-Ponty says of Flesh that it „is not matter, is not 
mind, is not substance…[it is] a sort of incarnate principle that brings style of being wherever 
there is a fragment of being‟ (The Visible and the Invisible, ed Claude Lefort (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 139.)  
120 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 70. 
121 Ibid, p. 272. 
122 Ibid, p. 92. 
123 Ibid. p. 127. 
124 Ibid, p. 122. 
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Phenomenology, „Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the 
intermediary of the body…and to move one‟s body is to aim at things through 
it‟.125 
 
 
2.5 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF TOUCH AND THE AESTHETICS OF 
TROMPE L’ŒIL 
 
If we therefore adopt the tenets of Merleau-Ponty‟s thought it may seem that we 
have a basis for explaining why a trompe l‟œil like Gijbrechts‟s appeals to our 
sense of touch. Let us start by considering the subject matter of the picture. As 
we noted earlier, Gijbrechts presents us with familiar objects which are close at 
hand. But while we might not think of these objects as especially pleasant to the 
touch, their everyday banality (to a seventeenth-century observer, at least) may 
be precisely what invests them with a tactile magnetism. More specifically, by 
being things which are handled regularly in life, the very perception of these 
objects might be said to mobilise our hands into action.
126
 Their proximity to the 
viewer thus adds to this feeling by making them seem as if readily available. 
Furthermore, since they are depicted as loosely attached to the surface we are 
invited to see them as easily removable and hence as eminently usable too. 
 
                                               
125 Ibid, pp. 159 –161. 
126 This point may be illuminated by Merleau-Ponty‟s description of a workaday task: „the 
subject, when put in front of his scissors, needle and familiar tasks, does not need to look for his 
hands and fingers, because they are […] potentialities already mobilised by the perception of 
scissors or needle, the central end of those „intentional threads‟ which link him to the objects 
given.‟ Ibid, p. 121. 
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But of course, we need to understand how this effect is transported from 
real life into the realm of representation and why, in particular, it is engendered 
so effectively by Gijbrechts‟s style. In this case, the answer appears to be that it 
is not so much translated into a language of pictures that is sui generis for, as we 
have seen, the artist deliberately conceals the artifice of his work.
 127
 Rather, the 
motor response elicited by this painting seems due to the way that it behaves like 
a chameleon against the backdrop of reality, merging with its surroundings in an 
inconspicuous way. Accordingly, if seeing and acting are indissolubly related in 
normal perception and if this style allows a flat plane to masquerade (however 
briefly) as a real three-dimensional scene, then the phenomenology of the former 
will be transferred to the latter. Thus, for as long as the illusion lasts (or perhaps, 
for as long as it is entertained) the quodlibet will be invested with the „thickness‟ 
of the real.
128
 
 
This points to a further reason why the spaces and subjects of still life are 
favoured in the trompe l‟œil tradition. For not only do they bolster the illusion of 
the picture, but they also invest it with a particular tactility which is borrowed 
from – but can nevertheless thematise – the physicality of sight. I say „thematise‟ 
because this is not something that we necessarily attend to in real scene 
perception since, according to Merleau-Ponty, the intentionality of thought 
                                               
127 Of course, I am not denying that this effect is translated into the terms of the medium, as it 
obviously must be. And neither am I saying that Gijbrechts‟s picture lacks a representational 
system which operates according to the principles that Willats describes. My point is rather that 
the formal syntax employed by the artist avoids the kind of detectable structure that would serve 
to differentiate it from the look of real space. It might therefore be said that in terms of his use of 
the medium, Gijbrechts‟s work exhibits no visible style. 
128 The word „thickness‟ is one I borrow from Merleau-Ponty. This word refers to the substantive 
nature of perceiving in the world and the way that objects encountered through one sense seem to 
speak to all the senses at once. See, for example, Ibid, p. 237. 
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obscures the motor intentionality of vision.
129
 Thus, we are not normally aware 
of the physical magnetism which gives the visual field its meaning, even though 
it instructs and depends upon our movements and actions.
130
 Nevertheless, an 
artist may draw attention to this pre-objective realm by representing a scene 
which – through the selection of objects or their deliberate arrangement – is 
abundant in the qualities which invite a manual response. Thus while it may be 
the ready availability of the objects in Gijbrechts‟s work which invites us to 
manipulate and use them, it may be the exquisitely rendered silk in van der 
Spelt‟s painting which make his curtains solicit a more caressing kind of touch. 
But whatever the specifics, these „proximal‟ trompe l‟œils do not simply produce 
visual illusions. Rather they recruit from perceptual reality the appearances 
which most forcefully engender a sense of movement and touch. 
 
One thing that therefore distinguishes an effective trompe l‟œil from most 
other pictures is the peculiar physicality of its aesthetic effect: an effect that one 
might characterise as exhilarating for it makes us feel ourselves in the process of 
perceiving and therefore affirms our sense of being alive. However, because this 
is purely a function of the verisimilitude of the spaces and subjects represented, 
this condition only obtains to the extent that we entertain the illusion, that is, to 
the extent that we treat the contents of the picture as if they are real. When we 
                                               
129 For example, Merleau-Ponty claims that: „…the positing of one single object…exceeds 
perceptual experience…I detach myself from experience and pass to the idea…I am no longer 
concerned with my body, nor with time, nor with the world, as I experience them in 
antepredicative knowledge, in the inner communion that I have with them. I now refer to my 
body as only an idea, to the universe as idea, to the idea of space and the idea of time. Thus 
„objective thought‟…is formed – being that of common sense and of science – which finally 
causes us to lose contact with perceptual experience, of which it is nevertheless the outcome and 
the natural sequel.‟ Ibid, p. 82. I shall go on to say more about this in the following chapter. 
130 This seems to be what Merleau-Ponty means when he describes the spatiality of the body as 
„not…a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation‟. Ibid, pp. 114 – 115 (original 
emphasis). 
 96 
discern or pay attention to the artifice of picture – when we consider it as a 
painted surface – this sense of tangibility will inevitably fade. But equally, it is 
only with this latter mode of seeing that the style of the artist – or of trompe l‟œil 
more broadly – becomes apparent, for if we are to see the manipulations of the 
medium we must suspend the „reality effect‟131 (and vice versa). In other words, 
we can either be deceived by the illusion or we can admire the artistry that 
creates the illusion, but since the one is the obverse of the other, we cannot 
experience these things at the same time. Trompe l‟œil does not therefore accede 
to the logic of the „third domain‟, for it either deceives as an illusion or is 
appreciated as paint on a surface, but because this phenomenology is disjunctive 
it does not constitute its own representational space. 
 
In summary, therefore, it is by simulating the perceived world in its most 
physically evocative aspects that a trompe l‟œil becomes invested with the 
„thickness‟ of the real. In other words, it is by tricking the eye that these artworks 
fool the body: they produce a contagion that spreads from vision to touch. In 
comparison, I wish to argue that the strategies of Cubism are manifestly 
different: Picasso and Braque do not structure an experience which is physically 
invested by deceiving the senses and which loses its tactility as soon as the 
illusion recedes. Rather feelings of touch are directly engendered through the 
                                               
131 My use of this term does not correspond to the definition given by Roland Barthes. According 
to Barthes the „reality effect‟ is occasioned by as „the direct collusion of a referent and a 
signifier,‟ such that „the signified is expelled from the sign‟ and the latter purports „to denote the 
real directly‟ (p. 147; p.148). The descriptive detail included in a trompe l‟œil is clearly not 
designed to serve this purpose, for it is not incidental or superfluous, but rather conforms to the 
iconography of a particular genre (be this a quodlibet, a curtain painting or an illusionistic 
ceiling). Thus while a photograph might be included under Barthes‟s description, a trompe l‟œil 
is closer to the figure of hypotyposis which he claims is intended to „“put things before the 
hearer‟s eyes,” not in a neutral, constative manner, but by imparting to representation all the 
lustre of desire…‟ (pp. 145 – 46). See Barthes, „The Reality Effect‟ in The Rustle of Language, 
trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 141 
– 148, first published in Communications (1968). 
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actual nature of their style. So one thing is not gained or lost at the expense of the 
other – while artifice is announced, motor intentionality is retained. 132 This is 
therefore my interpretation of the „realism‟ of Cubism133 – it does not produce its 
effect by masking its own pictorial nature, that is, by letting the fact that it is a 
representation slide out of view. Instead, it creates this experience on its own 
terms. Thus, in place of deceiving, it might be said to evoke.
134
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
132 Jaakko Hintikka has also noted the accord between Cubism and phenomenology. However, 
his interpretation is very different from mine since he argues that the Cubists attempt to represent 
the intentionality of thought (in the sense proposed by Husserl) instead of the perspectival 
appearance of objects. See The Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities 
(Dordrecht and Boston: Reidel Publishing Co., 1975), Chap. 11, „Concept as Vision: On the 
Problem of Representation in Modern Art and in Modern Philosophy‟. 
133 Cubism has frequently been discussed as a style of realism, although this term has been 
defined in many different ways. In the early critical literature, Courbet is often cited as the father 
of the movement due to his emphasis on the substantiality of form rather than on shifting visual 
appearances. This is in accordance with an understanding of realism as a form intellection 
whereby the Cubists are said to represent the world as it is known instead of as it is seen. Writers 
who espouse this view include André Salmon, Guillaume Apollinaire, Albert Gleizes and Jean 
Metzinger and Fernand Léger. More specifically, Apollinaire and Gleizes and Metzinger 
characterise realism as an act of creation which, by expressing new ideas, the artist actively 
constitutes the world. Alternatively, Jaakko Hintikka has claimed that the realism of Cubism is to 
be associated with the essential character of experience that phenomenological reflection reveals. 
For an analysis of this concept in the early critical literature see Christopher Gray, Cubist 
Aesthetic Theories (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1953). For extracts from some of the key 
texts see Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (ed), Art in Theory: 1900 – 2000 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2003), pp. 184 – 217. 
134 To be explicit, then, my concept of Cubist realism can be said to have two distinct 
components: first, it alerts us to a latent substrate of perceptual reality by serving as a pictorial 
„criterion‟ of it (in the Wittgensteinian sense) and second, it does not deny (and in many cases, it 
emphasises) the ontological status of the representation itself. 
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CHAPTER 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
Seeing as Thinking and Seeing as Sensing 
 
 
 
 
…Vision doubles. There is the vision upon which I reflect; I cannot think of it 
except as thought, the mind‟s inspection, judgement, the reading of signs. And 
then there is the vision which actually occurs, an honorary or established thought, 
collapsed into a body – its own body, of which we have no idea except in the 
exercise of it, and which introduces, between space and thought, the autonomous 
order of the composite of soul and body. The enigma of vision is not done away 
with; it is shifted from the “thought of seeing” to vision in act. 
  
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty135  
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Essentially, then, my claim is that there is not one, but two ways of seeing: one 
coupled with feeling and one coupled with thought. However, the former variety 
– that which is more fully invested with bodily sensations – tends also to be that 
which escapes our notice in everyday life. Accordingly, its arrival into art had to 
be contingent on a tireless observation of the phenomenal world and the means to 
                                               
135 „Eye and Mind‟ in The Maurice Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting, 
ed. Galen A. Johnson (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993), p. 136. 
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express it would necessarily depend on a gradual process of trial and error, 
successes often being counterbalanced by frustrations and dead ends. Thus, if we 
are to nominate Cézanne as the father of this tradition, following Merleau-Ponty, 
it also seems appropriate to speak of his „doubt‟.136 But while artists may have 
developed this „physicalised‟ style in an intuitive fashion, this is not to say that it 
(or indeed its counterpart) cannot be described in a more empirical manner, 
especially given the evidence that is available to us through contemporary 
science. Therefore, by showing how these distinct conceptions of seeing may be 
linked to distinct modes of visual processing – how, in short they have a 
psychological reality – I intend to pave the way for an analysis that will connect 
them precisely and substantially to the formal structures of pictorial art. 
 
 
3.2. CUBIST PAINTING AND ‘SEEING HOW’ 
 
To begin this argument, let me first recount my own experience of the peculiar 
physicality of Cubism, for hopefully this should give us an idea of the work that 
is yet to be done. The painting that initially sparked my interest and led me to 
believe that there was something incongruous about this style which required 
further explanation was Picasso‟s House in a Garden, La Rue-de-Bois (fig. 27). 
What struck me about this picture was that, although I recognised the house as a 
house and the wall as a wall, at a more intuitive level these elements seemed like 
building blocks – that is, they reminded me of the kinds of objects we are given 
                                               
136 „Cézanne‟s Doubt‟ is the name of Merleau-Ponty‟s famous 1945 essay, wherein Cézanne‟s 
approach to painting is described as a form of phenomenological reflection. See The Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: Philosophy and Painting, ed Galen A. Johnson (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 1993), pp. 59 – 75. 
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as children in order to develop manual dexterity and hand-eye coordination 
(compare figure 27 and figure 28). However, it was not so much that the forms 
looked like toy building blocks. Of course, in view of their geometrical shapes, 
they do. But this interpretation did not seem to issue from a visual comparison. 
Instead, it was as if it arose from a physical experience: from the sense I had that 
there were real objects within my body‟s vicinity and that it would be possible to 
and stack or slot them together.
137
 
 
Two things therefore became clear to me as a result of this encounter: 
first that the tactile appeal of the early landscapes is dissociable from their 
referential content, and second that it is a function of feeling and not a fact of 
identity. In short, it seemed that the objects I recognised were not the same as the 
ones that I perceived within the orbit of my body. Of course, we often speak of 
pictures as possessing sensuous qualities, but when this is a consequence of the 
things they depict it is usually born of an association with previous experience 
and therefore content is supplied to the picture through the faculty of memory.  
And so, the palpability of a still life by Chardin – his Carafe, Silver Goblet and 
Fruit, for example (fig. 29) – may be explained through the fact that he renders 
objects and textures that are eminently familiar and agreeable to touch: the 
coldness of silver, the roughness of peel, the curvature of glass and so on and so 
forth. In contrast, the tactile appeal of a Cubist landscape cannot be understood 
as a product of memory since distant objects cannot be touched in reality.
 
 
                                               
137 I am not the first person to note the peculiar physicality of the early landscapes. See, for 
instance, Rosalind Krauss‟s discussion of Picasso‟s Houses on the Hill, Horta de Ebro in „The 
Motivation of the Sign‟ in W. Rubin, K. Varnedoe and L. Zelevansky, Picasso and Braque: A 
Symposium (New York: Museum of Modern Art / Abrams, 1992), pp. 261 – 287. This is also 
suggested by John Golding when he speaks of the „sculptural feeling‟ of Picasso‟s early Cubism. 
See Cubism: A History and an Analysis (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1959), pp. 81 – 82. This 
view has also been corroborated by Paul Smith through personal correspondence.  
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Trompe l‟œil paintings, as I have already indicated, are somewhat 
exceptional in this regard. For, in these instances, it is not so much a matter of 
remembering the tactile qualities of objects but of thinking that they are actually 
present in front of our eyes. In other words, they recruit their phenomenology 
from reality rather than deriving it from memory in an indirect way. This 
therefore raises an interesting issue, for we might wonder why non-trompe l‟œil 
representations, insofar as they are still considered parasitic on real scene 
perception, should require this associative link to memory in order to evoke 
tactility. Why not say that they derive it – in a weaker but still direct way – from 
the imbrication of vision and touch that (allegedly) characterises the experience 
of seeing in real life? In truth, I think the matter is more complex than this: the 
greater the naturalism of the representation, the easier it will be to treat it as a 
slice of reality and thus the more directly it will seem to reproduce this 
perceptual effect. The more it abstracts from (or symbolically figures) the look of 
the world, the more we will rely on thought and memory to fill in the gaps. 
Therefore, belonging to the former category, the tactility of Chardin‟s picture is 
perhaps more directly perceived.  
 
Be that as it may, the modus operandi of Cubism must be altogether 
different. What I am suggesting, in other words, is that when we look at a Cubist 
landscape, if we do experience forms as palpable entities it cannot be that we 
first identify depicted objects and then relate these to past tactual encounters. No 
doubt, perception does possess this associative dimension, but it does not help to 
explain the phenomenology of this experience since we have never held a 
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building or a wall in our hands. Instead, what I think that these landscapes reveal 
– indeed what they require for their particular effect – is the hidden layer of 
motor intentionality in vision that Merleau-Ponty describes. My claim, 
accordingly, is that there is something peculiar about the style of these pictures 
which conflicts with their manifest content and, in doing so, reshapes the 
pictorial field into a zone of potential activity. In this case it would not be an 
epistemic act of vision
138
 – a kind of „seeing that‟ – which gave rise to the 
building block analogy, but rather a kind of seeing that indicated how to engage 
with an object of such graspable dimensions when it is located within our 
peripersonal space.
139
  
 
 
3.3 VISUALISED THINKING AND THE RENAISSANCE TRADITION 
 
Let me be more explicit: „seeing that‟ essentially refers to an experience whereby 
what we see is subsumed under a concept. In other words, we do not simply 
detect something visually, but we understand it as being about some object or 
event, whether real or illusory, actual or imagined. And to avoid further 
confusion, this should also be distinguished from Wittgenstein‟s concept of 
„seeing as‟.140 He invokes this term to draw attention to the difference between 
having a visual experience with some determinate content (for example, seeing a 
rabbit) and responding to our experience in a particular way (for example, seeing 
                                               
138 I borrow the idea of „epistemic seeing‟ from Marc Jacob and Pierre Jeannerod, who compare it 
with „non-epistemic seeing‟ – having a visual experience without identifying what it is of. Ways 
of Seeing, p. xvii. 
139 „Peripersonal space‟ refers to the space that is within reach of our limbs. This is usually 
compared with the physically inaccessible zone of „extrapersonal space‟.  
140 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1953), Part II, section xi. 
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Jatrow‟s ambiguous figure as a rabbit rather than seeing it as a duck (fig C)). 
However, the experience I had of Picasso‟s picture did not seem to belong to 
either of these categories. Instead, it was associated with my body more directly 
and did not lead to the idea of any particular thing.  
 
On first consideration, this notion may seem strange since we tend to treat 
sight as a means to acquire knowledge and thus ascribe it a role as the 
handmaiden of thought. For instance, when I say „I see a table in front of me‟ I 
treat the verb „to see‟ as if the sole purpose of vision were to deliver up nameable 
entities. But seeing is not always an act of classification and is not necessarily 
guided by concepts. I do not, for example, form a concept of the pen‟s position in 
relation to my body and then consciously map out the movements of my hand as 
I reach out to grasp it. However, for the normally sighted this action must depend 
heavily on vision, for otherwise we would not be able to locate the pen without 
feeling around for it first. Equally, I do not need to look at my feet when I walk 
up the stairs. And yet since this task is markedly more difficult when I do it with 
my eyes closed, I must be relying on sight in some way, even if seems that this 
information is not being consciously represented or actively sought. 
 
We have already gone some way to understanding this tendency to equate 
perception with thought in light of Merleau-Ponty‟s argument in the 
Phenomenology. According to the philosopher, we are inclined to consider the 
world as a self-sufficient space filled with objects that are distinct from our 
bodies because the synthesising activity of perception obscures its own 
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operations and „escape[s] from itself into the thing seen‟141. Consequently, it 
appears that we encounter a „sphere of immanence‟ in which the items we see 
have determinate qualities and exist independently of our contact with them. Or, 
to put this another way, a separation is effected between the world and ourselves 
such that we are no longer aware of our „pre-objective‟ dialogue with the things 
we perceive.
142
 In summary, therefore: 
 
[…] when I move towards a world I bury my perceptual and practical 
intentions in objects which ultimately appear prior to and external to 
those intentions, and which nevertheless exist for me only in so far as 
they arouse in me thoughts  or volitions.
143
 
 
We might therefore conjecture that this drive of consciousness towards meaning 
will act to erode the distinction between seeing as a constitutive process and 
recognition as a reified act. And so, if it appears that we immediately see things 
as having definite identities, and indeed if this activity of labelling is what allows 
us to conceptualise them further, then we will be led to treat vision as an 
accessory to thought.
144
  
 
On the face of it, this idea seems to be reinforced by our normal 
experience of seeing, especially in light of the way that the visual field appears to 
                                               
141 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 438. He also claims that, „Our perception 
ends in objects, and the object once constituted, appears as the reason for all the experiences of it 
which we have had or could have had‟ (p. 77). 
142Merleau-Ponty states that: „The natural world presents itself as existing in itself over and above 
its existence for me; the act of transcendence whereby the subject is thrown open to the world 
runs away with itself and we find ourselves in the presence of a nature which has no need to be 
perceived in order to exist.‟ Ibid, p. 178. 
143 Ibid, p. 95. 
144 For a discussion of how visual percepts may be mapped onto thoughts by way of object 
recognition see Jacob and Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing, pp. 30 – 32 and pp. 140 - 143 
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detach itself from, and spread itself beyond, the site of the body. As Husserl 
notes, for instance, visual sensations are not like tactile ones for they are not 
experienced as physically „localised‟ (that is, while they may seem concentrated 
at the point of the eye they are not felt to press against its skin). Touch therefore 
plays a special role in his philosophy (as it does in Merleau-Ponty‟s) since it 
affords a „double sensation‟ which reveals the chiasmic relation between subject 
and object. In touching one hand with the other, for example, we can either 
experience ourselves as the perceiving subject or as the object perceived. 
However since vision lacks this intimate connection with the body – since we 
cannot literally see ourselves seeing – Husserl claims that it is not adequate to 
disclose this „lived‟ relation to things.145  
 
But equally, it is precisely this dephysicalised aspect of seeing which 
earns it a privileged position in the hierarchy of the senses and leads it to be 
understood as an adjunct to thought. For through the eye‟s ability to range over 
distances, to fixate and resolve the areas in its foveal centre and to weave them 
together into a simultaneous whole, it appears to afford us an immediate and 
panoramic experience of the world. And furthermore, since this operation is 
                                               
145 Edmund Husserl, Ideas II § 36 – 37. For a discussion see Françoise Dastur, „World, Flesh, 
Vision‟ in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Flesh, ed. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor (New 
York: State University of New York Press, 2000), pp. 23 – 49. The idea that vision divorces us 
from the phenomenal body and that this relationship is only recuperated through the intermediary 
of touch is of course something that Merleau-Ponty refutes by considering sight as a power of 
motor intentionality. However, in his early works such as the Phenomenology of Perception, this 
idea still arguably depends on an analogy with touch. By instituting the principle of „flesh‟ in 
later essays such as „Eye and Mind‟ and in his last incomplete work, The Visible and the Invisible 
he develops an account of vision as the sense that pre-eminently reveals our chiasmic relationship 
with the world. On this view, vision is „a sort of straits between exterior horizons and interior 
horizons ever gaping open‟ and „every visible is cut out in the tangible, every tactile being in 
some manner promised to visibility, and that there is encroachment, infringement, not only 
between the touched and the touching, but also between the tangible and the visible, which is 
incrusted in it, as conversely, the tangible itself is not a nothingness of visibility, is not without 
visual existence.‟ The Visible and the Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort (Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1968), p. 132; p.134. 
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usually performed with such rapidity and ease, and since it so rarely fails to 
disambiguate meanings, we tend not to reflect on the actual process of seeing – 
that is, on the indeterminacy which precedes, and the work that is involved in, 
the recognitional act.
146
 Therefore, in theorising sight we tend to consider it as a 
fait accompli or, in Merleau-Ponty‟s terms, we think that it opens out onto a 
„readymade‟ world. And so, to explain how coherent perceptions are made out of 
the inchoate data of light we refer to cognitive acts such as memory and 
reasoning. Thus the body is viewed as the passive receiver of sensations and 
sight is recast as a power of the disembodied mind.
147
    
 
I suggested earlier that this conception of sight may have a correlate in art 
insofar as it is expressed through pictorial conventions which were developed in 
the Renaissance and which thereafter became dominant until the nineteenth 
century. As many authors have noted, the most obvious of these is linear 
perspective, particularly in light of viewing experience which it structures 
through its ordering of space.
148
 Consider, for example, Claude‟s Seaport with 
the Embarkation of the Queen of Sheba (fig. 30). At first glance, what is striking 
about this composition is its balance and symmetry: the sea and the sky neatly 
divide the picture horizontally, while the three dominant architectural elements – 
                                               
146 For this reason, some philosophers have claimed that visual experiences are „transparent‟ or 
„diaphanous‟. See, for example, Gilbert Harman, „The intrinsic quality of experience‟, in The 
nature of consciousness, eds N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press), pp. 663 – 75. 
147 This is a criticism that Merleau-Ponty levels at both the empiricist and the „Intellectualist‟ 
approaches to perception. See particularly the introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception, 
pp. 3 – 74. In more contemporary terms, we might relate these positions to the bottom up and top 
down approaches to vision insofar as they make no reference to the synthesising power of the 
body. 
148 Leonardo was the first to raise this issue, noting that the space structured by linear perspective 
is not the same as that afforded by natural (i.e., embodied) vision, since it presumes a single or 
monocular point of view. Leonardo da Vinci, Treatise on Painting, trans. John Francis Rigaud 
(London: J. B. Nichols and Son, 1835), Chap. CXXVI, pp. 57 – 58. 
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the column, the palace and the watchtower – create a repoussoir that leads our 
gaze inexorably towards the vanishing point, a location which is both reinforced 
by and dissolved through the glow of the sun. However, this culminating point is 
not merely the climax of a pleasant vista; it also tacitly mirrors and stipulates the 
viewer‟s own position in space through the imaginary vector of the centric ray 
which glues our eye to this luminous spot. Therefore, since the location we are 
assigned is essentially a point on a line, no allowance is made for the presence of 
our body (or indeed, for depth-giving power of binocular vision). Instead, the 
viewpoint we are offered is one of a dephysicalised being whose sole purchase 
on the scene is as a power of sight.
149
 
 
This impression of pure visuality is further abetted by the imperceptibility 
of Claude‟s brushwork which, save for a concession to aerial perspective, 
meticulously describes every form in the scene. Therefore, as Norman Bryson 
argues with respect to Western representational painting more generally, such 
highly polished surfaces cause the „work of production‟ and the work of vision to 
be equally suppressed.
150
 On the one hand, we are left with no evidence of the 
traces of the brush or of the „body of labour‟ which wields it. Thus, the duration 
of painting as a physical process is hidden from view. And, on the other hand, 
there is no hint of the temporality of seeing itself. That is, we are not made aware 
                                               
149 In this respect, the sun is not only our spatial equivalent but may also act as a metaphor for our 
gaze. It could be said, for example, that both our sight and the sun „illuminate‟ the scene and 
accordingly, that each bathes the world in the „light of reason‟. But equally, since looking at the 
sun – as the composition entreats us to do – causes blindness, it could also stand as a metaphor 
for the blindspot of the eye. Perhaps, then, it also hints at the enigma of sight: how it seemingly 
constitutes an experience of plenitude out of nothing. In any case, this „God‟s-eye view‟ might be 
taken to have a religious significance in light of the theme of the picture. In the Bible, the queen‟s 
arduous journey to visit King Solomon to test his wisdom is equated with the true path to 
knowledge which comes from following the teachings of Christ. See The New Testament, 
Matthew 12:42 and Luke 11:31. 
150 Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (London: Macmillan, 1983). See 
particularly Chapter 5, „The Gaze and the Glance‟, pp. 87 – 131. 
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of how – instead of rendering everything immediately lucid – the eye jumps from 
place to place, only resulting in a stable perception through scanning and 
saccadic movements that happen in time.  
 
Therefore, in Bryson‟s terms the constitutive work of the „glance‟ is 
disavowed in favour of the „panoptic, split-second clarity‟ of a decarnalised 
„gaze‟.151 Or, to put it more plainly, in a picture such as this – that is, one 
combining self-effacive brushwork with central perspective (or perhaps, more 
broadly, one belonging to the Renaissance tradition) – we find painting 
bracketing out the bodily process of vision and instead giving itself over to the 
thought of sight.
152
 Hence, to make further use of Merleau-Ponty‟s vocabulary, 
we might say that the lived „settings‟ of time and space are ushered out of 
depiction,
 
only to be replaced with something more congealed and abstract: a 
space where it is fairly easy to recognise objects, but not one in which they are 
sensed in a physical way.
 153
 
 
 
                                               
151 Ibid, p. 95.  
152
 Hubert Damisch has also noted how perspective introduces an element of thought into 
painting, claiming that it is the „paradigm of representation…through which [it] reflects on itself 
and reveals its operation‟ (p. 269). However, being primarily concerned with perspective as a 
form of visual signification which disposes symbols of the gaze throughout the field of 
representation, his approach differs markedly from my own. See Damisch, The Origin of 
Perspective, trans. John Goodman (Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1995. First 
published 1987 by Flammarion, Paris). My argument is also informed by Merleau-Ponty‟s 
critique of perspective in his 1960 essay „Eye and Mind‟. Comparing this mode of representation 
to Cartesian philosophy, he claims that each conceives of space as something that is thought and 
which presupposes the vantage point of  „absolute‟ Being as opposed to one that is „lived‟ and is 
constituted through the activities of the embodied perceiver. See „Eye and Mind‟, pp. 133 – 136.  
153 Merleau-Ponty uses the word „setting‟ to refer to the perceptual background which is 
structured by motor intentionality and which allows meaningful thoughts and activities to take 
shape. Time, for instance, is durational and fluid, or as Merleau-Ponty puts it: „in our primordial 
experience, it is not for us a system of objective positions, through which we pass, but a mobile 
setting which moves away from us, like the landscape seen through a railway carriage.‟ 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 437. 
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3.4 THE DUAL VISUAL SYSTEM HYPOTHESIS 
 
But what else can the „vocabulary‟ of representational pictures consist of if this is 
not drawn from the contents of epistemic seeing, or from the visual percepts that 
allow recognition to take place? At this point, it might seem like I have backed 
myself into a corner due to the conflicting nature of my theoretical commitments. 
On the one hand, I have argued along with Merleau-Ponty that perception 
„doubles‟, either tending towards thought or catering to action (and thus 
establishing a more „primordial‟ and bodily relationship with the world).  But, on 
the other hand, I have endorsed Willats‟s theory of pictures. And since Willats 
advances a perceptualist account of representation
154
 and describes perception as 
a process which enables us to recognise objects, then he must also understand the 
process of depiction as being contingent on this same mode of sight.
155
 
Therefore, if recognition is a top down activity whereby we subsume what we 
see under concepts – if it is ultimately a mode of reflexive perception – then 
depiction will never directly induce the carnal phenomenology that Merleau-
Ponty describes. Or to put this in the slightly different terms of Husserl, if 
representation only extracts the „reference‟ or Bedeutung from seeing and not its 
                                               
154 I do not mean that Willats‟s account is „perceptualist‟ in the sense that Norman Bryson applies 
it to theories of representation (like Gombrich‟s) which suppose that pictures produce copies of 
the things that we see. I mean that he views depiction as something that has a natural basis in our 
visual capacities. For Bryson‟s critique see Vision and Painting, pp. 37 – 66. 
155 Willats claims that „providing a representation in which something specific can be recognised 
can be seen as the most basic function of pictures‟. However, nowhere does he say that this is the 
definition of representation. Art and Representation, p. 22. According to Merleau-Ponty, „The 
recognition of phenomena…implies a theory of reflection‟ and reflection „detaches subject and 
object from each other‟. Phenomenology of Perception, p. 58; p. 231. This might also be linked to 
his idea of second-order expression where, in denominating (and hence, recognising) an object, 
we are no longer aware of investing it with meaning. Instead, we think that this meaning belongs 
to the object itself. Ibid, pp. 202 – 32. 
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intentional, bodily „sense‟ or Sinn, then pictures will always cloak perception in 
the mantle of thought.
156
  
 
But it is not necessary to follow Willats all the way through to this 
conclusion. We may still adopt the basic premise of his account – the idea that 
pictures encode and are perceived by grace of the visual cues we are predisposed 
to detect in real scenes – without thinking of these cues as priming only for 
recognition. For, while Willats‟s allegiance to Marr commits him to this view, 
there is growing evidence to suggest that his theory of sight is too narrowly 
conceived. Instead, the idea that has succeeded it – the „dual visual system 
hypothesis‟ – proposes that vision serves not one but two discrete functions: on 
the one hand it allows us to identify objects (as Marr‟s theory proposes) and on 
the other hand it allows us to perform actions upon them and use them as 
markers of bodily space (as Merleau-Ponty‟s philosophy suggests).157 Let us 
therefore investigate this view further, since it would seem to promise a more 
concrete way of describing the peculiar phenomenology of Cubism while still 
allowing us to draw on Willats‟s account. 
 
                                               
156 In the philosophy of language, the terms Sinn and Bedeutung were first used by Gottlob Frege 
to emphasise the difference between sense and reference. Later Husserl used this distinction to 
characterise sense-giving acts more broadly, where Sinn refers to the meaning that gives content 
to the intentional act (or the noema) and Bedeutung refers to the intended object. Frege‟s terms 
are also occasionally used by Merleau-Ponty.  
157 According to Marr, „the main job of vision [is] to derive a representation of shape‟ (Vision, p. 
36). Therefore, since he claims that computing three-dimensional shape is what allows us to 
recognise objects (and indeed, since describing this process is the goal and the end point of his 
theory), he would seem to be implying that the primary function of vision is perceptual 
identification. That he did not consider it necessary to treat visually guided actions may be due to 
the fact that he performed his research before the dual visual system hypothesis had become 
current. And while Gibson‟s work had already hinted at this line of inquiry, for Marr this 
approach was too speculative to provide an explanation of sight. For his critique of Gibson see 
Vision, pp. 29 – 31. 
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The first version of the dual visual system hypothesis was developed by 
Leslie Ungerleider and Mortimer Mishkin in the early 1980s.
158
 Their research 
showed that, after a juncture at the primary visual cortex, the visual pathway 
bifurcated into a „dorsal‟ stream and a „ventral‟ stream. Anatomically mapped, 
the dorsal stream passes through the middle temporal area (MT) and projects to 
the inferior parietal lobule while the ventral stream passes though V4 and 
projects to the inferior temporal cortex (fig. C). Having observed that lesions to 
each pathway resulted in distinct visual impairments, they claimed that the dorsal 
pathway – or the „where‟ system – was responsible for processing information 
about space, while the ventral stream – or the „what‟ system – processed 
information about objects. 
 
But while Ungerleider and Mishkin made little of the fact that the parietal 
areas in which the dorsal stream terminates are substantially linked to the motor 
centres of the brain – particularly the premotor cortex and the frontal lobe – later 
theorists came to regard this information as vital. As Melvyn Milner and David 
Goodale first pointed out in the 1990s, these anatomical connections suggest that 
the dorsal stream feeds visual information forward for movement, and hence for 
action.
 159
 Drawing particularly on case studies of brain damaged patients, they 
therefore claimed that the difference between the ventral and dorsal stream 
processing was not so much a matter of „what‟ versus „where‟ but rather of  
                                               
158 L. G. Ungerleider and M. Mishkin, „Two visual systems‟ in Analysis of Visual Behaviour, ed 
D. J. Ingle, M. A. Goodale and R. J. W. Mansfield (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 549 – 
586. 
159 Melvyn A. Goodale and A. David Milner, „Separate visual pathways for perception and 
action‟, Trends in Neuroscience, 15, no. 1 (1992) pp. 20 – 25. 
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„vision for perception‟ versus „vision for action‟ or put in its simplest form, of 
„what‟ versus „how‟. 160 
 
More recently, Pierre Jacob and Marc Jeannerod have elaborated this 
thesis, integrating it into a more philosophically grounded theory of vision.
161
 
Characterising the dorsal stream as dedicated to „pragmatic processing‟ and the 
ventral stream as dedicated to „semantic processing‟, they claim that each mode 
of vision extracts different information from the retinal image and encodes it in 
form that is uniquely tailored to suit the demands of its task. Like Marr, they 
therefore assert that visual processing produces internal visual descriptions,
162
 
but unlike him they argue that these belong to two distinct categories.  
 
In essence, what distinguishes these descriptions is that they encode 
different information and meet different needs (fig. D). On the one hand, the job 
of semantic processing is to produce visual percepts. These store information 
about object identity (and thus are comparable to Marr‟s 3D model 
representations insofar as they encode viewpoint invariant features of shape).
163
 
This information is then fed into the „belief box‟ where it can be stored in 
memory and made available for the purpose of thought. The job of pragmatic 
                                               
160 In particular, Milner and Goodale consider the case of patient DF who, having suffered ventral 
stream damage, was no longer able to recognise objects but was still able to reach out and grasp 
them. See especially Goodale, „The Cortical Organisation of Visual Perception and Visuomotor 
Control‟ in An Invitation to Cognitive Science, eds Stephen M. Kosslyn and Daniel N. Osherson, 
vol. II, Visual Cognition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1995, 2nd edition), pp. 167 – 
209. 
161 Jacob and Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing (Oxford University Press, 2003).  
162 Jacob and Jeannerod actually refer to these as internal visual representations. However, I have 
chosen to use the word „description‟ instead as it avoids the suggestion that these are to be 
conceptualised as pictures in our head. While it is not yet known with any certainty how this 
information is encapsulated (if indeed, this theory is right), the prevalent view in science today is 
that it is a pattern of activity across a specific neural network. 
163 This is not to say, however, that the two are identical. As I shall argue later, Marr‟s theory of 
vision can be related to both types of processing even though it is largely considered from a 
semantic point of view.  
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processing, on the other hand, is to generate visuomotor representations (these 
have no explicit correlate on Marr‟s account, but they may nevertheless depend 
on the computational processing that his theory describes). The purpose of these 
is to encode information which allows us to act upon objects, specifically those 
which are located within our peripersonal space. This information can then be 
used in one of two ways: either it can engender motor imagery or reflex reactions 
by being directly converted into motor commands. Or it can be fed into the 
„intention box‟ where, by being coupled with „causally indexical concepts‟, it can 
allow us to formulate more mediate plans to act.
164
 
 
Figure. C. Dual Visual System Hypothesis
Afferents from the retina via the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) project to V1 and V2 and 
bifurcate into two pathways:
Ventral pathway: receives afferents from V3 and V4 and reaches the inferior temporal cortex
Dorsal pathway: receives afferents from MT, MST, FST and V6 and reaches the parietal 
cortex
 
                                               
164 Jacob and Jeannerod associate motor imagery with what Brian O‟Shaughnessy calls „sub-
intentional acts‟. These are non-deliberate movements such as tapping one‟s foot or mirroring 
another person‟s body language which differ from reflex reactions in that „one can come to 
notice, and thus discover [their] existence…‟ (see pp. 34 – 38) Insofar as these movements may 
be imaginary as well as real, they may be suitable for characterising the kinds of motor response 
that pictures elicit. „Causally indexical concepts‟ are defined as „shallow but indispensable 
concepts, whose references change as the perceptual context changes‟. They may, for instance, 
pass judgements on objects such as „within my reach‟ or „too large‟ (see pp. 205 – 208).  
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Ventral stream Dorsal stream
Semantic processing Pragmatic processing
Recognition of objects Visual control of action
Visual percept
Belief box
Visuomotor representation
Intention box
Figure. D. Jacob and Jeannerod’s theory of semantic and pragmatic processing
 
 
 
3.5 THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE 
 
In light of growing evidence in support of the dual visual system hypothesis – 
gathered not only from anatomical studies, but from electrophysical testing and 
psychological research too – it is clearly no longer adequate to think of vision as 
singularly tailored to the demands of perception, as Marr‟s theory (and by 
implication Willats‟s) would seem to suggest. The idea may owe its 
pervasiveness to the fact that conscious awareness is largely ventral (or 
perceptual) and so we tend to see the world as a collection of definite identities, 
or as Merleau-Ponty might have put it, we think of it as a realm of „determinate 
being‟. However, it seems that the philosopher may have been right in 
juxtaposing this form of seeing with a more primary and embodied stratum of 
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perception.
 165
 For, insofar as the dorsal stream evokes motor imagery and guides 
our actions, it might be said to induce the carnal phenomenology that he 
attributes to sight. 
 
However, it is necessary to exercise caution in making this claim for, as 
Taylor Carman points out, „motor intentionality is not a neurological datum, not 
is it simply Merleau-Ponty‟s name for…dorsal stream processing‟. Rather it is 
the essential intermediary which connects our bodies to the world and which, by 
establishing their unity, allows our conscious activities and thoughts to gain their 
significance against a background of perceptual experience.
166
 Accordingly, it is 
not my intention to suggest that psychology supplies an explanation for – or 
indeed, explains away – Merleau-Ponty‟s metaphysical assertions. My claim is 
simply that science and philosophy point in the same direction by positing the 
existence of a more embodied form of sight. Thus, while the dorsal stream might 
tentatively be understood as the physiological correlate of motor intentionality, 
its identification does not detract from the philosophical implications of Merleau-
Ponty‟s account. And in particular, it does not imply that the body is reducible to 
an object or that it is ultimately a complex of physio-chemical processes. In 
short, while knowledge of these operations may illuminate aspects of our 
perceptual or our aesthetic experience, their human significance may lie 
somewhere beyond. 
 
                                               
165 Goodale argues that the evolutionary development of the dorsal stream predates that of the 
ventral stream since the brain „did no evolve to enable us to think, it evolved to enable us to act.‟ 
„Action Insight: The Role of the Dorsal Stream in the Perception of Grasping‟, Neuron, 47, no. 3 
(August 2005), pp. 329. If this is correct then the dorsal stream can be characterised as „primary‟ 
in a phylogenetical sense. Bur of course, this has no relation to Merleau-Ponty‟s claim that 
embodied perception is the ground of consciousness.  
166 Taylor Carman, Merleau-Ponty (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), pp. 116 – 17. 
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Nevertheless, taken together these two modes of description supply us 
with a powerful tool for reassessing the validity of our commonsense 
assumptions. And more importantly for my argument, this scientific research 
lends support to Merleau-Ponty‟s criticism of the view that visual information is 
only made available to our motor capacities by way of an associative process.
167
 
What classical psychology suggests, for instance, is that when I see a pen I relate 
this to my previous experience by way of memory and judgement. Thus, I infer 
how to coordinate my movements towards it rather than having this information 
directly available. But the existence of parallel pathways in the brain suggests the 
opposite: that an integral part of seeing the pen is understanding it as a target for 
action, or, more generally, that perceiving motor affordances is a direct 
consequence of vision. This is not to say, of course, that I do not need to 
recognise the pen in order to select it for use. What it suggests, however, is that 
when I do form this plan I already possess the requisite knowledge to reach out 
and grasp it. Since visuomotor processing is faster than perception, actions can 
often pre-empt judgements of identity. For instance, when a projectile is flying 
towards me, I may duck before I know what it is.
168
  
                                               
167 While this view has been held by various philosophers and scientists for many hundreds of 
years, it reached a peak in the twentieth century with Ivan Pavlov‟s studies of classical 
conditioning. Pavlov showed that the repeated pairing of two stimuli led them to be associated, 
thereby producing a behavioural response. This idea proved to be influential in the formation of 
behaviourist psychology, an approach which Merleau-Ponty constantly challenged in his work. 
For Merleau-Ponty‟s criticism of this view see Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 15 – 29. 
168 This is to be predicted from the fact that, in order to be effective, our capacities to move and to 
act – and particularly to perform such defensive responses as flinching and ducking – need to be 
continually updated with information about the location and movement of objects in our 
immediate environment. Therefore, in contrast to visual percepts which need to be taken „offline‟ 
in order to supply content to memory, visuomotor representations must always be „online‟ in 
order to keep track of real time changes (although, psychophysical studies suggest that they can 
be briefly encoded in short-term memory). Evidence for these different modes of processing is 
provided by the anatomical organisation of each visual pathway. While the ventral stream passes 
through several intermediary areas before reaching the inferotemporal cortex, the dorsal stream 
includes projections from the magnocellular area of the lateral geniculate nucleus which link to 
areas MT and V6 directly. Thus, according to Jacob and Jeannerod, „visual latencies in the dorsal 
stream (40 – 80 ms) are faster than in the ventral stream (100 –150 ms). Ways of Seeing, p. 55. 
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And so, hypothetically speaking, this duality of sight might also have a 
bearing on the way that we perceive representational pictures. That is, any image 
which refers to some content iconically (which is to say, by resembling it 
visually) may not only present us with something we recognise, but even before 
this, with something we know how to orientate our bodies towards. Thus, while it 
might seem natural to classify pictures as visual objects pure and simple, we 
might here have been led astray by the ostensible phenomenology of seeing – a 
phenomenology which pictures generally heighten by reducing the information 
available about depth and which the Western tradition has emphasised even 
further by celebrating the conjunction of the eye with the mind. But while the 
motor intentionality of sight may lie hidden – and indeed, while in some cases it 
may have been wilfully disavowed – its growing acknowledgement in the 
twentieth century shows that it is not beyond the scope of our conscious 
awareness, even if it is not transparently available to thought.  
 
If „vision for perception‟ and „vision for action‟ are therefore so separated 
in normal seeing but if, however, the latter lies hidden and either takes the insight 
of a philosopher or the expertise of a scientist to be drawn out, can an artist also 
be said to perform this revelatory function? This, I want to suggest, was precisely 
the advance of Cézanne‟s classicism – that is, the power of his style in producing 
a criterion of a visual experience that the post-Renaissance tradition had 
systematically disavowed. And equally, I wish to propose that it was the lesson 
that Picasso and Braque took from his art and further developed through their 
invention of Cubism. What this means, therefore, is that they did not simply 
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consult his style in order to learn from its technical innovations (the use of 
passage and the integration of foreground and background being the most often 
cited). Rather, what makes their Cubism truly „Cézannian‟ – and not only in 
1908 - 9, but later on too – is their desire to build on his art‟s peculiar aesthetic: 
that is, the way it replaced visualised thinking with physicalised sight. 
 
Nonetheless, we still do not have an adequate explanation for how this 
elusive dimension of motor intentionality can be transfigured into a language of 
form, or why its counterpart, the conceptualising tendency of vision for 
perception, should give rise to the particular representational conventions it does. 
As I intend to show in the following chapter, this will require something of a 
detour: an attempt, no less, to trace representation back to its very roots. In short, 
we shall have to consider the fundamental – and crucially, the non-arbitrary – 
relationship between the structure of pictures and the structure of sight. 
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CHAPTER 4 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
The Varieties of Visual and Pictorial Space 
 
 
 
 
The space into which I was advancing remained enigmatic, and would have 
remained so, had I not by chance ... remembered modem painting.  
 
– Jean Paulhan169 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
Having discussed the distinction between „vision for perception‟ and „vision for 
action‟, I shall now consider how these different ways of seeing „get into‟ 
pictures, that is, how they are lifted out of the arena of real life perception and are 
translated into the terms of a two-dimensional medium. My proposal is that 
Willats‟s account offers us a template for how this transformation takes place and 
how, moreover, it determines the sequence of children‟s drawing development. 
However, as his argument stands, it only relates to the kinds of internal 
description which are considered by Marr. And since these ultimately serve the 
purpose of shape, and hence object, recognition – that is, since Marr‟s theory is 
                                               
169 „Petite aventure en pleine nuit‟ (1959) in Oeuvres complètes V. (Paris: Le Cercle du Livre 
Précieux, 1970), pp. 80 – 81. Translation by Dominique Fisher, „Jean Paulhan: Towards a Poetic 
/ Pictural Space‟, The French Review, 61, no. 6 (May 1988), p. 879. 
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essentially one of semantic processing – Willats‟s theory, being founded on these 
principles, will inevitably harbour this prejudice too. As I hope to make apparent, 
this limits his account in two separate but overlapping ways: first, he has nothing 
to say about the ties between representation and vision for action, and second – 
and perhaps far more damagingly – he collapses the distinction between 
discrepant varieties of pictorial space.  
 
 
4.2 THE CUES OF DORSAL AND VENTRAL STREAM PROCESSING 
 
Let us start by making some basic assumptions about how it is possible to extend 
this account while still keeping its basic premises intact. To begin this process, 
what we first need to do is preserve Willats‟s understanding of the 
transformational process – that is, the idea that the denotation system translates 
scene primitives into picture primitives while the drawing system stipulates how 
these are to be arranged on a two-dimensional surface. But instead of considering 
these rules as being exclusively parasitic on visual percepts, we now need to 
consider how they might also be related to visuomotor representations as well. 
Therefore, on such an account it will not only be the information which is 
relevant to shape recognition which resurfaces in pictures, but also – or at least in 
some cases – the dorsally processed cues which enlist us to act.  
 
The next step is therefore to identify these cues more precisely. First, let 
us begin by considering vision for perception: what information should this 
process extract from the retinal image and how will it allow us to recognise 
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objects? The general task in this respect is to encode constant properties so that 
we can commit this information to memory and retrieve it over changes in 
viewpoint. And so, as Marr makes clear, the most important information would 
seem to be shape since it is possible to strip away other visual attributes such as 
colour and size and still be able to judge the identity of an object. As we have 
seen, therefore, the visual system must derive an object-centred description of 
shape – that is, an algorithm which schematically describes an individuated 
volume – since our memory capacities are not large enough to store the infinite 
number of views that would be required to decipher an object from every new 
angle of sight. Marr‟s theory of this process is summarised below (fig. E): 
 
 
 
Figure E. The four main stages of vision and the primitives associated with each. 
Adapted from Marr (1982). „Computing and the Arts‟, 
http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~mas02fl/MSC101/Vision/Marr.html. 
 
On this view, the function of early vision is to extract shape-related 
features from the retinal image and to represent them as primitives specifying 
information about the orientation, depth and discontinuity of surfaces.
 170
 This 
process is said to involve two discrete steps. First, dips in light, or „luminance 
                                               
170 For a fuller account of these processes, see Vision, chapters 2 – 4. 
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valleys‟ are detected, using an algorithm like that which has been applied to the 
image below (fig. F). This results in what Marr calls the full primal sketch, a 
description which essentially picks out the edges of objects. Next, a more 
sophisticated description called the 2½D sketch is formed. This specifies the 
orientation of surfaces and their position in depth, thus allowing discrete objects 
to be parsed from the visual array. Figure G suggests a possible method for 
representing this information (although, of course, we should bear in mind that in 
reality this will not resemble a picture in our head). 
 
 
Figure F. Marr (1982). Example of zero-crossing detection using a Laplacian of Gaussian filter 
 
Figure G. Marr (1982). Symbolic representation of the 2½D sketch. Surface orientation indicated 
by arrows, occluding contours shown with full lines and surface orientation discontinuities with 
dotted lines. 
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However, since these descriptions are still in viewer-centred coordinates 
they must now be transferred into an object-centred frame of reference. This 
hinges on a process which Marr calls the 3D model representation which can be 
crudely summarised in the following way.
 171
 First, the silhouette of the shape is 
decomposed into primitives which describe the object‟s principle axes. Next, 
these are specified as volumes in object-centred coordinates and are then 
organised in a modular fashion so that individual components can be further 
decomposed (fig. H). Accordingly, once enough information has been stored in 
an object-centred description, this can be matched against pre-existent templates 
in memory, finally allowing recognition to take place. This argument is therefore 
taken to justify one of Marr‟s key claims about vision: namely, that when 
familiar items are seen from a canonical viewpoint (that is, when foreshortening 
does not substantially deform their appearance) they can be recognised 
exclusively by way of bottom up processes.
 172
 Or to put this differently, their 
identities will be known without judgement or reasoning having to come into 
play. 
 
 
                                               
171 It is useful here to bear in mind the distinction Marr draws between a description and a 
representation. According to his terminology, „A representation is a formal system for making 
explicit certain entities or types of information, together with a specification of how the system 
does this…the result of using a representation to describe a given entity [is] a description of the 
entity in that representation. Vision, p. 20 (emphasis in original). For Marr‟s discussion of the 3D 
model representation see Ibid, chapter 5, „Representing Shapes for Recognition‟. 
172 Ibid, pp. 35 – 36; p. 328. Marr refers to „conventional‟ rather than „canonical‟ viewpoints; I 
have chosen to use the latter term as it is now more common in the literature. 
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Figure H. Marr (1982). The organisation of shape information in a 3-D model description. 
 
 
  However, what Marr‟s theory does not account for is the fact that shape 
information alone will not allow us to distinguish between similar items or track 
the same object over successive encounters. For instance, if there were two 
apples on the table I could not tell them apart simply on the basis of shape for in 
this respect they are too nearly equivalent. A more effective way to capture this 
difference would therefore be to compare their positions in space. Now, I could 
make this calculation by locating each apple in relation to my body. However, 
this would not preserve the constancy of shape for it would require information 
to be specified about viewpoint. For this reason, the visual percept must 
somehow present information in a spatial format that is external to the body. 
Jacob and Jeannerod (and many other theorists besides) have therefore related 
this to the „allocentric‟ frame of reference, a coordinate system that maps object 
locations independently of viewpoint but relative to each other (fig. E (a)).
173
 
                                               
173 Jacob and Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing, p. 103; pp. 193 – 198.  The counterintuitive nature of 
this claim has been pointed out by José Bermúdez who objects that, „No two things stand in this 
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What this implies, then, is that I am able to distinguish between the apples by 
seeing `how they are located in space, not with respect to my body, but with 
respect to one another. 
 
 
 
Visual percept
a) Allocentric frame of reference
Spatial location of objects 
encoded in relation to one another 
but independent of the perceiver
Visuomotor representation
b) Egocentric frame of reference 
Spatial location of object encoded 
with respect to the  perceiver‟s body 
and specifically in relation to the 
executive limb
Figure. E. The spatial coding of the visual percept and the visuomotor representation
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
[allocentric] relation simpliciter. They only do relative to a third thing, which is typically the 
perceiver.‟ While Jacob and Jeannerod avoid addressing this quite obvious objection in Ways of 
Seeing, when forced to reply to Bermúdez they state their position more clearly. For example, 
they say that „we do not agree that there must be room for some conceptual representation of the 
self in one‟s visual percept‟ and „one can think of (or imagine), but one cannot visually perceive, 
that standpoint which one is currently occupying.‟ I take it, therefore, that the allocentric 
coordinate system is „viewpoint independent‟ in the sense that the perceiver‟s position is factored 
out of the equation, although these words are not used by the authors themselves. See „Replies to 
our Critics‟, Psyche, 13, no. 2 (April 2007), 
http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/seeing/replies.pdf, consulted 22 July 2007 (emphasis in 
original). 
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According to Jacob and Jeannerod, the visuomotor representation must 
map space in a different format since the ability to perform actions explicitly 
requires that we situate objects in relation to our body and in correspondence 
with its sphere of possible movements. What this means, more precisely, is that 
we need to know the object‟s position with respect to the executive limb and the 
vector (that is, the distance and direction) of the movement required to bring it 
within reach (fig. F (a)).
174
 Therefore, instead of this information being encoded 
in an allocentric format – that is, instead of it stipulating the relative locations of 
objects – it must be presented in a coordinate system that takes account of the 
body, or what psychologists refer to as an „egocentric‟ frame of reference  (fig. E 
(b)).  
 
But simply knowing the target‟s location with respect to the body is not 
sufficient to grasp it. For this purpose, we also need to know something about its 
structural properties. Two types of information are relevant to this task (fig. F 
(b)). First, we must compute the overall size of the object in order to scale our 
grip to suit its dimensions. And second, we must have at our disposal information 
about its absolute shape – presumably in the form of an object-centred 
description – so that we can locate stable „grasp points‟ and secure a firm grip on 
its surface. Such points are usually chosen in such a way as to pass through the 
object‟s centre of mass and are often located at places of maximal concavity (as 
is the case with an apple) or maximal convexity (as is the case with a banana).
175
   
                                               
174 Ibid.  
175 Jacob and Jeannerod do not consider the properties which are conducive for reaching and 
grasping in detail. My argument here is informed by Goodale‟s discussion in „The Cortical 
Organisation of Visual Perception and Visuomotor Control‟, see especially pp. 185 – 191.  
 127 
Figure F. Information encoded for reaching and grasping
a) b)
 
 
Thus, it will be seen that on this theory it is not so much a case of 
discarding Marr‟s account as it is of treating it as a step towards something more 
complex. There are two reasons for this. First, even though Marr assumes that the 
purpose of vision is shape recognition, since he commences his analysis at the 
level of the retinal image, it may be that the lower-level computational operations 
he describes are pertinent to both semantic and pragmatic processing. For 
instance, one might suppose that each is contingent on the 2½D sketch since, 
according to Marr, this is what facilitates object individuation.
176 
And second, if 
information about three-dimensional shape is just as important for grasping an 
object as it is for identifying what it is, then object-centred descriptions shall be 
basic to both modes of sight.  
 
                                               
176 Marr, Vision, pp. 270 – 77. 
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Of course, the plausibility of this hypothesis will ultimately depend on the 
areas of the visual brain which are involved in the computation of three-
dimensional shape and whether these contribute to both ventral and dorsal stream 
processing. Since parvocellular cells in the retina and the lateral geniculate 
nucleus are selective for edges and areas in V1 are sensitive to their orientation 
this might suggest that both pathways have access to shape information since 
their bifurcation (largely) occurs after V1.
 177
 It may be however, that while both 
pathways process information about three-dimensional shape, they are 
responsive to different aspects of this attribute. For instance, Jacob and 
Jeannerod cite electrophysical studies which indicate that cells in the 
inferotemporal cortex (i.e., in the ventral stream) are sensitive to the complex 
contours of three-dimensional shape, while cells in the anterior intraparietal area 
(i.e., in the dorsal stream) respond to the motoric properties of shape.
178
 To 
summarise then, it would seem that the ventral stream specifies shape in more 
detail, while the dorsal stream represents it in a fairly coarse way.  
 
Furthermore, it ought to be noted that the volumetric primitives that Marr 
relates to the object-centred description do not only carry information about 
shape but also about size and the spatial distribution of shape.
 179
 This data might 
                                               
177 This claim is supported by the results of an experiment which was designed to test the 
responses of visuomotor neurons to the presentation of basic three-dimensional shapes. What this 
study shows is that these neurons not only fire when visual presentation is coupled with grasping 
movements, but that they are also activated in object fixation tasks alone. Given that these 
neurons are selective for specific shapes and specific kinds of grasping movements which 
optimally suit the dimensions of the object, this would suggest that they are in some way 
responsible for generating motor imagery in the absence of actual movement. What it also seems 
to imply is that a volumetric description of shape (i.e., an object-centred description) is directly 
available to the dorsal stream instead of it being a product of ventral stream processing alone. See 
Akira Murata et al, „Object Representation in the Ventral Premotor Cortex (Area F5) of the 
Monkey‟, The Journal of Neurophysiology, 78, no. 4 (October 1997), pp. 2226 – 2230.  
178 Ways of Seeing, pp. 183 – 84. 
179 Marr, Vision, pp. 300 – 302.  
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therefore be available for pragmatic and semantic processing as well (that is, in 
addition to shape information pure and simple). Since Jacob and Jeannerod rarely 
refer to Marr, it is hard to know what they consider the role of object-centred 
descriptions to be, or indeed whether they think that this account has been 
superseded by the dual visual system hypothesis. It might be inferred from their 
theory, however, that they regard this stage of vision as preliminary to both ways 
of seeing. For instance, they claim that the visual percept and the visuomotor 
representation both encode information about shape, size and orientation (which 
would therefore seem to correspond to the information encoded in object-centred 
descriptions). But while they say that the visual percept allows us to compare this 
information by simultaneously representing at least two distinct items,
180
 they 
state that the visuomotor representation „can only represent the absolute 
orientation, size and shape of the target.‟181 Thus, the disassociation between 
these modes of vision may be partly due to the fact that they separately compute 
object-centred descriptions which are then inputted into distinct frames of 
reference.  
 
My proposal, therefore, is that it is not necessary to conceive of vision for 
perception and vision for action as wholly unrelated, for while the visual percept 
and the visuomotor representation are generically different, they may still extract 
some of the same information from light. And indeed, while this claim may await 
                                               
180 Since on this account the visual percept allows us to make a comparative judgement, Jacob 
and Jeannerod claim that it fulfils Jérôme Dokic‟s constraint of contrastive identification which 
states that, „Unless a creature has the resources to make…comparisons among different 
instantiations of one and the same visual attribute or property, she will not be able to recognise or 
re-identify the property or attribute in question.‟ In short, encoding in allocentric coordinates 
makes recognition possible, encoding in egocentric coordinates does not. Ways of Seeing, p. 193. 
181 Ibid, p. 198 (emphasis added). For a detailed comparison of these two frames of reference see 
pp. 191 – 198. 
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further corroborative evidence, it would at least seem to make sense from an 
evolutionary point of view. In other words, it is not controversial to speculate 
that the visual system operates in the most economical or energy efficient way. 
 
 
4.3 THE SPATIALITY OF SEEING AND THE SPATIALITY OF 
PICTURING 
 
To return to Willats‟s theory, we might now conjecture that since he borrows his 
understanding of vision from Marr, he can make no allowance for these further 
computational steps or how they bear on the process of picture production. And 
so, this extended account of seeing might have two implications for his schema 
which are in line with the amendments we made to Marr‟s account. First, if the 
representational language of pictures is parasitic on the early stages of vision (as, 
for instance, optical denotation systems are said to be on the primal sketch, or 
line drawings are on the 2½D sketch)
182
 then this might mean that they equally 
serve „depiction for perception‟ or „depiction for action‟. And second, if object-
centred descriptions proffer the pictorial means for making shapes recognisable 
they might also allow for an imagery which we experience as graspable too. All 
in all, therefore, the structural elements of pictures and certain of their 
concatenations may just as well underpin the recognitional content of a work as 
they do its embodied effects. Accordingly, this might give us a loose explanation 
for the incongruity of Picasso‟s Rue-de-Bois: that is, why it could at once be seen 
as a landscape and as a collection of manipulable objects. 
                                               
182 Willats, Art and Representation, pp. 152 – 3. 
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But this will not be the end of the story since vision does not culminate in 
object-centred descriptions, but with outputs which are distinct and more 
informationally replete. And so in this respect, it seems necessary to consider the 
divergent spatiality of the visual percept and the visuomotor representation. Can 
these differently inflect the spatiality of pictures? And more specifically, can they 
be identified with different classes of drawing system and the distinct set of 
mapping rules on which these depend?  
 
In Art and Representation, Willats suggests that drawing systems can be 
parasitic on two stages of vision which Marr identifies as fundamentally distinct. 
On the one hand, they can be associated with internal visual descriptions (such as 
the primal and 2½ D sketch) which encode information about shape in relation to 
a particular point of view. Or, on the other hand, they can be related to the later 
stages of visual processing whereby constant features of shape are presented in a 
view-invariant format. So, for example, Willats proposes that it is likely 
(although not irrefutable) that Vermeer‟s The Music Lesson (fig. 31) is derived 
from a view, while Andrei Rublev‟s The Holy Trinity (fig. 32) (and more 
interestingly for our purposes, most Cubist pictures) are structurally related to 
object-centred descriptions.
183
 
 
 However, there is a slight complication here since if any of these are to 
underpin „effective‟ representations, they must approximate to the projective 
geometry of possible views (which is where „anomalous‟ systems such as 
                                               
183 For Willats‟s discussion of Vermeer see ibid, pp. 59 – 61; for his discussion of inverted 
perspective (the dominant system in Rublev‟s picture) and its dependency on object-centred 
descriptions see pp. 65 – 69.  
 132 
inverted perspective miss out).
184
 What Willats therefore believes to be fortuitous 
for most of the common drawing systems is that they can both be described in 
terms of primary geometry (that is, with respect to the projective geometry of 
possible views) and in terms of a secondary geometry (that is, with respect to the 
two-dimensional geometry of the picture surface).
185
 Thus, the crucial claim of 
his account is that, insofar as the rules for mapping in secondary geometry are 
determined by the structure of object-centred descriptions, they can be naturally 
generated rather than having to be consciously learned.
186
 
 
If this hypothesis is sound then children and adults who have not received 
formal training in art should generally produce pictures which are mapped from 
object-centred descriptions.
187
 According to Willats, this is most evident in the 
drawings of young children. For instance, in an experiment devised by the 
author, a group of children aged six to twelve were asked to draw a die presented 
at eye level so that two of its sides could be simultaneously seen.
188
 Interestingly, 
some of the younger children produced drawings such as the one shown below 
(fig. K) in which all the spots – including those which were not visible in the 
view – cohabit a single region. It may therefore be, as Willats suggests, that these 
children intend the region to stand for the whole volume of the die and are thus 
deriving their drawings from an object-centred description. And so, in a more 
typical example such as figure J, the child may be using lines to denote long 
                                               
184 As was discussed in a previous chapter, the second criterion for an effective shape 
representation is that it is depicted from a general position. See ibid, pp. 23 – 24; for a 
consideration of the lawful concatenation of lines and line junctions see pp. 207 – 214. 
185 Ibid, pp. 37 – 69. 
186 For Willats‟s most explicit statement to this effect, see ibid, pp. 317 – 19. 
187 For Willat‟s discussion of children‟s drawing development see ibid, pp. 287 – 319. For his 
discussion of the use of object-centred drawing systems in adult‟s pictures see pp. 186 – 190. 
188 Ibid, p. 184 – 185. 
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volumes such as arms and round regions to denote spherical volumes such as the 
figures‟ heads. 
 
Figure K. Child‟s drawing of a die. 
From Willats (1997)
Figure J. Drawing of My Family by a 
three-year old girl
 
 
If we take this claim in conjunction with the argument I have been 
developing then it seems that any drawing system which derives its mapping 
rules from object-centred descriptions may transform information about shape 
from visual percepts or from visuomotor representations. But either way, it is 
hard to see how this process would amount to a spatially coherent depiction (that 
is, one in which a congruity between distinct parts gives rise to a unified 
appearance) unless the representation were simply of one discrete object. The 
reason for this is that object-centred descriptions converge uniquely on one 
single item and thus do not allow for a global or comparative mapping of 
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space.
189
 For Willats, who is of course talking about representation as a function 
of what can be recognised in a picture, it is the drawing system‟s adjustment to, 
or fortuitous coincidence with, a view which allows it to pattern this global 
coherence. Thus on his account, most pictures are derived from object-centred 
descriptions but these are adjusted to views by monitoring spatial relations as 
they emerge within the picture. He states, for example, that: 
 
[The rules of secondary geometry are] applied to an object-centred 
description. Once this has been done […] a view of a scene begins to 
emerge, and the artist or draughtsman can then continue the picture by 
adding further details in accordance with the coordinate system set up 
within this pictorial view.
190
 
 
But while this recursive process may form a substantial part of picture 
production, one might wonder whether the allocentric and egocentric frames of 
reference can also inform the artist‟s construction of space. Now, it seems that 
the latter, insofar as it only encodes the position of one individuated item in 
relation to the body, can have no more influence on the global mapping of space 
than was said of the object-centred description. Therefore, if it does underpin 
certain compositional schemata (as I shall argue in a following section), then it 
may be that these are worked out by meditating on the phenomenology of vision 
                                               
189 While Marr proposes that volumetric primitives can decompose the principle axes of an object 
so that the 3-D model description may capture „the geometry of shape to an arbitrary level of 
detail‟, and thus while it may be that these descriptions can specify structural relationships 
between the parts of a perceived item, if this modular organisation is always local to the object‟s 
own axes, then it will make no allowances for the spatial intervals between it and other elements 
in the scene. Vision, p. 306. 
190 Art and Representation, p. 198. 
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and by monitoring the progress of the picture
191
 so that it is both internally 
consistent and able to evoke the physicality of sight. However, any spatial 
coherence that this affords cannot be drawn from the structure of visuomotor 
representations since, due to their contingency on egocentric coordinates, they do 
not proffer the relevant cues.
192
  
 
 
4.4 ALLOCENTRIC SPACE 
 
It may be, however, that such cues are supplied by the allocentric coordinates of 
the visual percept. The reason for this is that, if this format encodes information 
about the relative positions of two or more objects, it may stipulate the rules 
about where to site picture primitives so that a consistent space is mapped 
between distinct elements in the pictorial field. Furthermore, these rules would 
not be determined ex post facto by monitoring the look of a picture as it 
develops. Nor would they necessarily require that the artist was drawing from 
life so that the transient information of views was constantly available for 
reference. Since visual percepts facilitate recognition, presumably their output 
can be stored in and accessed through long-term memory, thus allaying (but not 
supplanting) the need for outwardly directed visual attention, whether this is of 
the picture itself, of other pictures, or of the look of real scenes. In short, 
                                               
191 This idea – and similarly Willats‟s discussion of the way a view is worked out from the 
emerging look of the picture – both owe a debt to Wollheim‟s argument about the dual role of the 
artist as both the producer and the initial beholder of the work. See „What the Spectator Sees‟, 
especially pp. 101 – 104.   
192 While Paul Smith argues that there is such a thing as a naturally generated pictorial „grammar‟ 
insofar as this relates to vision for perception, he claims that there is no such grammar relating to 
vision for action as it would be too fragmentary and too piecemeal to warrant this name. Personal 
correspondence, 24th August 2010. 
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allocentric coordinates might have an equivalent role to object-centred 
descriptions – they might allow the representation to develop in a non-arbitrary 
fashion according to rules which are innately supplied. However, while the latter 
would underpin the mapping of primitives with respect to a discrete shape or 
object, the former would give consistency to the intervening space.
 193
 
 
But this also generates another set of questions, for if object-centred 
descriptions are identified with one frame of reference and allocentric 
coordinates are identified with another, then how should we say that they relate 
to one another? If children have not mastered the more „advanced‟ drawing 
systems such as linear perspective – that is, if they have not yet learnt how to 
adjust their pictures to views and thus are mainly relying on formats which are 
more easily encoded in visual memory – will they abide by rules which 
transform object-centred descriptions or those which transform allocentric 
coordinates? Should we hypothesise that object-centred descriptions are more 
likely to underpin the mapping rules employed by younger children since, on the 
one hand, theirs tends to be a less globally coherent space and, on the other, these 
rules relate to a less developed phase of vision?
194
 Or should we simply say that 
                                               
193 Of course, it is difficult to say what counts as a discrete object either in a real view or in a 
represented scene. For Marr‟s comments on this subject see Vision, p. 270. Jacob and Jeannerod 
claim that for something to be considered a visual object it will necessarily be subject to both 
perceptual individuation (parsing and attribute binding) and conceptual classification (assigning 
to a stimulus class). Ways of Seeing, pp. 139 – 40. 
194 On the face of it, this might seem like a fairly tenuous suggestion for even if there were a 
correlation between the age of a child and the complexity of the transformational algorithms used 
in vision, then it would still seem likely that these capacities are developed well in advance of the 
ability to draw (given, for example, the relatively slow development of the motor skills required 
to produce meaningful pictures). And even then it might be argued that the computation of 
object-centred descriptions actually supervenes on the computation of locational coordinates. For 
instance, developmental studies indicate that the child‟s ability to track and individuate multiple 
objects by location (and thus, as Jacob and Jeannerod suggest, by coding in allocentric 
coordinates) precedes its ability to do so by using featural information such as shape (and so 
potentially by coding in object-centred descriptions). See Fei Xu and Susan Carey, „Infants‟ 
metaphysics: the case of numerical identity‟, Cognitive Psychology, 30, no. 2 (April 1996), pp. 
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these two frames of reference are collapsed together in pictures as they are in 
normal seeing? In other words, if it is not possible to see a shape without seeing 
its location in a field, should we say that the material these coordinate systems 
proffer for transformation cannot be distinct and that, as a consequence, it cannot 
differently affect the appearance of pictures? 
 
 I pose these questions, not because I intend to answer them exhaustively 
– for this would warrant a thesis in its own right – but rather because I wish to 
make some brief suggestions which, while they are rather speculative in nature, 
at least have the merit of hinting at the work that is left to be done in this field. 
First, it is worth pointing out that since there is evidence for attention at multiple 
levels of spatial description,
195
 it may be that we are aware of these different 
frames of reference as they modulate perception. For instance, this tension in 
seeing might relate to the „object-horizon structure‟ that Merleau-Ponty 
describes. According to the philosopher: 
 
It is necessary to put the surroundings in abeyance the better to see the 
object, and to lose in background what one gains in focal figure, because 
to look at an object is to plunge oneself into it…it comes to life and is 
                                                                                                                               
111 – 53 and Jacob and Jeannerod Ways of Seeing, pp. 191 – 94. However, as I intend to show 
later, there are still grounds for thinking that younger children‟s drawings are mapped from 
object-centred descriptions while only later do they use systems which derive from allocentric 
coordinates.  
195 For instance, Steven Tipper and Marlene Behrmann write that, „Increasing 
evidence…suggests that attention can operate on object- as well as on location-based 
representations and that accessing one representation rather than another may be a function of the 
task demands‟ „Object-Centred Not Scene-Based Visual Neglect, Journal of Experimental 
Psychology, 22, no. 5 (1996), pp. 1261 – 1278. Presumably, „location based coordinates‟ can 
either refer to allocentric or egocentric frames of reference.  
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disclosed, while the other objects recede into the periphery and become 
dormant, while, however, not ceasing to be there.
196
  
 
It may therefore be that things appear to gain volume (or shape 
constancy) when we focus upon them because, in narrowing our gaze, we reduce 
the range of allocentric coding – that is, the number of items that can be 
individuated concurrently – and allow object-centred descriptions to be retrieved 
more effectively. But this will also imply the reverse situation: if we attend to a 
wider segment of the visual field, then more objects will retain their identity 
while simultaneously appearing much flatter. In short, the power of allocentricity 
will be gained at the expense of volume perception and vice versa. Therefore if 
this idea has any purchase, then these two opposing pulls – the tension between 
single-object focus and panoramic sight – may account for the elastic 
phenomenology of visual attention. And indeed, if Merleau-Ponty is right in 
suggesting that the object-horizon structure is precisely „what guarantees the 
identity of the object‟197 then this play of forces may characterise the process of 
perception before it is rendered determinate by conceptual thought. 
 
It is therefore plausible that the extraction of object-centred descriptions 
in semantic vision acts as a constancy mechanism which adjusts the appearance 
of objects in the direction of their true dimensions. And so, if seeing were wholly 
dependent on allocentric coordinates, then presumably space would be a pure 
function of the respective locations of objects and would not seem to come into 
definition under the attentions of our gaze. Of course, it is difficult (and perhaps 
                                               
196 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 78. 
197 Ibid. 
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futile) to imagine what this would actually look like, and yet it is interesting to 
consider pictures in precisely these terms, for these evidently do structure 
different kinds of visual space.  
 
It might be, for instance, that images which generalise viewpoint while 
still being effective for the recognition of shape – such as this drawing of a 
locomotive in orthogonal projection (fig. L) or this Japanese illustration of the 
Genji Monogatar (The Perfumed Prince) in oblique projection (fig. 33) – form a 
loose correspondence to the allocentric frame of reference. The reason I suggest 
this is that each drawing system produces an arrangement that extends uniformly 
across the representational field without this being afforded its stability by a 
vanishing point. Therefore, on the one hand it would seem that the problems 
presented by mapping from object-centred descriptions have been avoided since 
there is no evidence of the disjunctures which might potentially arise from trying 
to make discretely perceived volumes agree. But equally, the integrity of these 
pictures cannot only be a function of their reliance on views, for space is 
isotropic between objects and their parts rather than radiating out from a 
particular point. In other words, the space is recursive and eo ipso cohesive. 
 
Figure L. Drawing of a locomotive in orthogonal projection 
Published in the Bulletin de la Societe de la d’Encouragement d’Industrie, 1815 
 140 
  Of course, if we say that the artist is positioned far enough away from the 
scene that the projection rays reaching the eye are parallel, it is possible for each 
picture to be derived from a view. However, this seems a fairly contrived way of 
looking at things, particularly in the case of The Perfumed Prince since, given its 
raised vantage point, the artist would have to be stationed somewhere high in the 
air. Evidently, this is not suggested by the size of the figures unless they had 
somehow been seen through a telephoto lens. 
 
Furthermore, if we consider the relationship of these pictures to their 
contexts of reception and use, we may gain an insight into the kinds of function 
this scene-based arrangement can serve. As Willats notes, for instance, 
orthogonal projection offers a particular advantage to engineers and architects. 
This is because, by phasing out the distortions of viewpoint and depth, such 
pictures can give us accurate information about the shape of an object and (as 
Willats fails to acknowledge) about the relationship between its parts (or between 
it and other objects) insofar as they occupy the same plane in space.
198
 In 
contrast, the space constituted by oblique projection, while still arguably based 
on allocentric coordinates, structures a very different kind of viewing experience. 
As can be seen by looking at The Perfumed Prince, a sense of depth is preserved 
but unlike the convergence of linear perspective, it runs diagonally across the 
scene without diminution of scale. In this way, the artist creates a kind of self-
contained world, which seems to carry on endlessly, irrespective of the beholder. 
Thus, as Rudolf Arnheim notes, this kind of „centreless continuum‟ is well suited 
                                               
198 For Willats‟s discussion of orthogonal projection see Art and Representation, pp. 43 – 46. 
 141 
to the Taoist and Zen philosophies of the East which stress, among other things, 
the equality and unity of man with nature.
199
  
 
However, it might be more accurate to say that the drawing systems this 
coordinate system underpins are suitable for the purposes of religious depiction 
more broadly. This is because, by implying a station point which we know we 
cannot occupy, they effect a departure from realism which may at once safeguard 
against idolatry while also indicating the juncture between our world and a 
spiritual realm.
200
 For instance, the oblique projection implied by the table in 
Duccio‟s Last Supper (fig. 34) may help to emphasise the religious significance 
of the Eucharist by tipping the food up so that it is readily seen and by forging an 
unlikely, or otherworldly space. And moreover, since Christ occupies the crucial 
interstice between this system and the converging orthogonals which define the 
depth of the room, this may further underline his divinity by locating him at the 
most nodal and anomalous place. 
 
 
4.5 THE ANOMALY OF LINEAR PERSPECTIVE 
 
Insofar as linear perspective simulates the geometry of light rays that reach the 
eye from a scene, it would also seem to lack the volume-swelling effect supplied 
by object-centred descriptions.  Nevertheless, we may still speculate that it 
preserves something of the structure of visual percepts, not only insofar as it 
                                               
199 Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception: A Psychology of the Creative Eye (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1974), p. 295. 
200 This point is made by several times over by Willats in relation to anomalous combinations of 
drawing and denotation systems. See, for example, Art and Representation, p. 34 
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tends to team up with optical denotation systems which are approximate to the 
raw primal sketch (as Willats proposes),
201
 but also because it maps space in a 
loosely allocentric fashion. However, this comes with one important 
qualification, because while perspective specifies the positions of objects in 
relation to one another, it also projects their shape and size in relation to a 
viewpoint – something which a scene-based coordinate system will not permit. 
Therefore, instead of constituting a homogenous space (as do orthogonal and 
oblique projection), perspectival constructions at once allow for a co-operation 
between objects while precipitating a rush into depth towards the vanishing 
point. And so, if the isotropism of an allocentrically mapped space is 
accommodated to a third axis pointing away from the viewer – that is, if it not 
only cancels but counters the swelling effect of object-centred descriptions – no 
wonder perspective can be regarded as an „infallible device for making things 
shrink‟202.  
 
For the purposes of exposition, let us consider two works by Rodchenko 
which constitute extreme examples of this perspectival effect: his Fire Escape 
(with a man) and Assembling for a Demonstration, both of the late 1920s (fig. 35 
and fig. 36). It seems here that the artist is making a very explicit point about the 
disjunction between real scene perception and the unalloyed perspective that the 
camera presents. Counter to the view that photographs are the most faithful 
correlates to our vision, these works demonstrate the most uncanny degree of 
                                               
201 Art and Representation, p. 152. While Willats asserts that certain drawing an denotation 
systems are „natural allies‟, he is also advises that we do not view them dogmatically as such 
since artists can combine them in unusual ways. Accordingly, he claims that „the combinations of 
systems that [artists] use are deliberately chosen, rather than “natural” in the sense of reflecting 
internal images or descriptions in any direct way.‟ (P. 158.) 
202 Guillaume Apollinaire, cited in Smith „How a Cubist Painting Holds Together‟, p. 83. 
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deformation, not only in their sharp convergence and their violent shrinkage, but 
perhaps most unsettlingly in their strange frozen look. On the one hand, the 
ladder in the first image seems to suck towards the vanishing point vertiginously 
while simultaneously flattening the empty space which surrounds it, and on the 
other hand the demonstrators on the street in the second image not only seem far 
too far away from the woman on the balcony, but moreover they seem „slippery‟ 
– they offer no grip for the eye.  
 
Now, it seems fairly easy to explain this away by saying that, in 
opposition to natural seeing, the camera has no constancy mechanism. But this 
ignores the fact that by ossifying an inverted allocentric space – the famous 
visual pyramid of which Alberti first spoke
203
 – photographs and perspective 
paintings are eminently resistant to our visual probing. This is because they 
flatten out the gaps between things that in normal perception are ever in flux due 
to the flexible phenomenology of our visual attention. Or, to put this another 
way, because the field of our sight is constantly being defined and redefined by 
the pull of different coordinate systems, perspective will put a halt to this process 
by fixing the gaps between things and sucking them back into space. In 
comparison, it may be that the spatial elasticity of a painting by Cézanne such as 
Still Life with Plaster Cupid (fig. 37) is actually closer to the phenomenology of 
real life perception, even while his „deformations‟ tend to strike us as odd.204 
                                               
203 Leon Battista Alberti, ‘On Painting’ and ‘On Sculpture’, ed. C. Grayson (London: Phaidon, 
1972), section 8 (pp. 44 – 45). This idea originated in the work of Alhazen. According to Martin 
Kemp, Leonardo was among the first to cast doubt upon the veracity of this notion, see 
„Leonardo and the Visual Pyramid‟, Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 40 (1977), 
pp. 128 – 149.  
204 For a discussion which is sensitive to this aspect of Cézanne‟s painting and which makes 
particular reference to its relationship with touch see Richard Shiff, „Cézanne‟s physicality: the 
politics of touch‟, in The Language of Art History, ed Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp.129 – 180. 
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Indeed, this is exactly the point that Merleau-Ponty seems to be making when he 
contrasts Cézanne‟s „lived perspective‟ with a „geometric or photographic one‟. 
For while, on the one hand, photographs, and indeed most paintings „freeze these 
distortions…[and] stop the spontaneous movement in which they pile up in 
perception‟, in Cézanne‟s pictures: 
 
Perspectival distortions are no longer visible in their own right but rather 
contribute, as they do in natural vision, to the impression of an emerging 
order, an object in the act of appearing, organising itself before our 
eyes.
205
 
 
Therefore, if linear perspective bears a fairly contrived relationship to our 
everyday sight and thus has to be learnt according to conventionalised rules, why 
are we so ready to assert that it produces the most realistic pictures? Several 
explanations can be offered for this and perhaps, in truth, they are all mutually 
reinforcing. The first hinges on the way that we are inclined to consider the 
nature of visual experience. Rather than thinking of it as something that is 
durational, admixed with memory and modulated by attention, we tend to 
understand it as presenting us with a seamless and instantaneously lucid view of 
the world. This may be an opinion which has issued from the fallacies of 
„objective thought‟; it may not. But whatever the case, it is very difficult to say 
what our visual experiences are actually like. And when we do decide to reflect 
on this process, we adopt a critical attitude – we try to analyse sight – for 
instance, we shut one eye or keep our heads still, we ignore objects and try to 
                                               
205 Merleau-Ponty, „Cézanne‟s Doubt‟, in The Maurice Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader: 
Philosophy and Painting, ed Galen A. Johnson (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 
pp. 64 – 65. 
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attend to the coloured patches of the „visual field‟.206 Perhaps in this respect 
appearances do most approximate the views afforded by perspective, for in this 
way we shut out the influence of object-centred descriptions and halt the flow of 
our visual attention. But crucially, this bears little relation to our experience as it 
is actually „lived.‟207 
 
 Of course, this critical mode of vision also has benefits: it recommends 
itself as objective, as measurable, as mechanisable and as repeatable, thus giving 
rise to myriad instruments designed to reify sight.
208
 And so, it would seem that 
perspective has two qualities which – aside from the nature of the historical 
discourse it slots into  – have helped to encourage its growth and widen its 
influence. On the one hand, it seems to clarify sight by making explicit the 
stabilising effect of our viewpoint, an aspect of our experience which perhaps 
had not received an adequate criterion until Brunelleschi came along.
209
 But 
precisely because his innovations allowed perspective to be turned into a formula 
                                               
206 Here I am using this term in the sense that J. J. Gibson employs it in his 1950 work, The 
perception of the visual world. According to Gibson, in order to experience the visual field, „The 
attitude you should take is that of the perspective draughtsman. It may help if you close one eye. 
If you persist, the scene comes to approximate to a picture.‟ Gibson further compares this 
experience to that of the „visual world‟. Here our attention is drawn to objects and what we see is 
modulated by constancy effects. Cited by Willats, Art and Representation, p. 173.  
207
 For instance, speaking of this „analytic attitude‟ Merleau-Ponty states that, „It appears when, 
instead of yielding up the whole of my gaze to the world, I turn towards this gaze itself and when 
I ask myself what precisely it is that I see; it does not occur in the natural transactions between 
my sight and the world, it is a reply to a certain kind of questioning on the part of my gaze, the 
outcome of a second order or critical vision which tries to know itself in its own particularity, of 
an „attention to the pure visual‟, which I exercise either when I am afraid of being mistaken, or 
when I want to undertake a scientific study of the spectacle presented.‟ Phenomenology of 
Perception, p. 263.  
208 For a consideration of these and their varying relation to a discourse of sight see Jonathan 
Crary, Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century 
(Cambridge, Mass. & London: MIT Press, 1990). 
209 Referring to Brunelleschi‟s experiments which highlighted the effects of perspective with the 
aid of a mirror, Hubert Damisch notes that, while the ancients may have known of this spatial 
arrangement, Brunelleschi gave it „the force of science‟ by presenting it in a demonstrative form. 
This is the moment, he claims, „of the inversion of practical interest into theoretical interest.‟ The 
Origin of Perspective, translated by John Goodman (Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 
1995), p. 162; p. 157. 
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– not only one that quickly become doctrine in the Academies, but one that was 
later proved anew at every click of a shutter – it was seized upon as the shared 
paradigm of art and science and finally of popular culture (the invention of the 
cinema being another critical moment in this unfolding history). So perhaps the 
answer is that perspective strikes us as „right‟ not because it is any more so than 
the „awkwardness‟ of Cézanne, but rather because we have become so 
accustomed to its effects and because the instruments it has given rise to 
continually assert its authority and make its „objectivity‟ available for all to see. 
 
 
4.6 CHILDREN’S DRAWING DEVELOPMENT 
 
In light of the argument we have so far developed, it is tempting to complicate 
Willats‟s view of drawing development so that his schema now interposes a 
phase of picture production based on allocentric coordinates between one based 
on object-centred descriptions and one based on views. What this means, in other 
words, is that the developmental hierarchy which Willats proposes remains the 
same and so too does his classification of drawing and denotation systems. But 
instead of correlating age with the complexity of mapping rules derived only 
from object-centred descriptions, we will consider the series as beginning at this 
level, adjusting to allocentric coordinates and finally (with the aid of relevant 
examples and adequate training) transforming material from views. And so, we 
might tentatively represent this progression accordingly (fig. M):
210
 
                                               
210 While the information in this table is organised by age (top to bottom), I am not suggesting 
any one to one correspondence between the frames of reference and the drawing and denotation 
systems. Nevertheless, as I shall presently propose, it may be that certain of these systems are 
naturally allied to certain frames of reference. 
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Frame of reference Drawing systems Denotation systems 
Object-centred 
coordinates 
Allocentric 
 coordinates 
Viewer-centred 
coordinates 
Topology / extendedness 
Othogonal projection 
Horizontal and vertical 
oblique projection 
Oblique projection 
Perspective 
Regions as picture 
primitives 
Lines as picture 
primitives 
Line junctions as picture 
primitives 
 
 
Let me explain more fully how this revised schema conforms to Willats‟s 
view and how it differs. Firstly, I agree with him that the earliest drawings 
produced by children – namely, those in topological geometry (roughly from 
around three years of age to seven)
211
 – most likely derive their mapping rules 
from object-centred descriptions. In this system only the most basic properties of 
objects such as enclosure and extendedness are preserved and only rudimentary 
spatial relations such as connectedness and separation. Therefore, in drawing b of 
the table in Willats‟s experiment (fig. A), it would seem that regions are being 
used to denote three-dimensional volumes, as for example, the tipped up view of 
the tabletop and the saucepan suggest. However, more crucially for my 
argument, it appears that spatial relations only cohere insofar as they indicate the 
shape of objects themselves, and only then with respect to their canonical axes, 
as the child‟s drawing of the saucepan shows. Conversely, there is very little 
attempt to preserve the intervals between things – in drawing b, for instance, the 
items which are on the table have been dislocated in space so that their relation to 
one another is only very loosely preserved (note that while objects are 
                                               
211 Age can only be imprecisely correlated with the different phases of drawing development 
since, as Willats notes, this depends „very much on the individual child, the nature and 
complexity of the task, and the object to be drawn.‟ Art and Representation, p. 310. The age 
correlations I make here are largely based on his findings. 
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represented as above the table, their lateral spatial order has been lost altogether). 
Thus, if the mapping rules for depicting these cues are derived from allocentric 
coordinates, then it might be suggested that children who employ topological 
geometry have not yet mastered their use. 
 
On the other hand, it is difficult to generalise about systems in orthogonal 
projection and horizontal and vertical oblique projection. Here it seems a 
question of assessing individual drawings to seek out anomalies which suggest 
the influence of object-centred descriptions, or of finding evidence of an attempt 
to map spatial relationships as they exist between objects (and thus, on my 
hypothesis, of an attempt to derive rules from the allocentric frame of reference). 
Indeed, it might be speculated that this stage of development (roughly from nine 
to twelve years of age) is a transitional period where different kinds of 
compromise can be struck between indicating the volumetric qualities of objects 
and representing their discrete positions in an allocentrically mapped space.  
 
The reason for suggesting this is that if these two frames of reference 
convene in normal perception (thus making different aspects of the visual field 
available to our gaze), then it will take some practice to detach one from the 
other as the child tries to make representations which more effectively resemble 
real scenes. As with Willats‟s earlier definition, an „effective representation‟ is 
one that both shows a scene from a possible and a general position. But, on my 
reappraisal of this notion, no longer does this mean simply producing 
recognisable shapes and accommodating these to views (either views worked out 
from within the picture or matched to real scenes). Rather, it means something 
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more definite: namely, a method for representing the intervening space between 
different objects. Thus, it might be said that only after the child has mastered 
these allocentrically derived rules and can therefore image a space which is 
globally coherent will he or she be able to progress to views. For without some 
way of figuring interstitial relations, a view – which is by definition a panoramic 
experience – can never be depicted in an adequate way. 
 
While I have not rigorously tested this theory, I decided to assess its 
plausibility by asking a group of twenty-nine children from this age group to 
draw a picture of their house.
212
 The idea behind this was that, insofar as they 
were representing something from memory, they should either be mapping from 
object-centred descriptions, allocentric coordinates or using some mode of 
drawing which strikes a balance between the two. In other words, this would test 
the relative priority afforded to these different mnemonic formats, while 
minimising the possibility that the children were mapping from views.  
 
Of the twenty-nine pictures, seven could not be strictly classified due to 
the use of anomalous combinations of drawing and denotation systems; ten – by 
far the most significant proportion – were in orthogonal projection; three were in 
vertical oblique projection and three were in oblique projection; two were in true 
horizontal oblique projection and a further one used this system whilst 
                                               
212 This was an informal experiment performed in a classroom in April 2008, the mean age of the 
children was 11.2 years. The children were given fifteen minutes to draw while being supervised 
by a teacher and myself; no photographs or pictures were allowed in the room. However, given 
that the sample was relatively small and the criteria were not adequately stipulated, the validity of 
this hypothesis cannot be said to depend on these results. Rather, the purpose of doing this 
research was to generate examples which gave me a better purchase on the mental processes 
involved at this critical age. 
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committing the „flat bottom error‟213; finally one was in divergent perspective 
and two showed evidence of naive perspective insofar as they used converging 
orthogonals to indicate the side face of the house. Seven children used rulers to 
render edges exactly,
214
 while twelve represented the house‟s face so that it was 
continuous with the bottom edge of the paper, thus failing to make its relation to 
the ground plane explicit. 
 
 
 
Figure N. Child‟s drawing of a house employing 
discrepant drawing systems
Figure O. Child‟s drawing of house showing the 
use of a region to denote a volume
 
 
 
 
                                               
213 This refers to the mistake children commonly make of depicting a cubic object so that the 
bottom edge of its side face is continuous with the horizontal line representing the bottom of the 
front face while representing its top edge obliquely. 
214 It might be said that the children‟s preference for using rulers was related to the fact that this  
instrument facilitates a metrical, and hence an allocentric, mapping of space. 
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Figure P. Child‟s drawing of a house in which the 
roof is drawn from multiple points of view
Figure Q. Child‟s drawing of a house showing 
evidence of naïve perspective and of a recursive 
application of the mapping rules using a coordinate 
system set up within the pictorial view
 
 
 
 
Figure R. Child‟s drawing of houses with an 
inconsistent use of horizontal oblique projection
Figure S. Child‟s drawing of a house in orthogonal 
projection
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Figure T. Child‟s drawing of a house in vertical oblique 
projection
 
 
 
Out of the seven anomalous drawings, it seemed that most of the 
inconsistencies arose from the children‟s attempt to convey recession in pictures 
whose other dominant features indicated other types of spatial arrangement. For 
instance, in figure N the child has represented the house in orthogonal projection 
while the annex at the side is rendered in a rough approximation to oblique 
projection. So here it could be that a denotation system in which regions 
represent volumes (e.g., the front face of the house) conflicts with one where 
lines represent edges (e.g., the roof and sides of the annex). In support of Willat‟s 
theory, there are several quite obvious examples in this grouping of the children 
attempting to convey the volumetric qualities of shape rather than its appearance 
from a specific point of view. For instance, in figure O the flower boxes have 
been „glued‟ to the side of the house as if, instead of an edge, this line belonged 
to a region indicating a three-dimensional shape. And a similar thing could be 
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said of figure P in which the roof is tipped up to show us its other side and the 
attic window gainsays perspective and instead is flipped out to show us a view 
from head on. 
 
But while it may be that many of these pictures are derived from object-
centred coordinates so that the child first describes the volume of the house as a 
region and then adds specific details (such as curtains, window frames, tiles and 
so on), in others there is evidently an attempt to adopt a different set of principles 
so that the space is given a more unified effect. However, it would seem that this 
is not only (or not always) generated in a recursive manner by extending the 
mapping rules applied to the house out to the scene in which it is nested (as for 
instance may be the case in figure Q). And nor is this self-evidently an attempt to 
accommodate viewer-centred coordinates, for in only one (and possibly two) of 
these pictures does the spatial distribution imply a convergence into depth (see 
also figure Q). Rather, what may be at stake, particularly if we consider drawings 
such as figure R, is an emerging desire to treat items as apart from the viewer and 
independent of one another – in other words, to structure a space which is 
imparted its cohesion by allocentric coordinates.  
 
I wish to suggest that drawings in this vein have several structural 
features in common. First, the denotation system will no longer map regions as 
volumes. Instead, these shall relate to faces, lines will correspond to edges and 
line junctions to corners, and sometimes (but not always) to points of occlusion. 
The reason for this, as I have already suggested, is that if scene-based 
coordinates are to be mapped in a relatively faithful way then a method must be 
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found for preserving the relations between multiple objects (and perhaps also 
between their parts if they are widely distributed in space). What this means, 
therefore, is that the denotation system must proffer more fine-grained 
information about the structure of shape, something which the topological 
denotation system is not equipped to do.  
 
On the other hand, an allocentrically derived drawing system must be 
capable of evenly distributing these elements so that they sit within a unified 
space, but in a way which does not imply a perspectival arrangement (and so, in 
this respect, the arrangement might be compared to a mapping in Euclidian 
geometry).
 215
 What this means in practice is that objects must be represented as 
if they occupy a single, homologous plane, or, in terms of projective geometry 
one in which the light rays reaching the eye from a scene are parallel. For 
instance, this space might be flat and frontal as in this drawing in orthogonal 
projection (fig. S), or isotropically recessional as is perhaps the case with figure 
T if it is interpreted as a drawing in vertical oblique projection. In light of the 
discrepant orientations of the two houses in figure R, it might therefore be said 
that the child is attempting to produce a transformation from allocentric 
coordinates – meaning that she is attempting to show the relative locations of the 
structures in a view-invariant space – but has not yet quite learned how to apply 
these rules consistently. And so, in sum – and depending on the evidence 
presented by the individual drawing – orthogonal projection and the parallel 
                                               
215 I make this statement cautiously, for I do not intend this reference to Euclidian geometry to 
bring to mind Jean Piaget‟s theory of drawing development. Unlike Piaget, I do not think that 
these varieties of view-invariant pictorial space are derived from conceptual schemata which 
become available through the child‟s increasing knowledge of the world. Rather, I think the child 
is drawing on the computational outputs of semantic processing, which is to say, products of 
seeing which are innately supplied. For Piaget‟s theory see J. Piaget and B. Inhelder, The Child’s 
Conception of Space (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956). 
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oblique systems might potentially derive their principles from this variety of 
visual space.  
 
But if it is assumed that children who are old enough to produce coherent 
representations already possess the requisite visual capacities to compute both 
object-centred and allocentric descriptions, then we might lastly wish to ask why 
this developmental sequence is said to take the course that it does. In other 
words, why should it be that children begin by deriving their mapping rules from 
object-centred descriptions and only then proceed to make use of an allocentic 
frame of reference? In this respect, there is little conflict with the view presented 
by Willats, since it is not a question of assessing the relative complexity of the 
visual algorithms involved (if indeed, it makes any sense to compare them in this 
way). Rather, as the author proposes, the crucial consideration is the complexity 
of the mapping rules as they are described in terms of secondary geometry.
216
 
And therefore, since topology is the most straightforward system in this respect – 
for instance, the rule for depicting enclosure might simply be „when the object is 
enclosed by another, represent the enclosed object within the outline representing 
the surface of the enclosing object‟217 – it will plausibly be the method to which 
young children are initially drawn.  
 
But insofar as the motor driving drawing development is the desire to 
produce pictures whose content can be recognised more easily (which, pace 
Willats, is not simply a matter of shape representation) the limitations of 
topology will spur the child on to seek alternative means. However, this is where 
                                               
216 Willats, Art and Representation, p. 291. 
217 Ibid, p. 75. 
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a complexity arises, for while this might be achieved by applying more complex 
transformational algorithms to an object-centred description, it might also be 
achieved by mapping from allocentric coordinates as well. This is because, since 
each approach is able to capture more fine-grained information about the 
structure of visual percepts – for instance, in the case of the former, the 
complexity of contour and in the case of the latter, the distribution of elements in 
space – each shall result in a representation which is more easily perceived. And 
furthermore, it may be hard to track mapping rules back to these different sources 
in vision, since the algorithms they stipulate – and thus the kinds of marks that 
they engender – may not be easily separated, especially if the child is in the grip 
of a transitional phase. More precisely, it may be difficult to decide what 
properly belongs to shape as a more precisely specified, although still 
volumetrically described structure, and what belongs to space as a more holistic 
mapping between parts. Indeed, this might be like trying to draw a distinction 
between what it means to see something in focus and what it means to see 
something as an individuated object in a field. 
 
When it comes to considering children‟s drawings or indeed the drawings 
of untutored adults, it might therefore be useful to consider the kind of task that 
has been set or that the individual has set for themselves. If, for example, the 
challenge is to represent a landscape (something which is expansive by nature) 
then it may be likely that a mapping from an allocentric frame of reference will 
be preferred. If, on the other hand, a more proximate space is to be rendered, then 
there might instead be a tendency to derive mapping rules from object-centred 
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descriptions, for when things are seen close up they reduce and obscure the view 
of other items in the visual field.  
 
 
4.7 CÉZANNE AND THE RESCULPTING OF PICTORIAL SPACE 
 
So far we have not considered the difference between what most people do when 
they make pictures and what artists do when they make pictorial art. While it is 
not possible to draw any clear distinctions, there are reasons for thinking that the 
artist‟s approach is different. For a start, we would expect a person who is trained 
in representational conventions to know these rules by way of formalised schema 
so that certain drawing and denotation systems can be selected in order to meet 
the demands of a task. But of course, when we relate these tasks to systems such 
as patronage, or more broadly, when we consider art as a cultural and hence as an 
institutionalised practice, it becomes clear that these choices may be limited or 
fixed in advance. Such was the case for a long time in the West with regards to 
linear perspective, this being the system that tradition prescribed, the Academy 
disseminated and the patron endorsed. And even though vanishing points shifted 
and duplicated over the years, the essential formula remained the same: namely, 
to represent a space that receded cohesively away from the eye. 
 
A shift occurred in the nineteenth century due to the convergence of 
numerous factors: perhaps most vitally the advent of industrialised capitalism 
and its creation of a new middle class able and willing to invest in art. Therefore, 
with this new social structure the possibilities for art expanded since a freer 
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market meant more patrons and a more diversified taste. Moreover, this was a 
world in which artists no longer felt that the Renaissance tradition offered them 
the necessary means to produce pictures that were adequate to their experience or 
which were adequately expressive of the environment around them. Therefore, 
perhaps the confluence of these factors in some way motivated Cézanne to sit 
and „germinate‟ in front of his motif,218 so that through this profound reflection 
on vision he could let nature assert itself over convention in guiding the 
development of his pictorial style. Of course, in this respect, his path had already 
been cleared by the Impressionists, and before them by the Realists, the 
Romantics and the Barbizon school. But Cézanne‟s art brought to life something 
which, although it had other precedents, was only truly anticipated by the work 
of Courbet: an aesthetic which seems to accommodate the body of viewer by 
collapsing her space into its own.
 219
 I would propose, therefore, that these 
innovations helped to break the grip of linear perspective, supplanting its 
synoptic, decarnalised view of the world with one that invoked the bodily 
contingency of sight.  
 
An idea of how this was actually drawn out through the formal structure 
of Cézanne‟s art can perhaps be gleaned from his comment that: 
 
[The eye] becomes concentric by looking and working. What I mean is 
that, in an orange, a ball, a head, there is a culminating point; and this 
                                               
218 According to Merleau-Ponty (who attributes this comment to Madame Cézanne), the artist 
would „look at everything with widened eyes, “germinating” with the countryside.‟ „Cézanne‟s 
Doubt‟, p. 67. It seems that Merleau-Ponty is here paraphrasing one, or several, statements made 
by Joachim Gasquet, who speaks vividly of Cézanne‟s almost physical relation to his motif in his 
memoir on the artist. See Chapter 1, note 80. 
219 See Michael Fried, Courbet’s Realism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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point is always closest to our eye; the edges of objects always recede 
towards a centre place on our eye level.
220
 
 
What this seems to indicate is that Cézanne had noted a certain salience 
in vision whereby, instead of flattening out and receding, things projected out 
towards the eye. And perhaps, therefore, we might say that he had come to attend 
to the life which seeing instils into things by honing in upon them and thus 
describing their volume in an object-centred frame. But, of course, how to 
represent this phenomenon would inevitably be a problem for the artist, since 
while the three-dimensionality of objects may be given some indication by 
aspects of the denotation system such as tonal modelling,
221
 these local effects 
will tend to be counterbalanced by the demand to give cohesion to the interstitial 
space. And, as we have seen, since this normally entails using drawing systems 
which fix relationships so that they are isotropic across a field, it will also 
normally conceal the elasticity of sight. This is why perspective, in inviting the 
eye to glide into depth, or oblique projection, in inviting it to sweep across in 
parallels, prevent us from obtaining a visual „grip‟ upon objects, thereby 
undermining the salience that they have in real life. 
 
It would seem that Cézanne tackled this problem by loosening his 
outlines, by modelling in colour and most crucially by permitting for a slippage 
                                               
220 Letter to Bernard, 25 July 1904. Reproduced in The Courtauld Cézannes, ed. Stephanie Buck, 
John House, Ernst Vegelin Van Claerbergen & Barnaby Wright (London: Paul Holberton 
Publishing, 2008), p. 157. 
221 According to Willats, tonal modelling is a variety of optical denotation system. I think that it 
is important to note that when this representational device is spread across the scene in the 
manner of chiaroscuro, it will act in support of allocentrically derived drawing systems by further 
homogenising the intersititial space. This is perhaps one reason its effect was subverted by 
Cézanne and more particularly by the Cubists. For Willats‟s discussion see Art and 
Representation, pp. 133 – 135. 
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between distinct planes in space. For what this latter device effected was 
essentially a disruption of the homogeneity of the pictorial field, allowing it to 
ebb and flow rather than forming a smooth continuum in which the salience of 
objects is disciplined by the unity of the space. Thus, instead of consistently 
using one drawing system in a picture, Cézanne tended to splice several together, 
hiding their joins at the critical points – a fact that Paul Smith has particularly 
drawn attention to in his work and which he likens to a loosening of „grammar‟ 
for „poetic effect‟.222 Finally, therefore, we might note two consequences of this 
„poetry‟ which shall prepare us for a more detailed consideration of the tactility 
of Cubism. First, if what Cézanne inhibits in doing this is the panoramic 
phenomenology of allocentric sight and if what he emphasises are the volume 
swelling effects of object-centred descriptions, then essentially it will seem as if 
the space of the picture is brought within our reach.
223
 And second, if the 
representational field is structured so that it is not homogenous but rather has 
peaks and troughs, then it will invite the eye to probe space and to „palpate‟ 
discrete objects in a manner that distinctly recalls the phenomenology of 
touch.
224
 
 
                                               
222 „Cézanne‟s Primitive Perspective or the „View from Everywhere‟‟ (unpublished) and personal 
correspondence. Smith also makes this point in relation to Cubism, see „How a Cubist Picture 
Hangs Together‟ in Art of the Twentieth Century, ed Jason Gaiger and Paul Wood (London: Yale 
University Press/Open University, 2003), p. 81. Willats draws this analogy but does not treat it as 
an effect of hiding the seams between drawing systems. See Art and Representation, p. 251. 
223 My discussion here is very much informed by Richard Shiff‟s article, „Cézanne‟s physicality: 
the politics of touch‟. I have attempted to expand this account by giving it some basis in the 
psychology of vision. 
224 Again, the term „palpate‟ is one I borrow from Merleau-Ponty, who states, for example, that, 
„the look…envelops, palpates, espouses the visible things.‟ The Visible and the Invisible, ed 
Claude Lefort (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968), p. 133. 
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4.8 PICTURING TACTILITY: THE VISUOMOTOR CUES OF EARLY 
CUBISM 
 
It is evident from several statements made by Braque that he and Picasso had 
understood the flattening effects of perspective and that they intended their 
pictures to structure a very different kind of space. In this respect, two of his 
comments particularly stand out: first that,  „Scientific perspective…forces the 
objects in a picture to disappear from the beholder instead of bringing them 
within his reach as a painting should.‟225 And second that „Visual space separates 
objects from each other. Tactile space separates us from objects. The tourist 
looks at the site. The artilleryman hits the target (the trajectory is the 
prolongation of his arm.)‟226  
 
It might be argued, therefore, that in making these observations Braque 
had intuited the phenomenology of space which is given by egocentric 
coordinates for, as will be recalled, these encode the location of an object in 
relation to our body. Therefore, it could be that he and Picasso appealed directly 
to this mode of seeing by constructing their pictures in a way that recalls the 
structural constituents of vision for action. The purpose of this section is to 
substantiate this claim by showing how a particular painting which is 
representative of the early Cézannian period of Cubism (1908 – 1909) asks us to 
surrender imaginatively to a particular kind of physical response. This can be 
                                               
225 J. Richardson, „The Power of Mystery‟, The Observer, 1st December 1957. Cited in Mullins, 
Braque, p. 128 
226 Le jour et la nuit, Cahiers de Georges Braque, 1917 – 1952 (Paris: Gallimard, 1952), p. 26. 
This translation is from Christine Poggi, In Defiance of Painting: Cubism, Futurism, and the 
Invention of Collage (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), p. 97 
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classed as „manual prehension‟: a form of touching which we enact with our 
hands in order to reach and grasp objects within our near personal space. 
 
The painting I shall consider is Picasso‟s Houses on the Hill, Horta de 
Ebro (fig. 16). This work has already been discussed in detail by Paul Smith 
who, by adopting Willats‟s theory of pictures, argues that it combines several 
drawing and denotation systems so that it at once „retain[s] the semblance of a 
view, while achieving a fully three-dimensional look.‟227 This is effected, he 
claims, through Picasso‟s use of a pictorial „grammar‟ which obtains a general 
coherence by mapping sufficient information from viewer-centred descriptions, 
while yielding a sense of volume (and hence of tactility) by combining elements 
in such a way that they seem to correspond to object-centred descriptions. 
Therefore, for Smith, the work gains its physicality by replacing the isotropic, 
recessional space of traditional depiction (or more precisely, of linear 
perspective) with a seamless fusion of representational systems that emphasise 
the constancy of three-dimensional shape. 
 
I wish my treatment of this picture to be read against the backdrop of this 
one, but now with several important qualifications in mind. First, while Smith 
supposes that the effect of tactility is achieved by recombining representational 
systems which, in their pure form, facilitate shape recognition (because on 
Willats‟s account they are parasitic on internal representations which do the same 
thing), I shall argue that this effect is wrought in a more direct way, that is, by 
drawing on a stratum of vision which serves the purpose of action performance. 
                                               
227 Paul Smith, „How a Cubist Picture Hangs Together‟, p. 81. 
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But importantly, this does not negate Smith‟s account of the tactual qualities of 
this picture for, in many respects, the elements he attributes this to can 
themselves be ascribed to this immediate source.  
 
Therefore, turning to Picasso‟s picture, let us start by considering spatial 
relations and how these may be thought to correspond to egocentric coordinates. 
As noted above, this frame of reference specifies the position of the object with 
respect to the body and therefore stipulates a one to one relationship between 
target and viewer. An approximation to this is, I think, achieved in this picture by 
allowing each form to assume independence from its surroundings. Picasso 
structures this experience in two different ways. First, he uses incisive lines to 
define the contours of objects so that each seems to distinguish itself from its 
neighbours. And second, he uses different drawing systems to map different 
forms so that each appears to inhabit its own dimension of space. For instance, 
the building at the extreme left, the two nearest to the horizon and the one at the 
bottom right all possess orthogonals which converge towards a vanishing point, 
but since they do not agree on the location of this point, it is not possible to see 
them as occupying a unified space. The building in the centre, on the other hand, 
seems to be rendered in a modified form of vertical oblique projection so that the 
roof is tilted up towards the picture plane and seems to coextend with the front. 
Oblique projection also makes an appearance at the back right, and finally the 
house at the bottom is depicted in inverted perspective which perhaps makes this 
the most disruptive area of the picture. 
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In this respect, it is difficult to compare the locations of depicted items 
since spatial relations are only coherent between parts of the same form – and 
even then only loosely – and are less easy to stabilise as our gaze pans across the 
scene. Since the space is not therefore strictly allocentric, neither it is optimal for 
object recognition. Indeed, when we do ascribe identities to forms it seems to be 
specific details that give the game away like the door, the chimney and the gable 
of the roof. Nevertheless, the scene is not simply experienced as a chaotic 
melange of forms since Picasso is careful to preserve harmony at a more holistic 
level. He achieves this in two different ways. First, by limiting his palette, he 
balances colours and tones evenly throughout the picture. And second, he creates 
areas of ambiguity at critical points in the picture – for example, by bringing 
edges into alignment (false attachment) and by blurring the boundaries between 
discrete spatial planes (passage) – which serves to unify different parts of the 
scene and thereby creates a global coherence. Thus, while individual forms seem 
to demand that we engage with them uniquely, if we survey the picture more 
generally they also appear to partake of a more cohesive space.
228
  
 
As I said earlier, the visuomotor representation specifies the location of 
objects so that we can compute the distance and direction of our movements 
towards them, but this is always on the condition that they occupy a space which 
is close to the body. Consequently, if Houses on the Hill is to simulate a space 
for manual prehension, it must suggest that forms are within reach of our hands. 
The cohesion of space at the global level serves this purpose since it collapses 
local spatial relations and tilts forms up towards the picture plane so that they are 
                                               
228 This account of the coherence of Houses on the Hill is particularly indebted to Paul Smith‟s 
treatment, see especially pp. 84 – 85.  
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experienced as being equally close. The top and bottom areas of the picture are 
also crucial in this process. On the one hand, the high point of the horizon and 
the materialisation of the sky into gradated facets block the passage of spatial 
recession. Conversely, the ground plane appears to intersect with the space of the 
viewer, especially since the foreground house is shorn off at the edge and is not 
therefore contained within the picture. Moreover, since the space constituted at 
this edge seems to slip away from under our feet, we have the sense of being 
positioned directly over the scene – an angle which seems secured by the upward 
tilt of the roofs of the three central buildings.
229
 Taken together, these cues 
therefore describe a proximate space in which each form can offer itself to the 
touch. 
 
Discrete forms also seem to exhibit properties which make them 
appropriate for grasping. Size, for instance, is a major factor in this equation 
since the actual measurements of the elements we decipher (from a standard 
viewing distance, that is) roughly approximate the dimensions of objects which 
we could accommodate within the scale of our grip. To encode a target for action 
we also need to be sensitive to its three-dimensional shape, and this is something 
that Picasso makes explicit it a number of ways. First, he often presents us with 
more information about the structure of shape than could be possibly gleaned 
from a single point of view. For instance, the splayed perspective of the house in 
the centre makes it appear as if seen from two different angles at once. This 
                                               
229 This idea is crucial to Rosalind Krauss‟s discussion of Houses on the Hill in „The Motivation 
of the Sign‟ in W. Rubin, K. Varnedoe and L. Zelevansky, Picasso and Braque: A Symposium 
(New York: Museum of Modern Art / Abrams, 1992), see especially pp. 266 – 271. I shall return 
to Krauss‟s argument in the following chapter on collage and construction. 
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therefore allows us to conceive shape in volumetric terms or, in other words, in 
terms of an object-centred description. 
 
And yet, even when buildings are rendered in such a way as to imply a 
single viewpoint, they are often presented at an angle which is optimal for 
deducing shape. This means, in practice that the vertex where different planes in 
a polyhedral shape meet is presented head-on to the viewer so that the relations 
between surfaces are made explicit, as for instance is the case with the building 
on the right and the one directly above it. The inconsistent chiaroscuro also 
contributes to the distinction of planes by emphasising the sheer difference of 
their orientations rather than merely emphasising the extrinsic condition of light. 
And finally, by rendering the impression of form so vividly, Picasso also allows 
us to imagine where we might place our fingers if we were to grasp the object 
since we can sense which surfaces would yield the most stable grasp points and, 
specifically, which combination we would choose in order to locate the centre of 
mass. 
 
By analysing this picture, I hope to have indicated a few of the ways in 
which Picasso thematises the cues of space, shape and size which relate to 
visuomotor processing. To put this in terms that are easier to grasp, I think that 
these landscapes exemplify Merleau-Ponty‟s dictum that seeing is not primarily a 
matter of „I think‟ but rather of „I can‟.230 And yet, as I suggested earlier, these 
two things do not have to be regarded as mutually exclusive, neither in vision nor 
in representational pictures insofar as they owe their structure to sight. This last 
                                               
230 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 159. To be exact, this is a claim that the 
philosopher makes about consciousness, but since it is presented in the context of a discussion 
about sight, I shall take it to apply equally to the latter. 
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assertion is, of course, the basic premise of Willats‟s account, but I hope now to 
have extended the implications of this claim a little. For while his theory of 
representation can only make space for recognitional seeing and its convergence 
with thought, I have tried to reveal how depiction may also hinge upon a more 
embodied and intersensory stratum of sight. 
 
Accordingly, the basic structural overlap of these two modes of vision, 
and particularly their mutual dependence on object-centred descriptions, may be 
why Smith is able to use the representational systems that Willats describes – and 
yet which the latter understands in terms of shape recognition – to account for 
the tactility of Picasso‟s picture. But, on the other hand, if Picasso has developed 
a pictorial grammar which is principally based on visuomotor cues, then this may 
be why Houses on the Hill deploys a mixture of drawing and denotation systems 
and yet does not lose its feeling of coherence. For then, instead of simply 
amalgamating „separate systems‟ and forcing them to comply – as would be the 
prediction from Willats‟s account – these pieces of the jigsaw would slot together 
to form a pictorial syntax of its own kind. And what is more, this would not be 
continuous with the kind of seeing that hides its operations behind thought. 
Rather, it will represent and engender the actual unfolding of natural sight: it will 
be the Cubist „space before reason‟ that Jean Paulhan describes.231 
 
 
 
 
                                               
231 Jean Paulhan, „Peindre en Dieu (1960) in Oeuvres complètes V. (Paris: Le Cercle du Livre 
Précieux, 1970), p. 40.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
 
 
Meaning and Motor Intentionality in Synthetic 
Cubism 
 
 
 
 
…Those actions in which I habitually engage incorporate their instruments into 
themselves and make them play a part in the original structure of my own body. 
As for the latter, it is my basic habit, the one which conditions all others, and by 
means of which they are mutually comprehensible. 
 
– Maurice Merleau-Ponty232 
 
 
5.1 THE MOTIVATION OF THE SIGN 
 
I wish to begin this chapter by considering Rosalind Krauss‟s reading of 
Picasso‟s Houses on the Hill, Horta de Ebro (fig. 16) in her important essay, 
„The Motivation of the Sign‟.233 According to Krauss, the space of this picture 
can be read in two distinct ways, each one suggestive of a different mode of 
perception. This duplicity is said to arise from the way that the artist configures 
the edges of discrete forms so that they globally articulate the shape of a diamond 
                                               
232 Phenomenology of Perception, p. 104. 
233 In W. Rubin, K. Varnedoe and L. Zelevansky, Picasso and Braque: A Symposium (New York: 
Museum of Modern Art / Abrams, 1992), pp. 261 – 287; for Krauss‟s discussion of Houses on 
the Hill and its implications see particularly pp. 266 – 71. 
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with its points joined up across the centre. Thus, on the one hand, the houses may 
be seen as reinforcing the two-dimensionality of this form, allowing it to be 
perceived as a lozenge-shaped „relief plane‟ which rises parallel to the picture 
and squarely confronts our upright regard (fig. 38).
234
 But, on the other hand, this 
configuration can engender the unstable gestalt of a pyramid, so that its tip may 
either seem to drop into depth or jut forwards towards the viewer (fig. 39). 
Therefore Krauss contends that when this pyramid inverts, we feel as if we are 
suspended above it, looking down along the vertical axis of our body and into a 
yawning space below. And so, unlike the relief plane which is said to emphasise 
the frontality of the visual field, she claims that this destabilisation of the ground 
plane induces an awareness of our body and thereby thematises the sense of 
touch.
235
 
 
Having identified this disjunction in Houses on the Hill, Krauss uses it to 
trace a trajectory through Picasso‟s Cubism which she states finds no parallel in 
the contemporaneous work of Braque. For while she observes that the latter 
treats touch and vision as „functions of the same interlocking network‟236, she 
claims that the former, in subscribing to the view of associative psychology,
 
                                               
234 By „relief plane‟, Krauss means a pictorial space which is suggestive of the shallow and 
frontal appearance of bas relief. She also refers to this as the „diaphane‟, which implies that it is 
something that lets light pass through without being totally transparent.  See Ibid, p. 266 and note 
238. 
235 According to Krauss, this „is a depth which takes its cues from quite another zone of the 
sensorium, for it is a depth that occurs when the ground gives way below one‟s feet, a depth that 
is a function of touch, of the carnal extension of one‟s body.‟ Ibid, p. 268. 
236 Ibid, p. 270. Here Krauss is specifically talking about Braque‟s works of 1908 – 09. These are 
said to be distinct from Picasso‟s works at Horta insofar as Braque uses the device of passage to 
engender a relief plane which encompasses the whole of the representational field. Krauss 
suggests that the consistency of this space secures the union between vision and touch in his 
work. Later this idea is used to support her argument that his art „never moves beyond the 
iconically structured sign toward the symbolic one‟ (p. 264).  
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wishes to stress the distinction between these two modes of perception.
 237
 Thus, 
according to this analysis, Picasso believes that that there is a disunity between 
vision and touch and thinks that it is only by recourse to memory and judgement 
that their inputs are combined. And so, in his Horta pictures and other works of 
this period: 
 
Picasso seems to be playing with the way that one and the same set of 
marks can open out onto two separate sensory tracks: one, a visual 
stratum, the other a tactile one; the first a registration of the frontality of 
the optical field, the diaphane, the second a descriptor of all those 
kinaesthetic cues upon which the perception of depth depends. And in 
this oscillation what seems significant is the constant unravelling of what 
we can think of as the perceptual plenum, a disintegration of it into the 
unsynthesized possibility of two separately marked sensory channels.
238
 
  
However, according to Krauss‟s deconstructive logic, this approach will 
inevitably spell its own end. And more specifically, it will erode Picasso‟s faith 
                                               
237 See Ibid, pp. 269 – 70. It is unclear whether Krauss thinks that Picasso was directly influenced 
by associative psychology or whether she thinks that he reached this conclusion in an intuitive 
manner. However, as Christine Poggi points out, this notion of sensory experience may have been 
familiar to the Cubists through Adolf Hildebrand‟s famous book The Problem of Form in 
Painting and Sculpture which was translated into French in 1903. See Poggi, In Defiance of 
Painting: Cubism, Futurism, and the Invention of Collage (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1992), p. 270, note 37. I shall consider the tenability of this historical reading in 
a following section. 
238 Krauss „The Motivation of the Sign‟, p. 268 – 69. Krauss borrows the term „diaphane‟ from 
Leo Steinberg, who uses it in his article „The Philosophical Brothel‟ to stress the assertive 
frontality of certain figures in Les Demoiselles D’Avignon and their juxtaposition with (and thus 
essential separation from) those we view as if from above. On Steinberg‟s view, this is a strategy 
which is used to ensnare the viewer‟s gaze, thus making him (and this gender is evidently 
presupposed by the content of the work) a constituent part of the scene. I would suggest that it is 
precisely the trauma associated with this form of physicalised seeing which is sublimated in the 
Cubist works. Krauss also implies this when she claims that the movement towards Synthetic 
Cubism is born of the desire to „objectify [this experience] at the level of the sign‟. See Krauss, 
„The Motivation of the Sign‟, p. 272 and Steinberg, „The Philosophical Brothel‟, October, 44 
(Spring 1988), p. 60.  
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in the idea of depiction as visual resemblance – the notion that pictures derive 
their content and comprehensibility by imitating the look of the world. This is 
because if depiction turns on the logic of visual resemblance, and if vision is 
further conceived as a purely optical phenomenon, then pictures will only non-
arbitrarily depict aspects of light and surface and not tactile cues relating to 
volume and depth. And so on this understanding, a pictorial representation will 
not directly evoke the form of an object or indicate its position in a recessional 
space. Therefore, as Picasso comes to reach this conclusion, Krauss claims that 
he will gradually erase „touch from the field of the visual‟.239 For instance, she 
considers his displacements of flesh in Girl with a Mandolin (fig. 40) as 
poignantly expressing this renunciation of touch.
240
 The teleology of this 
argument will accordingly map out two choices for the artist as he edges ever 
closer to the total elimination of these cues: either he will have to abandon 
representation completely, or he will have to make his art legible in a entirely 
different way. 
 
For Krauss, Picasso takes the second route and more specifically he 
comes to understand depiction in a way that parallels the structural linguistics of 
Ferdinand de Saussure.
 241
 In other words, he intuits that pictorial signification is 
                                               
239 Ibid, p. 271. 
240 For instance, she states that this picture „resonates with [a] sense of consternation at the 
thought that the extraordinary unity of the sensory plenum…is no longer available‟. Ibid. 
241 Saussure laid the ground for this theory in a series of lectures at the University of Geneva 
between 1906 and 1911. Notes from these lectures were compiled and published posthumously 
under the title Course in General Linguistics in 1916. Of course, Picasso could not have known 
of this theory and so Krauss would seem to be suggesting that he reached this conclusion in an 
intuitive way. On the other hand, Yve-Alain Bois relates this to Picasso‟s encounter with African 
art and in particularly to his purchase of a Grebo mask in the summer of 1912. See, for instance, 
„Kahnweiler‟s Lesson‟, Representations, no. 18 (Spring 1987), pp. 33 – 68. However, it should 
be pointed out that the idea of art having a language of its own (that is, one that does not depend 
on the logic of visual resemblance) was one of the main tenets of the symbolist aesthetic. 
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less dependent on the look of things in the world (that is, on the iconic link 
between a sign and its referent) than it is upon the arbitrary connection between a 
material signifier and its conceptual signified (in pictorial terms, the link between 
a specific configuration of marks and what we take them to mean). And more 
precisely, he is said to understand how meaning is constituted through the 
difference between signs. That is, like Saussure, he realises that the system as a 
whole and the form of its articulation at any one time determines the meaning of 
the individual signifier by ascribing it a value through its opposition to 
neighbouring signs.
242
 Hatched lines, for example, might be taken to represent a 
patch of shadow because, on the one hand they are not triangles or planes, and on 
the other hand, they are placed in relation to pictorial elements that make this a 
viable reading. Consequently, for Krauss, this slippage hails the arrival of 
Synthetic Cubism, for no longer will Picasso use iconic means to suggest the 
experience of depth. Instead he will „write‟ its signifiers on the surface of his 
canvas, thus emphasising how depiction functions in a language-like way. Thus, 
instead of his pictorial signs resembling things in the world, they will be shown 
to draw their meaning from the internal organisation of the picture itself.  
 
On Krauss‟s reading, therefore, the collages are characterised by their 
insistent frontality since the illusions of depth and volume are „nowhere to be 
                                                                                                                               
Picasso‟s connection to this milieu may therefore have shaped his approach to the legibility of 
pictorial signs. 
242 Saussure states that „In language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference 
generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are 
only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language 
has neither ideas or sounds that existed before the linguistic system but only conceptual and 
phonetic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign 
contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it.‟ Course in General 
Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 120. 
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seen’. 243 Instead, she claims that Picasso alludes to these qualities by using signs 
that are symbolic – that is, signifiers that refer to a concept in a purely 
conventional and arbitrary way. As a case in point she cites his Violin of late 
1912 (fig. 41). Two aspects of this image are cited in support of this argument. 
The first of these is the vast difference in size between each of the f-holes which, 
by being sandwiched between elements which pronounce the flatness of the 
surface, are prevented from iconically figuring a turn into depth. Rather, their 
exaggerated discrepancy is said to assert their function as symbols so that they 
act as a „suspended emblem of foreshortening‟.244 The second piece of evidence 
is Picasso‟s use of the newspaper cuttings. The contours of these fragments not 
only connect them to the body of the violin, but they also indicate that they are 
two disconnected halves of the same piece of paper. And since in silhouetting the 
instrument, one has been flipped over to show its reverse, Krauss claims that this 
inversion inscribes on the pictorial surface the notion of the violin‟s back through 
a purely formal opposition between signs.  
 
 
5.2. THE MUTABILITY OF THE SIGN: PICASSO’S VIOLIN 
 
I have begun this chapter with a detailed account of Krauss‟s essay, for not only 
does my argument run parallel to the one that she develops, but it will also 
challenge many of her claims. However, it is not that I think that this approach is 
wholly mistaken. I concur with Krauss and the other advocates of this 
semiological interpretation that in turning to collage Picasso meditates on the 
                                               
243 Krauss, „The Motivation of the Sign‟, p. 263 (emphasis added). 
244 Ibid. 
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relational character of pictorial signs and that he problematises the notion of 
iconic resemblance.
245
 And yet, it seems to me that what is at stake in the 
transition from Analytic to Synthetic Cubism
246
 is not so much a straightforward 
shift to a symbolic mode of signification. Rather, I think that these works ask to 
be read on multiple levels thereby emphasising the inherent mutability of 
signs.
247
   
 
To introduce this argument, let us take the newspaper cuttings in Violin as 
an example. Now, if we consider these elements individually they seem to be 
deprived of any substantive connection to a referent. In other words, we would 
not recognise a violin solely on the basis of these scraps. Thus, their meaning is 
secured through their relation to neighbouring elements, which then gives 
credence to the semiological view. But nevertheless, when we consider their role 
within this pictorial matrix, they may also be seen as participating in the creation 
of an iconic sign. This is because the left edge of each element helps to describe 
the silhouette of the violin by substituting for the discontinuities and distortions 
in the charcoal drawing. And so, by assisting in the definition of the violin‟s 
contour, these fragments provide crucial information about the structure of its 
shape. Therefore, in light of Marr‟s theory of vision we might see these elements 
                                               
245 Other theorists who take this approach include Yve-Alain Bois, Jean Laude, Pierre Daix and 
Pierre Dufour. 
246 While these terms perhaps obscure the fluid development of Cubism, I have nevertheless 
chosen to follow convention by distinguishing between the Cézannian, Analytic and Synthetic 
phases of the movement. The words „analytic‟ and „synthesis‟ were first used by Daniel-Henri 
Kahnweiler in his 1920 book The Rise of Cubism (Der Weg zum Kubismus) and were popularised 
by Alfred H.Barr in works such as Cubism and Abstract Art (1936). 
247 In making this claim, I shall appeal to Charles Sanders Pierce‟s classification of signs, using 
his three main categories of icon, index and symbol. The assumption I make in doing this is that 
visual signs can never straightforwardly be read as symbols. Instead they tend to operate in a 
polysemic way so that resemblance and convention inflect one another. This approach has been 
informed by Michael Leja‟s article „Pierce‟s Visuality and the Semiotics of Art‟ in which he 
argues that Pierce adopted a similar view of the visual sign‟s hybridity. See A Companion to Art 
Theory, ed. Paul Smith and Carolyn Wilde (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 303 – 316. 
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as necessary to (but not sufficient for) the construction of an iconic sign. In other 
words, if the pasted papers a) fill in for the missing information in the charcoal 
drawing so that we are able to compute an object-centred description of its shape 
and b) permit this object-centred description to be matched to a schema in 
memory (for example, by allowing it to be adequately distinguished from other 
three-dimensional shapes) then they will help to establish a relationship of 
resemblance between the violin pictured and the mnemonic coding of a violin 
perceived.  
 
In a similar way, it may also be possible to view the right-hand element 
as non-arbitrarily invoking the presence of depth. For not only is this fragment 
displaced from its sister element in a manner which is consistent with the artist‟s 
indications of oblique projection (evidenced, for instance, by the parallel lines 
which cradle the bottom of the violin), but it also coincides with the marks which 
define the fleeing edge of the object, thus connecting it to a point which we see 
as furthest away. Therefore, counter to Krauss‟s claim about the insistent 
frontality of this collage, there is a sense in which these pasted papers can be 
seen as both structuring and belonging to an illusory space. And more to the 
point, if these elements partake of the logic of oblique projection, then their 
spatiality (both in terms of their placement by the artist and in terms of the 
illusion they help to establish) may not be determined in a wholly conventional 
or arbitrary manner. For if oblique projection is naturally affiliated with the 
allocentric mapping of visual space, then the pasted papers will not simply 
suggest depth by way of a formal opposition. Instead, their position and the 
network of relationships in which they are embedded will additively refer us 
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back to this structural feature of visual perception. In short, we can see depth in 
the picture because Picasso‟s placement of its elements is parasitic on the spatia l 
cues that facilitate seeing in the world. 
 
But nonetheless, the phenomenology of this space is dysmorphic; there is 
a sense of coherence, but this is forever sliding from view. In part, this may be 
due to the way that the collage‟s flatness – its adherence to the „optical plane‟ if 
we may use Krauss‟s terminology – can come to figure in, and indeed 
monopolise, our visual attention. This is because, in making a theme of the sheer 
materiality of the newspaper scraps, Picasso invites us to inspect the literal 
presence of the surface and (as has often been noted) the status of the artwork as 
an object in its own right. But in considering the actuality of these papers as 
opposed to their role in figuration, we may do more than simply register the 
collage‟s physicality. In addition, we may view them as testament to the process 
of creation by attending to the crudeness of Picasso‟s cuts and tears.248 In this 
respect, then, we can treat these elements as bearing the indexical marks of the 
artist‟s activities, thus allowing us to imaginatively reconstruct the procedures 
entailed in making the work. 
 
 It would seem, therefore, that Violin makes itself amenable to different 
interpretations depending on the way that our attention is spread. Thus, to put 
this in terms that can be applied to pictures in general, we might speak of a 
                                               
248 This is a reading suggested by Richard Shiff in his essay „Cézanne‟s Physicality: The Politics 
of Touch‟, see esp. pp. 160 – 166. Here, Shiff claims that in making his handiwork perceptible 
Picasso invites us to consider the picture „under a tactile mode of description‟ (p. 162). The 
implications of this idea shall be considered in more detail later in this chapter.   
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formal, a representational and a literal reading.
249
 By adopting the formalist 
position, our tactic is to focus on the relationships established between the 
compositional elements themselves. Or to put this another way, we treat the 
system of depiction as if it is has no truck with the anterior world. This therefore 
lends credibility to the semiological view since it draws attention to the way that 
meaning can be generated through the oppositional and multiplicative effects of 
signs. On a representational reading, conversely, we treat the picture in terms of 
its referential content by tracing visual resemblances between pictorial elements 
(either singly or collectively) and things in the world. In short, this will be an 
approach which privileges the iconicity of signs and which ascribes them a 
meaning from outside the work. And finally, we might read the picture in a literal 
way by exclusively considering its material aspects, for instance, its facture, 
medium and physical structure. However, since scrutinising the artwork in this 
manner can lead us to discern indexical marks, it can also catalyse reflection on 
how (and by whom) the picture was made.
250
  
 
Therefore, in light of this framework, it is not that Picasso has passed 
from one mode of signification to another. Rather, he has composed his collage 
so that it facilitates different readings rather than submitting only to one. This 
means that Krauss and her associates are right in saying that iconic resemblance 
                                               
249 Evidently, these are related to the symbolic, iconic and indexical modes of signification. 
However, in speaking of „readings‟ instead of significatory modes, my point is that meaning 
depends as much on the interpretant as it does on the referential capacities of the sign.  
250 However, as many art historians have pointed out, when this leads to the treatment of the 
indexical mark as a sign of its maker‟s particular psychology or mental state it can result in an 
approach that is highly problematic. This is because, firstly, there is no necessary connection 
between an artist‟s personality and his or her mark-making process and secondly, even if there 
were, it may not bear substantially on the meaning of the picture. This psycho-biographical 
reading of the indexical mark is evident, for instance, in Harold Rosenberg‟s notion of „action 
painting‟; see „The American Action Painters‟ in Tradition of the New (New York: Ayers 
Company Publishers, 1959), pp. 23 – 39. 
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is no longer a priority for the artist – and to this extent, they might also be right 
in saying that his Synthetic Cubism inaugurates a new tradition in art.
251
 
However, this advance cannot be characterised as a straightforward shift to 
symbolic representation since Picasso exploits his medium in three different 
ways. First, he often breaks the picture into individual components that fail to 
signify things in the world; second he also allows them to additively refer by 
invoking a non-arbitrary connection to sight; and third he draws attention to their 
literal qualities so that they can at once be read as articulations of the surface and 
as palimpsests of the constructive act. I would argue, therefore, that these works 
are intended to create a tussle between different interpretations. In other words, 
Picasso strikes a balance between the legibility of different kinds of pictorial 
sign.  
  
 
5.3 PICASSO’S METAPHOR: VIOLIN AND SHEET MUSIC 
 
In considering Picasso‟s Violin my purpose has been to show how our reading of 
the newspaper fragments can shift between different interpretations and how, 
more specifically, we can consider them as symbolic, iconic and indexical signs. 
What I have therefore been intimating is that it is precisely this kind of slippage 
that engenders the semantic ambiguity of Picasso‟s Synthetic Cubism. But of 
course, there are other metamorphic qualities that we can perceive in the papier 
collés and it is still incumbent upon us to account for these. To give this 
                                               
251 For instance, Yve-Alain Bois claims that Picasso‟s Synthetic Cubism is the origin „of a new 
era in the history of Western sculpture‟. „Kahnweiler‟s Lesson‟, p. 38. 
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hypothesis a little more force, let us therefore consider a further example in 
which this shift in meaning takes a more manifest form. 
 
The work I shall focus on, Violin and Sheet Music of autumn 1912 (fig. 
42), is representative of an effect which Picasso exploited throughout his career. 
This usually goes by the name of „visual metaphor‟, that is, the capacity of an 
artwork to represent two (or more) things by drawing attention to the properties 
that they share. But, how should we say that this twin evocation is effected in 
pictorial terms – how, for instance, does the formal language of the 1912 collage 
doubly refer to a head and a violin? Of course, on a semiological reading this 
cannot depend upon the sign‟s direct relation to two different referents which 
themselves possess analogous properties, since this relationship is supposedly an 
arbitrary one. Thus, according to Yve-Alain Bois it is instead a product of 
Picasso increasing the „value‟ of the sign – another Saussurian concept which can 
be summarised as the idea that the fewer signs there are in a system the more 
significations they will have to bear.
252
 Accordingly, Picasso‟s strategy is said to 
be one in which he severely restricts his formal repertory so that the individual 
signifier – insofar as it is only opposed to a handful of other signs – is forced to 
encompass a much wider range of meaning. For instance, the paper element at 
the left of the picture can be seen as an ear and as the contour of a violin because, 
on the one hand, its contextual position makes each interpretation viable and, on 
                                               
252 For Bois‟s discussion of Violin and Sheet Music and the series of collages to which it belongs 
see „The Semiology of Cubism‟ in W. Rubin, K. Varnedoe and L. Zelevansky, Picasso and 
Braque: A Symposium (New York: Museum of Modern Art / Abrams, 1992), pp. 188 – 90; for 
his treatment of the concept of value see „Kahnweiler‟s Lesson‟, pp. 50 – 52. Saussure‟s most 
famous example of value is the difference between the English word „sheep‟ and the French word 
„mouton‟. In this pairing, the word „mouton‟ is said to have a greater value, for unlike the 
distinction between sheep and mutton in English, the French have no separate word to refer to the 
meat that is eaten. Therefore the meaning of the word „mouton‟ is distended in French. Saussure, 
Course in General Linguistics, pp. 115 – 16; discussed in Ibid, p. 51. 
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the other hand, this context is not differentiated enough to allow one reading to 
trump the other. Thus, for Bois, Picasso is thematising „the minimum level of 
semantic articulation a shape is obliged to perform to be read as a sign.‟253 
 
Now, we can certainly agree with Bois that this picture possesses a 
minimum of formal elements and that if any of the middle four that constitute the 
head / violin were excluded one or both of these interpretations would fail. And it 
is also true that the contextual situation of these elements secures their meaning 
so that seen in isolation they would not refer to anything at all. But is this enough 
to prove that the metaphor depends on symbolic signification alone? This seems 
a hard pill to swallow for several reasons. First of all, this semiological reading 
would seem to imply that objects in the world are seen discretely, thus justifying 
the view that iconic signification operates in a one-to-one way. However, if our 
foray into visual science has taught us anything it is that object discrimination 
depends on seeing the relative position of things in a field, that is, it depends on 
the spatial coding of allocentric coordinates. Accordingly, we would not perceive 
an object unless there were sufficient spatial cues to establish a comparative 
relation between its constituent parts and nor would we be able to see a visual 
resemblance between a depicta and an object unless the pictorial field preserved 
sufficient of these cues. Thus, at its minimum level of differentiation, no pictorial 
element will signify an object iconically for it will not permit a spatial 
comparison to be made.
254
 
 
                                               
253 Ibid, p. 190. 
254 Indeed this makes us wonder what Bois and the other semiologists consider a discrete sign to 
be. 
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To return to Violin and Sheet Music we might therefore assert that both 
the additive constitution of shape by the four central elements and the spatial 
relations between each one allow the metaphor to work in an iconic way. Let us 
start by considering the pasted papers as cooperatively describing the silhouette 
of an object. In this respect, it is clear that we would struggle to recognise this 
form as a head, although we might have more luck in seeing it as a violin. But 
while the latter reading is more convincing, the structure of this shape is also 
sufficiently analogous to the outline of a head to not rule out this identification 
entirely. However, what is more important to this reading is the supplementary 
information provided by the individual components. And more particularly, this 
interpretation would seem to hinge on the relative size and shape and most 
crucially on the spatial distribution of the double-arced form, the black quarter-
circle and the holes cut out of the blue central element. It might be said, 
therefore, that these elements are positioned in relation to one another and in 
relation to the total contour so that they finally secure the reading of the head by 
preserving the allocentric coordinates that perception encodes. In other words, 
even if the relative shape and size of these papers crudely relates them to an ear, 
mouth and nose, it is only by way of their placement in space that they will come 
to assume the perceptual gestalt of a face. 
 
 Of course, the juxtaposition of these three paper elements also internally 
fractures the form of the violin. However, these fissures do not fundamentally 
disturb its identity. This is not only due to the reinforcement of this reading by 
the additive shape but also to the presence of individual elements which lend 
themselves to the articulation of the violin‟s features (consider, for instance, the 
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role of the white paper in describing its neck). Finally, however, it is the 
allocentric constituents shared by both the violin and head which facilitate the 
transition between different readings and thereby allow the pun to occur. This 
bridging function is particularly the role of the slits in the blue paper element. 
For due to the spatial interval between each one and their relationship to the form 
as a whole, they may equally stand in for sound holes or for eyes.
255
 Thus it may 
be that these slits form the perceptual pivot of the image by catalysing the 
reconfiguration of its gestalt. In this respect, then, it is not only the internal 
organisation of the picture that secures the possibility of two different readings. 
Rather it is the shaping of formal relations so that they at once derive from and 
thematise the structural similarity between two distinctive objects of sight.
256
 
 
 
5.4 THE BODILY PHENOMENOLOGY OF SYNTHETIC CUBISM 
 
The ideas in the two previous sections can be summarised by saying that Picasso 
disrupts the semantic coherence of the picture but prevents it from collapsing into 
complete illegibility. In other words, representation still „works‟ – the image still 
has a figurative content – but the viewer must build this up in a piecemeal way. 
The artist explored many different permutations of this effect between 1912 and 
1914. Sometimes it is the insertion of a self-sustaining iconic element which 
permits recognition to take place. And when this happens, the iconic field may 
                                               
255 In a like manner, the white pasted paper may be seen as articulating the neck of the violin or 
as a hat (or perhaps hair) crowning the head. However, since it would seem to correspond more 
strongly to the shape of the violin, it does not act as the vital passage between these two readings. 
256 For an alternative reading which also considers the iconic function of Picasso‟s collages see 
Roger Rothman and Ian Verstegen, „Arnheim‟s Lesson: Cubism, Collage and Gestalt 
Psychology‟, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 65, no. 3 (Summer 2007), pp. 287 – 
298. 
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extend to recruit non-mimetic elements, as we saw was the case with Violin. At 
other times, no individual component can be considered iconic, and yet figurative 
meaning may still be recovered through the artist‟s affirmation of an allocentric 
space. However, neither one of these strategies allows recognition to proceed 
straightforwardly to its goal. Rather we are forced to chase meaning around the 
picture by piecing together the partial evidence of its fragments and clues. This is 
therefore the sense in which Picasso‟s collages address us as games, as his 
frequent cropping of the word „Jou‟ from Journal implies (fig. 43).   
 
 But while the complexities of this issue could be thrashed out 
interminably, my purpose in this section is to consider a different aspect of 
Picasso‟s Synthetic Cubism. In this respect, I shall no longer be concerned with 
the legibility of the picture, or what I have referred to as its „semantic‟ 
dimension. Instead, I shall treat the „pragmatic‟ aspect of the collages, that is, the 
way they can structure bodily experiences and in particular how they can 
mobilise imaginary manual activities. I have already hinted at this experience 
when I spoke of Picasso‟s use of the newspaper clippings in Violin. But here I 
was solely treating this as a function of the work‟s literal surface and the artist‟s 
emphasis on the indexical sign. However, in order to begin this analysis properly, 
it is necessary to start by considering the spatial ambiguity of these works for, as 
I hope to make explicit, this is vital to their production of a physical effect.  
 
 While Clement Greenberg‟s discussion of the „opticality‟ of Synthetic 
Cubism may seem far removed from this issue, the description he gives in his 
1959 essay „Collage‟ would nevertheless appear to hint at the motor 
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intentionality of this space. On this view, the peculiarity of the collages is that, in 
producing an oscillation between flatness and depth, they seem to „encompass 
fictive space in front of the surface as well as behind it.‟257 For instance, we can 
observe this effect if we return again to Violin. In this case, we have already 
noted how, in attending to the sheer material presence of the pasted paper, we 
become aware of the literal flatness of the picture‟s surface. However, this 
experience only holds to the extent that we broadly distribute our visual attention 
and see the newspaper elements as locked into place by – and thus co-existing on 
the same literal plane as – the charcoal drawing. But when we come to focus on 
the elements themselves, and particularly when we become absorbed by their 
ragged cut and torn edges, they can seem to stand apart from, and thus float 
above, the sparse, white ground. Therefore, by way of the conjunction of these 
two effects – our ability to discern the artist‟s activities and the apparent lift of 
the pasted papers off the support – we may come to envisage these elements as 
planes or surfaces which can be shifted and manipulated in various ways. In this 
respect, then, we may not only „read‟ the rotation of the newspaper as a symbolic 
inscription of „/back/ or /behind/.‟258 Instead, by attending to the constructed 
nature of these fragments and by seeing them as floating in an ambiguous space, 
we may find ourselves identifying with the motions of turning that this activity 
entails. 
                                               
257 Greenberg, „Collage‟ (1959) in Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1961), p. 77. (My emphasis). In his discussion of the collages, Greenberg distinguishes between a 
depth which is suggested „pictorially‟ – that is, one that seems to recede behind the literal surface 
– and one that is suggested „optically‟ – that is, one that is established on top of the surface. On 
my understanding, however, the word „optical‟ is somewhat misleading as it does not capture the 
peculiar – and more specifically, the tactile – phenomenology of this space. In her essay Krauss 
makes no reference to this spatial aspect as it would obviously conflict with her characterisation 
of the collages as „inexorably flat‟ („The Motivation of the Sign‟, p. 262). On the other hand, 
Yve-Alain Bois does attempt to reconcile this effect with a semiological reading, claiming that 
real space could only be incorporated „once it had been transformed into a sign‟ („Kahnweiler‟s 
Lesson‟, p. 55). I will return to this argument in the following chapter.  
258 Krauss, „The Motivation of the Sign‟, p. 263. 
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Clearly, this effect is different from that which characterises Cézannian 
Cubism, and the means to obtain it have accordingly changed. In considering 
Picasso‟s picture of La Rue des Bois (fig. 27), I claimed that this work elicits 
sensations of reaching and grasping, or what is sometimes referred to as „manual 
prehension‟. Thus, in analysing the composition of Houses on the Hill I 
attempted to show how Picasso maps the visual cues which relate to this variety 
of action into the language of pictorial illusion, that is, into the space of the „third 
domain‟. However, these later works require a different explanation for two basic 
reasons. First, the artist has adjusted his medium so that bodily experience is 
primarily engendered through the perception of actual materials and indexical 
marks. In other words, this it is not simply a matter of visual illusion, even while 
the „floating‟ space may be characterised as an illusionistic one. And second, 
unlike the aesthetic of Houses on the Hill, we are no longer invited to imagine 
ourselves reaching out to grip illusory volumes. Instead, I would claim that the 
actions elicited by the collages relate to specific manipulations such as sliding or 
tearing or in certain cases they correspond to the use of particular tools. 
Accordingly, it would seem that these pictures present us with a constructive 
„work space‟ where we can imaginatively participate in the creative act. 
 
To give a little more weight to this argument, let us consider a further 
example: Picasso‟s Landscape of Céret of spring 1913 (fig. 44). While this work 
possesses pockets of recession and points of visible flatness, in general its space 
seems established above or on top of the drawing plane. This effect depends on 
two separate, but crucially interrelated strategies. On the one hand it hinges on 
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Picasso‟s loose attachment of the elements to the surface so that their corners 
float away from – and thus cast shadows on – the paper support. And on the 
other hand it depends on the depicted shadows which cling to the elements and 
which accordingly establish the illusion of a shallow „pictorial‟ depth. Therefore, 
since depicted and real shadows seem to merge, the whole shape of each pasted 
paper element no longer appears as if it is stuck down to surface. Instead, 
drawing momentum from the literal float of the corners, each seems to detach 
from the material ground and hover indeterminately in the space above. Thus, by 
way of this conflation of reality and illusion, the papers appear to flutter towards 
our bodies and so, I would argue, they seem capable of being rearranged and slid 
around. 
 
This effect of manipulability further unfolds through the crudeness of 
Picasso‟s collage technique. As previously noted, this is because by attending to 
the jagged snips and the frayed edges (and possibly even the wrinkles left behind 
by the glue), we may refer these marks back to the activities of cutting, tearing 
and pasting. And thus through our acquaintance with these procedures, we may 
come to imagine performing them ourselves. However, what is striking about 
this particular work (and more generally, about the series of collages to which it 
belongs – see for example, figure 45 and figure 46) is the way that this effect is 
further developed through the artist‟s use of dressmaker‟s pins. 259 For these not 
only make a theme of the literal removability of the papers, but they also speak 
of the humble and unassuming nature of the tailor‟s craft. And so, in sum, the 
                                               
259 Picasso began using pins in his compositions at the end of 1912 and made this a regular 
feature of his work in the spring of 1913. As Christine Poggi has pointed out, these pins may be 
interpreted as humorous references to Braque‟s trompe l‟œil nails which the latter used in 
paintings such as Violin and Palette and Violin and Pitcher of 1909 – 10. See Poggi, In Defiance 
of Painting, p. 19. 
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signs of making which are spread over the surface of the collage index the kinds 
of activities which we all can engage in and which we are likely to have 
performed in the past. It may therefore be that this rough-shodden appearance 
joins with the floating effect of the papers. If so then it will be the combined 
force of these two aspects which structures the bodily aesthetic of the work. 
 
Perhaps, then, we might draw out the significance of Picasso‟s procedure 
by relating it to Merleau-Ponty‟s discussion of the „sedimentation of habit‟: the 
idea that objects speak to us as „poles of action‟ by way of the bodily familiarity 
we have with them. For instance, the philosopher offers the example of the 
wallet-maker, Schneider, who: 
 
[…] when put in front of his scissors, needle and familiar tasks, does not 
need to look for his hands or his fingers, because they are […] 
potentialities already mobilised by the perception of scissors or needle, 
the central end of those „intentional threads‟ which link him to the 
object‟s given.260 
 
However, while Schneider can still perform these habitual movements, he has 
lost the capacity to spontaneously perform „abstract‟ movements – such as 
mimicking another person‟s actions or pointing to a part of his body261 – due to 
                                               
260 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 121. 
261 Merleau-Ponty defines „abstract‟ movements as those which are „not relevant to any actual 
situation, such as moving arms or legs to order…‟ These are compared to „concrete‟ movements 
which are those non-conceptualised acts which we habitually perform, such as walking or 
swatting a fly when it lands on our skin. In terms of seeing, this might therefore be related to the 
distinction between „vision for perception‟ and „vision for action‟ (and indeed, this is very much 
suggested by the philosopher‟s reference to „grasping‟ and „pointing‟ or Greifen and Zeigen). 
Ibid, p. 118; pp. 130 – 31. 
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the brain damage he suffered in the war. Instead, he must first conceptualise 
these motions – meaning that he must first look for their reference points in an 
„objective‟ (or perhaps, an allocentric) space262 – thus producing them in a slow 
and laborious manner. For Merleau-Ponty, then, this pathological case discloses 
the operations of normal perception. And more precisely it shows that „the 
acquisition of a habit is…the motor grasping of a motor significance‟263, so that 
the repetitive actions we daily engage in and the tools we habitually use (our 
ability to drive a car, for instance) are incorporated into, and are comprehended 
by way of, our bodies. Or to put this differently, they become a form of practical 
knowledge – a knowledge „in the hands‟264 – which is accessible to us without 
requiring the top-down contributions of thought. Schneider‟s incapacities 
therefore indicate that only the habits which were acquired before his injury 
remain intact. His body cannot „catch‟ and „comprehend‟ new significances, and 
for this reason the world of his experience is: 
 
[…] readymade or congealed, whereas for the normal person his projects 
polarize the world, bringing magically to view a host of signs which 
guide action, as notices in the museum guide the visitor.
265
 
 
But this account only seems to consider the motor habits that directly 
connect the subject to his or her perceptual surroundings. For instance, it may 
                                               
262 See especially ibid, pp. 118 – 129. Merleau-Ponty contrasts this objective experience of space 
to the normal bodily experience of it as a zone of potential activity. For example, he states, that 
„The normal person reckons with the possible, which thus, without shifting from its position as a 
possibility, acquires a sort of actuality. In the patient‟s case, however, the field of actuality is 
limited to what is met with in the shape of a real contact or is related to these data by some 
explicit process of deduction‟ (p. 125). In neuropsychological terms, we might therefore say that 
Schneider cannot generate motor imagery. 
263 Ibid, p. 165. 
264 Ibid, p. 166 
265 Ibid, p. 165; p. 129. 
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help to explain why actually perceived scissors (or perhaps, iconic 
representations of them) address the body as instruments of cutting, thus eliciting 
the appropriate grip and pincer-like action. However, if we want to know how we 
invest the signs of another person’s activity with significance then we might turn 
to neuroscience, and more particularly to the theory of „embodied simulation‟ for 
a clue.
266
  
 
This theory has developed from the identification of „mirror neurons‟, 
which are cells in the posterior parietal lobe that discharge when one and the 
same action is both performed and perceived.
267
 It has been proposed, therefore, 
that by connecting our own goal-directed movements to those which we see other 
people perform – that is, through each of these experiences producing the same 
„action representation‟ – this neural network allows us to understand the 
intentions of others by evoking a „motor resonance‟ with the acts we observe. 
And so, according to this view the „mirror system‟ could instruct our ability to 
mimic and to empathise with other members of our species in a „bottom-up‟ 
way.
268
 If mimicry is therefore involved in the learning of culturally specific 
activities such as the use of tools (as Jacob and Jeannerod and several others have 
argued)
269
 then there may be a scientifically justified reason for claiming that 
Picasso‟s collages evoke a motor resonance. We might say, for instance, that the 
movements involved in making the artwork are familiar to the viewer having 
                                               
266 For a summary of this theory and its implications see Vittorio Gallese and Alvin Goldman, 
„Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading‟, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 2, no. 
12 (December 1998) pp. 493 – 501. 
267 These neurons were first identified in the early 1990s. For the first papers on this subject see 
Di Pellegrino et al., „Understanding motor events: a neurophysiological study‟ Experimental 
Brain Research, 91 (1992), pp. 176 – 80 and Rizzolatti et al., „Premotor cortex and the 
recognition of motor actions‟, Cognitive Brain Research, 3 (1995), pp. 131 – 41. 
268 This identification will be much stronger with our conspecifics because we share the same 
neural architecture, cultural surroundings and ecological „niche‟. 
269 See Jacob and Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing, p. 226 – 236. 
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been encoded in her memory as „motor schemata‟.270 Accordingly, these will be 
activated when perception delivers the relevant cues.
 271
 
 
The final question, therefore, is whether an indexical mark can be 
considered a „relevant cue‟? Of course, it is clear from the start that seeing the 
residua of actions is not the same as seeing the deed being done (that is, we do 
not actually bear witness to Picasso making the work). Nevertheless, for these 
motor schemata to become useful to us in everyday perception, we must have 
some way of knowing when the situation around us makes them germane. If we 
therefore recognise that Picasso‟s marks have been caused in a particular fashion 
– for instance, through the familiar activities of cutting and tearing – then it may 
be that „vision for perception‟ is first required to activate these schemata. This 
would mean that a „literal reading‟  (in the sense I outlined earlier) is a necessary 
precursor to our bodily identification with the work. 
 
Accordingly, if Picasso‟s collages draw us closer to the creative process, 
then this may be due to the bodily acquaintance we have with the activities 
evidenced by his indexical marks. But crucially, this effect will be prevented 
from replicating the banal experiences of everyday life due to the way that the 
artwork reorganises – and in Picasso‟s case complicates – our perception of the 
world. Thus, as the picture plane presses forward into actual space, it will not 
simply be assimilated to the logic of reality; instead, it will invest reality with the 
                                               
270 Jacob and Jeannerod define this as the „internal representation of a recipe […] for the 
manipulation of tools. Ibid, p. 216. 
271 According to Jacob and Jeannerod, motor schemata „can be triggered exogenously when an 
individual perceives a token of the […] action performed by another agent.‟ They also suggest 
that such a token may not only be the perception of the action itself, but also the mere perception 
of tools. Ibid, pp. 217 - 18  
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quality of art.
272
 In summary, therefore, if familiar motions become absorbed by 
our bodies – if they become pre-reflexive or „sedimented‟ habits – then by 
resituating these activities in an aesthetic space the artist may „defamiliarise‟ 
perception.
273
 Thus, by way of a kind of „phenomenological reduction‟ he may 
reawaken our „wonder in the face of the world‟. 274 
 
 
5.5 CUBISM DIVIDED: PICASSO AND BRAQUE 
 
Does Braque‟s version of Synthetic Cubism similarly evoke this „constructive 
work space‟? I wish to suggest that it does not and that this therefore indicates a 
key point of disjuncture between his practice and that of Picasso. For a start, 
Braque always cut and laid his papers onto the support with great care and 
attention so that the indexical signs of making – while perceptible – are not 
visible in the same assertive, eye-grabbing way. And moreover, while Picasso‟s 
compositions are usually quite „open‟ and spreading, thus allowing their contents 
to „spill out‟ into the space of the viewer, Braque‟s compositions seem 
comparatively self-contained and closed. Consider, for instance, his Violin and 
Glass of 1912 – 13 (fig. 47), a work which is roughly contemporaneous with 
Picasso‟s Landscape of Céret. In this picture, we see the artist playing his collage 
elements off against the taut, linearly structured scaffolding of the drawing. But 
while this play of forms produces a shifting space by way of its transparencies, 
                                               
272 Yve-Alain Bois makes a similar point when he says that Picasso transforms reality „into a 
sign.‟ I shall address this point in my conclusion. 
273 According to Bois, the concept of „defamiliarisation‟ or ostranenie was first discussed in 
relation to Cubism by Roman Jakobson, who drew this idea from the work of Victor Shklovsky. 
See „The Semiology of Cubism‟, pp. 177 – 80. 
274 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. xv. 
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overlappings and superimpositions – and while it thereby creates a certain sense 
of „float‟ – at the same time this is regimented by the grid-like composition and 
by the way the paper elements loosely mimic the shape of the frame.  
 
It is this sense of elements being interlocked within an internally tensile 
space that I think Braque has carried over from an earlier phase of Cubism and in 
this respect, he has not made the transition that is evident in his associate‟s work.  
And more specifically, I would suggest that the goal of Braque‟s Synthetic 
Cubism is an extension of the aim of his Analytic works: namely, the desire to 
transform the experience of touch into a perceptual language of pictorial form. 
That Braque viewed touch as central to his project is evident from several 
statements he made later in his life. For instance, he proclaimed that:  
 
What particularly attracted me [to Cubism] was the materialisation of this 
new space that I felt to be in the offing. So I began concentrating on still-
lifes, because in the still-life you have a tactile, I might almost say a 
manual space…This answered to the hankering I have always had to 
touch things and not merely see them.
275
 
 
Now, of course, I have also been claiming that Picasso was interested in 
evoking sensations of touch. However, I would suggest that Braque‟s concern 
with this modality was different in two important respects. First, his art never 
creates the incongruity that is evident in his colleague‟s pictures for he does not 
see a philosophical problem in transforming tactile experience into something 
                                               
275 Dora Vallier, „Braque, la peinture et nous‟, Cahiers d’art, 20, no. 1, October 1954, p. 14. 
Quoted in Edwin Mullins, Braque (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), pp. 40 – 41. 
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that is visually perceived. Or, to put this another way, Braque does not seem to 
draw a distinction between our visual recognition of the tactile properties of 
surfaces and the indeterminate physical appeal they have for our bodies by way 
of enactive sight. Thus, unlike Picasso, he does not attempt to represent this last 
experience as something that is unique and different from the semantic 
phenomenology of vision. In real terms this means that Braque‟s artworks can 
combine literally tactile materials such as sand and sawdust with pictorial forms 
that either metaphorically or associatively figure the cues of touch. For instance, 
in The Fruitdish of 1912 (fig. 48) he makes tactility both a function of what we 
recognise in the picture by iconically representing the grainy appearance of wood 
and also a function of what we literally perceive by mixing sand in with the 
paint. In Picasso‟s pictures, on the other hand, what we recognise and what we 
tactually sense cannot be so easily combined.
 276
 
 
Furthermore, I would suggest that Braque‟s conception of touch is quite 
specific: perhaps due to his early investigations of Cézannian passage he seems 
to consider it largely in terms of haptic perception.
 277
 On this view, therefore, the 
aim of Braque‟s Cubism in all its phases is to produce an aesthetic experience 
whereby we are invited to imagine running our hands and fingertips over a 
surface, exploring its different angles and inflections in a piecemeal and 
cumulative way. Thus, in light of the argument I have so far developed, this will 
                                               
276 This might be related to Krauss‟s claim that Braque treats touch and vision as „functions of the 
same interlocking network.‟ „The Motivation of the Sign‟, p. 270. Bois also makes a similar point 
when he says of Braque‟s concern with touch that „[his] concept of the sign always remained 
synecdochical (hence fundamentally iconic)‟ „The Semiology of Cubism‟, p. 194. 
277 According to Susanna Millar, the term „haptic‟ perception refers to „the combination of inputs 
from touch and movement‟ particularly involving „exploring and scanning movements‟. 
Conversely, I understand the word „tactile‟ to embrace all forms of touch-like experience. See 
Millar, Space and Sense, p. 2. For Braque‟s early use of Cézannian passage see his pictures of 
L‟Estaque of 1908 and of La Roche Guyon of 1909. 
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mean that his Cubist practice differs from Picasso‟s since the latter begins with a 
concern for manual prehension and later makes constructive activity a theme. 
 
Nevertheless, this „haptic‟ concern is evident in the work of both artists in 
the years 1909 to 1911. Take, for instance, Braque‟s Clarinet and Bottle of Rum 
on a Mantelpiece of 1911 (fig. 49). In general, the tactile effect of this work is 
contingent on the artist‟s use of faceting to shatter the picture plane and his use 
of passage and shading to make the fragments seem as if they are equally within 
reach of our hands. However, what makes this space seem specifically haptic is 
the way our gaze is invited to proceed along specific vectors and how it then 
lights upon particular forms and textures as if replicating the exploratory 
movements of touch.
278
  
 
The scrolled edge of the mantelpiece, for instance, upon drawing our eye 
to its sensuous curves, almost appears to detach from the surface and float 
forward into our space (fig. 49 detail (a)). However, by tracing the flow of its 
curves, we reach a point where it seems to be hinged to the picture plane by a 
crisscross of lines. By their upward thrust, these lines then lead to a circular form 
which, by being the lightest element in the composition, has already made a grab 
for our attention. Yet, on closer inspection, this area is so thinly painted that it 
reveals the weave of the canvas, a fact that is made even more emphatic by the 
dark impastoed brushstrokes on the right. As a result, this element which had 
                                               
278 For a consideration of the movements involved in haptic perception see Ibid, chapter four 
„Hand movements and spatial reference in shapes and small-scale space‟ pp. 71 - 97. In 
reviewing evidence of Braille reading tasks, Millar notes that subjects tend to employ dynamic 
scanning actions and rely on specific tactile details to guide their movements. It might therefore 
be suggested that Braque‟s picture visually thematise the tactile cues that direct these manual 
activities.  
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first seemed to push forward assimilates to the literal surface of the work. A 
network of similarly incongruous effects traces its way around the whole central 
area of the canvas creating a perpetual ebb and flow of space, only briefly being 
interrupted by the trompe l‟œil nail which both paradoxically anchors the picture 
and constitutes its most ambiguous zone (fig. 49 detail (b)). An appropriate 
analogy for this work would therefore seem to be one relating to tactile – and 
more specifically to haptic – perception, which is presumably why the words 
„bas-relief‟ are so often invoked.279  
 
I would therefore suggest that this concern dominated Braque‟s Cubism 
even after he had begun to explore the medium of papier collé.
280
 And so, while 
this innovation may have allowed him to simplify the composition, to employ a 
wider variety of textures and to reintroduce local colour, these works 
nevertheless retain the manual effects of the previous few years. In other words, 
they continue to evoke metaphorical and metonymic exchanges between visual 
perception and haptic touch.
281
 It would seem, for instance, that Braque intended 
                                               
279 For instance, Greenberg uses this term numerous times in „Collage‟. 
280 Braque‟s first papier collé was Fruit Dish and Glass of September 1912; this was followed a 
few months later by Picasso‟s, Guitar, Sheet Music and Glass (dated from after 18th November, 
1912). It should be pointed out that Braque pioneered many of the key (material) developments 
of Cubism. It is known, for example, that he was the first to introduce lettering and the imitation 
of faux bois into his works and to mix his paint with sand and other extraneous materials and 
more recently it has come to light that he also made the first paper constructions (August 1912, 
no surviving examples). On the other hand, Picasso is credited with making the first collage (Still 
Life with Chair Caning, May 1912), and it is also sometimes contended that his cardboard guitars 
of autumn 1912 were the first „true‟ Cubist constructions insofar as Braque‟s (dated as early as 
1911) were intended as working models. For a generally accepted account of the chronology of 
Cubism see Picasso and Braque: Pioneering Cubism (exh. cat., Museum of Modern Art, New 
York, 24 September 1989 – 16 January 1990) ed. William Rubin (New York: Thames and 
Hudson, 1989), pp. 2 – 3.  
281 My use of rhetorical figures to describe Braque‟s strategy is indebted to Richard Shiff‟s essay 
„Cézanne‟s Physicality‟ in which he describes Cézanne‟s oeuvre in similar terms. However, pace 
Shiff, I would suggest that Cézanne, like Picasso, does not so much refer to touch by employing 
visual metaphors (as Braque often does). Instead, I would argue that his pictures evoke the 
difference between recognitional seeing and enactive perception. Shiff cannot say this since he 
does not consider sight to have its own tactile dimension, that is, he does not possess the concept 
of „vision for action‟. 
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his faux bois papers to function as visual signs for texture, that is, as pictorial 
elements which can be associatively referred to tactile sensations but which are 
not distorted by visual perspective.
282
 And colour is equally intended to disclose 
a material aspect; for instance, Braque stated to Dora Vallier that, „I saw how 
much colour depends on material. Take an example: dip two white pieces of 
cloth, but of different materials in the same pigment: their colour will be 
different.‟283  
 
But these are concerns that have vanished from Picasso‟s Synthetic 
Cubism; and in any case, it seems that they were never straightforwardly there. 
What then should we say is different about Picasso‟s collage practice? As Krauss 
notes, this seems to have something to do with the way that touch is held separate 
from vision. But does this mean that tactility has been totally eliminated from the 
work? Does it now only appear in the form of a symbolic „inscription‟? 
 
In my opinion, Richard Shiff has got a little closer to the truth in 
describing the specific mechanics of this dichotomy. In speaking of Picasso‟s 
collage practice he states that the artist „often configured “literal” cuts [that is, 
the marks of „cutting, tearing, binding and folding‟] so that the distinction 
between visual illusion and tactile physicality becomes a necessary part of any 
attentive description of the picture.‟ 284 This can be seen, he claims, in a work 
such as Bowl with Fruit, Violin, and Wine Glass of 1913 (fig. 50), especially if 
we consider the five pasted papers bearing images of apples and pears in the top 
                                               
282 For a detailed discussion of the role of faux bois in Braque‟s collages see Poggi, In Defiance 
of Painting, pp. 91 – 105. 
283 Vallier, „Braque, la peinture et nous‟, p. 17; quoted in Ibid, p. 15. 
284 Shiff, „Cézanne‟s Physicality: The Politics of Touch‟, p. 162. 
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left-hand corner. For while these are most immediately seen as three fruits 
occluding two more distant ones, any closer inspection destroys this illusion for 
it makes apparent the non-continuity between the shape of the paper and the 
edges of the fruit. And so, by refusing to allow these two aspects to cohere, Shiff 
claims that Picasso entreats the viewer to apply two distinct „modes of 
description‟ to the picture. On the one hand, the collage is treated as a space of 
visual illusion, a disembodied zone where substance and meaning are present 
only to the eye. And on the other hand, the picture is treated as a literal object 
animated by indexical marks, a physical zone where „touch implies dispersal of 
interest and energy‟.285  
 
If this argument is at all plausible (and it seems to me that it is) then 
perhaps the crucial issue in making sense of Picasso‟s Cubism as a whole is that 
of saying how the incongruous effect of a picture such as Houses on the Hill 
develops into and prefigures the dichotomous effect of the collages. In the next 
section I shall try to specify what this principle is and in doing so I shall offer an 
alternative to Krauss‟s account. 
  
 
5.6 THE SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF PICASSO’S CUBISM 
 
While Krauss claims that Houses on the Hill polarises the experience of vision 
and touch, I think that it instead wedges apart vision for perception and vision for 
action. Therefore, rather than the incongruity of this image being an effect of the 
                                               
285 Ibid, p. 165 
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tension between seeing a relief plane and sensing a chasm beneath our feet, I 
would suggest that it can be expressed as the difference between „seeing that‟ 
there are houses and „seeing how‟ to manipulate them as building block-like 
forms. Of course, there is an overlap between these two explanations: both 
register the fact that there is something peculiar about the imagery which 
heightens our sense of physical embodiment and in this way both refer to the 
modality of touch. And both acknowledge that this is in some way estranged 
from our normal experience of vision and that by attending to the picture in a 
different way, a semblance of this normality will still be preserved. However, I 
would contend that Krauss‟s argument fails to provide the relevant concepts to 
makes sense of this distinction, and while this paves the way for her final 
conclusion, it fails to shed light on the tension between semantic and pragmatic 
attention that Picasso‟s collages produce. 
 
 Picasso‟s problematic as I therefore understand it is one of evoking the 
phenomenology of enactive seeing while demonstrating its difference from 
recognitional sight. And so I would propose that the dichotomy structured by 
Houses on the Hill is due to his use of one and the same set of marks to figure 
visual cues that signal the graspable qualities of objects while allowing these to 
be perceived as distant entities in a landscape. Therefore while Krauss attributes 
the forward thrust of this picture to Picasso‟s assertion of the relief plane, I 
would ascribe it to his thematisation of cues relating to manual prehension. 
Conversely, while she treats recession as generating the carnal phenomenology 
of the painting, I would consider it as sustaining recognition by loosely 
approximating an allocentric space. Therefore, it may be the very slippage of this 
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space from an allocentric to egocentric phenomenology that generates our sense 
of vertigo – and therefore of heightened bodily presence – when enactive seeing 
takes priority over perception. And when Krauss notes that the „inverted 
pyramid‟ may flip out, this may be evidence of a similar shift in our attentional 
mode. 
 
Let me show in more detail how my argument compares to the unfolding 
logic of Krauss‟s account. As will be recalled, Krauss implies that Picasso 
subscribes to an associationalist view of perception and thus considers the 
experience of vision and touch to be fundamentally disjunctive and to be 
coordinated by way of memory alone. But since he would then presumably 
regard pictures as only directly engendering visual experiences, his project to 
bracket out tactility would seem to be quite illogical from the start. In other 
words, there is little sense in trying to carve out a distinct zone of carnality if one 
believes that pictures are purely visual objects and cannot eo ipso produce this 
effect. But if – as Krauss seems to be saying – this realisation only struck Picasso 
during or after the summer spent in Horta, there is still of course the possibility 
that this view negatively informed his subsequent development.
286
 In other 
words, from circa 1910 to 1912, Picasso may have been progressively 
relinquishing the iconic or illusionistic visual signs that are associated with 
                                               
286 According to Krauss, the sense of disjunction in Houses on the Hill is „what Picasso took from 
Cézanne, even more certainly that the lesson about the continuity of relief‟ (and accordingly, it is 
implied that his Cubism departs from Braque‟s on this point.) However, Krauss does not make it 
clear why this disjunction should motivate the artist‟s subsequent „withdrawal‟ of touch, which to 
my mind creates something of a puzzle. Presumably, Houses on the Hill either activates a tactile 
phenomenology and it does so using non-iconic means (i.e., Picasso does not adopt the strategies 
of trompe l‟œil to render this effect, and he does not simply depict objects that we recognise as 
being tactual) or it fails to induce this sensation, in which case there would be no disjunction for 
Krauss to note. Therefore, if we take the former interpretation to be correct, Picasso would 
(presumably) consider his project as successful and there would be no need for him to renounce 
tactility tout court, only to stress its non-reliance on the recognisibility of objects, and thus, in 
pictorial terms, on iconic or illusionist means. See „The Motivation of the Sign‟, p. 268. 
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tactility (and so, on this view, with volume and depth). However, if the artist did 
consider this as a phase of removal and erasure – if every picture he produced 
were experienced as a „passionate relation to loss‟287 – one wonders why he 
would continue to pursue this iconoclastic path unless he has already glimpsed 
the semiological solution lying ahead.  
 
Therefore, instead of foisting this teleology on his art, perhaps we might 
take the key observations from Krauss‟s account and conceptualise them 
differently. In this respect, she draws attention to two important aspects of his 
work that need explaining insofar as they seem to bear significantly on his future 
development: first, Picasso does undermine iconic representation, and second, 
the look of his pictures does seem to cleave the viewing experience in two. 
However, to say – as she does – that these twin facts are explained (and thus that 
the principle of his evolution is illuminated) by his ghettoisation and later 
elimination of tactile cues would seem to wilfully ignore the nature of the 
experience that has been reported by others. In other words, many have spoken 
of the appearance of Picasso‟s pictures (particularly in the middle years of 
Cubism) not as loosing their substantiality but as gaining in their physical 
effect.
288
  
 
I would argue, therefore, that Krauss erroneously equates greater flatness 
with a lack of tactility.
289
 Accordingly, while it may be true that there is a 
                                               
287 Ibid, p. 271. 
288 For references to this interpretation see Chapter 2, note 96. 
289 For instance, in one and the same paragraph, Krauss moves from the idea that „in its 
developing, Analytic years, the Cubism of Picasso and Braque pronounced the impenetrable 
frontality of the pictorial surface more obstinately and resolutely than had any style before it‟ to 
the claim that, „the asceticism [of this style] had almost totally renounced the possibility that the 
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tendency towards „lateral spread‟ in the paintings and while it may also be true 
that under a certain mode of description the collages look „inexorably flat‟290, 
this is not to say that their palpability diminishes and finally disappears. What it 
may mean, instead, is that this experience is being structured in a distinct 
manner, and more particularly in a way that is no longer contingent on iconic 
signs. Or to put this differently, Picasso may have wished to create this effect 
without imitating the determinate appearance of objects and thus he may have 
been trying to show how their tactile appeal is different from the aspect they 
present to recognitional sight. In order to do so, therefore, he would need to 
stress the disjunction between two aspects of vision which in everyday 
experience are normally collapsed into one.
291
 
 
In any case, why should we suppose that Picasso viewed depth and 
volume as solely experienceable through touch? Krauss traces this back to the 
influence of associationalist psychology, a claim which initially sounds plausible 
due to the prevalence of this view around the turn of the century. But equally it is 
evident that the hegemony of this discourse was being challenged at the 
beginning of the 1900s, and in this respect the work of Henri Poincaré may stand 
                                                                                                                               
two dimensions of the visual field could ever afford its viewer direct and unmediated access to 
that other world of tactile completeness…‟ Ibid, pp. 261 – 62. 
290 Both citations, Ibid, p. 262. 
291 According to Melvyn Goodale, „vision for action‟ is not „normally available to awareness‟, but 
it nevertheless modulates consciousness. „The Cortical Organisation of Visual Perception‟ in An 
Invitation to Cognitive Science, p. 207. The same point has been made with regards to the 
distinction between the „body schema‟ (the somatosensory site of our motor habits and reflexive 
actions) and the „body image‟ (our beliefs about, and conscious experience of, the body). For 
instance, Shaun Gallagher claims that „…various aspect of the body schemata have an effect on 
the way subjects perceive their own bodies, that is, changes in the body schemata lead to changes 
in body images.‟ Indeed, this might be said to be the whole premise of Merleau-Ponty‟s account. 
See „Body Schema and Intentionality‟ in The Body and the Self, ed. José Luis Bermúdez, 
Anthony Marcel and Naomi Eilan (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998), p. 237. 
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as a possible source for a different conception of sight.
292
 Poincaré‟s philosophy 
differed sharply from that of the associationalists since he did not consider touch 
to be wholly distinct from vision, and thus he did not treat depth as a dimension 
which could not directly be seen. Rather, his theoretical speculations 
fundamentally opposed this way of thinking by proposing that visual space was 
articulated through the capacities of the body. In other words, movement and 
touch were considered preparatory to sight and thus would inflect it from the 
inside and not from the top-down. For instance, in his widely read work The 
Value of Science of 1905 he made the claim that: 
 
[…] to localise an object simply means to represent to oneself the 
movements that would be necessary to reach it. It is not a question of 
representing the movements themselves in space, but solely of 
representing to oneself the muscular sensations which accompany these 
movements and which do not presuppose the existence of space.
293
 
 
 Now, it would seem likely that Braque was familiar with this idea and 
that he understood it as implying a distinction between two kinds of space and, 
by implication, between two modes of picturing. For instance, we might recall 
                                               
292 Regardless of whether Picasso had read Poincaré‟s work, it is quite possible that these ideas 
were known to him through his contact with figures such as Jean Metzinger and Maurice Princet. 
Princet was an enthusiastic advocate of Poincaré‟s ideas who contributed significantly to 
theoretical discussions of the Puteaux Cubists. Furthermore, Metzinger implies a connection 
between this idea and Picasso‟s art when he claims in his „Note sur la peinture‟ that „Cézanne 
showed us forms living in the reality of light, Picasso brings us a material account of their real 
life of the mind – he lays out a free, mobile perspective, from which that ingenuous 
mathematician Maurice Princet has derived a whole geometry.‟ Pan, Oct. – Nov. 1910, p. 650; 
cited in Linda Dalrymple Henderson, The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidian Geometry in 
Modern Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 64. For a discussion of these 
connections see Henderson‟s work, especially chapter 2 „Cubism and the New Geometries‟. 
293 Henri Poincaré, The Value of Science (1905) cited in Jacob and Jeannerod, Ways of Seeing, p. 
194.  
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his statement that „Visual space separates objects from each other. Tactile space 
separates us from objects. The tourist looks at the site. The artilleryman hits the 
target (the trajectory is the prolongation of his arm.)
294
 Of course, Picasso was 
never quite so open about his theoretical views, particularly when there was a 
danger of them being read into his art. Nevertheless, given his and Braque‟s 
close partnership over these years it is more than plausible that he was thinking 
along similar lines.  
 
However, while it would seem that Braque understood this cleaving of 
experience to relate to two types of space, I would suggest that for his colleague 
it was more a question of visual experience in toto. Accordingly, if Picasso is 
attempting to draw a distinction between two separate experiences, then perhaps 
it is not so much that of vision and touch per se but rather of two distinct aspects 
that are internal to sight. Thus, if he were to adopt Poincaré‟s terms, one half of 
this coupling would be the world as it is seen through the filter of experience and 
judgement and the other half would be the localisation of objects through an 
intuitive awareness of the body‟s capacity to move. Or, to put this another way, 
this distinction would be analogous to that between „vision for perception‟ and 
„vision for action‟. 
 
 As an aside, we might also note that Poincaré‟s approach had an earlier 
precedent in the work of Hippolyte Taine. In its general outline, Taine‟s theory 
of perception appears to suggest an associationalist view. Thus, in his 1870 work, 
De l’Intelligence, he claims that seeing has two distinct stages. First, sensations 
                                               
294 Cited in Poggi, In Defiance of Painting, p. 97.  
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of light are registered on the retina and form a meaningless melange of patches of 
colour
295
 and second, these sensations are organised through memory and 
experience, thus leading to the recognisable world that we consciously perceive. 
However, when considering how we come to localise objects, Taine adds a 
further qualification to this view. This „localising judgement‟, he argues, can 
either be composed of „tactile and muscular images or visual images‟.296 But 
while this former „muscular atlas‟ is built up through repeated experience, it is 
nevertheless said to be necessary and anterior to the „visual atlas‟ which presides 
over our conscious visual judgements of space. 
 
Taine would therefore appear to be expressing a view which anticipates 
both that of Poincaré and of Merleau-Ponty: namely, that primordial perception 
is a bodily affair. But even more interesting for our purposes is Cézanne‟s 
proclaimed affinity to the theorist and particularly, it seems, to this strand of his 
thought. For instance, he stated to Joachim Gasquet that „I like muscles, beautiful 
colours, blood. I am like Taine and what‟s more I am a painter. I am a 
sensualist.‟297 Therefore if, as I have been suggesting, the Cubists‟ main 
inheritance from Cézanne was his concern with a physicalised form of vision, 
then we might say that this develops in tune with a burgeoning discourse of 
sight.
298
 
                                               
295 According to Taine, this first stage of vision is equivalent to the way a newborn child sees. 
Therefore, as several historians have noted, this idea may have been a source for the 
Impressionist aesthetic, particularly given that several of these artists expressed their desire to see 
like a child. See Chapter 1, p. 2 notes 6 and 7. 
296 Hippolye Taine, On Intelligence, translated by T. D. Haye (New York: Holt and Williams, 
1872; first published 1870), p. 302. For Taine‟s full discussion of this subject see Book II, 
Chapter II „External Perception and the Education of the Senses‟, pp. 285 – 337. 
297 Joachim Gasquet’s Cézanne: A Memoir with Conversations, trans. Christopher Pemberton 
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1991), p. 133. 
298 This progression was suggested to me by Paul Smith. Smith has also discussed the connection 
between Cézanne and Taine in several articles. See for instance, „Cézanne‟s primitive self and 
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But regardless of whether Picasso and Braque were familiar with 
Poincaré‟s work, this text also hints at a characteristic of space which, even if it 
were only intuited by the artists, may explain why they began to favour still life 
over landscape. For if spaces are measured by way of the body‟s capacity to 
move, then those which are nearer at hand will necessarily give us a greater sense 
of immediacy.
 299
 We might therefore propose that the artists began their Cubist 
experiments with landscapes because these were the works that had most 
impressed them in Cézanne‟s oeuvre. In other words, their choice of subject had 
largely been arbitrary because they had not begun with any particular strategy in 
mind, only a desire to take their forebear‟s innovations one step further. 
However, in analysing his construction of pictorial space and in exaggerating his 
techniques though their own landscape painting, they may have come to 
understand a more elusive quality of Cézanne‟s aesthetic: the fact that it evokes a 
physicalised seeing which is at most its robust when it is performed within the 
zone of the body. Or as Braque explains this decision: 
 
[…] I worked after nature. This is even what directed me towards the still 
life. There I found a more objective element than landscape. The 
                                                                                                                               
related fictions‟ in The Life and the Work: Art and Biography, ed. C. Salas (Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
299 Neuropsychological studies would also seem to support this view since ventral stream 
processing has been shown to be principally responsible for distance perception while dorsal 
stream processing appears to function most effectively in peripersonal space. See Peter H. Weiss 
et al, „Neural consequences of acting in near versus far space: a physiological basis for clinical 
disassociations‟, Brain, vol. 123 (2000), pp. 2531 – 2541. Merleau-Ponty has also noted this 
distinction, claiming that distance „expresses […] that the thing is beginning to slip away from 
the grip of our gaze and is less closely allied to it. Distance is what distinguishes this loose and 
approximate grip from the complete grip which is proximity.‟ Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 
304 – 05. 
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discovery of the tactile space that put my arm in motion before the 
landscape invited me to look for an even closer, palpable contact.
300
 
 
 Therefore, pace Krauss, this implies that nearness can be as much a cue 
for touch as volume can be; and conversely depth – or in pictorial terms, the 
representation of the object turning or receding away from the frontal plane – 
may actually weaken this sense.  Accordingly, the denial of recession through 
faceting and – in the most extreme expression of this – Picasso‟s innovation of 
„piercing of closed form‟301 may serve to evoke a proximal and hence, a 
physically present space. Tactility, in other words, is not so much eliminated as 
spread across the representational field in a depth-denying way. Perhaps, then, 
this concern with the touch-like qualities of proximal space pre-empts the 
assertive frontality of the collages. However, in Picasso‟s practice this change in 
medium will recast the tactile aesthetic in an entirely new light, for he will now 
achieve this effect by emphasising the presence of literal materials and indexical 
marks. Thus, lodged within the ambiguity of a hovering space, these elements 
will seem to rise and fall in our visual awareness as the motor intentional threads 
of perception exercise their grip. 
 
 What then of the semantic dimension of seeing in Picasso‟s oeuvre? How 
is this held separate but nevertheless kept in play? The answer may be that he 
                                               
300 Cited in Jacques Lassaigne, „Un Entretien avec Georges Braque‟, p. 6; translation by Poggi, In 
Defiance of Painting, p. 98. In an interview with Dora Vallier, the artist also claimed that, „When 
a still life is no longer in reach of the hand, it ceases to be a still life.‟ Cited in Ibid. 
301 This is a slightly altered version of Kahnweiler‟s claim that in the summer 1910 „Picasso had 
pierced closed form‟. By this Kahnweiler seems to mean that the artist had developed a strategy 
in which a grid-like scaffolding is imposed upon objects so that their contours bleed into one 
another and form a series of interpenetrating planes. See The Rise of Cubism, trans. Henry 
Aronson (New York: Witterborn Schultz Inc., 1949), p. 10. 
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composes his works so that they make a theme of the way that recognition 
deploys a different mode of attention, or perhaps what we might refer to as a 
different kind of „visual spread‟. His works, as we have already discussed, often 
strain at the boundaries of perceptual legibility while nevertheless promising that 
meaning is there to be found. This strategy is effected in several different ways: 
it can be due to the dispersal of iconic signification across a collection of 
arbitrary elements; it may be a consequence of the same set of materials pointing 
towards two different referents; or it may be a question of juxtaposing the 
mimetic and the arbitrary so that we are required to perceptually fill in the gaps. 
But in each case this seems to call for a similar feat: we must gather together 
fragmentary pieces of evidence and synthesise them into a unified whole. And 
accordingly, this in itself necessitates a particular kind of seeing wherein we scan 
the picture or dilate our gaze in order to totalise the representational field. What 
then is this panoramic sight if it is not an allocentric form of vision? If so then 
this will be very different from the proximal attunement of our bodies to the 
„constructive workspace‟. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
From Two Dimensions to Three: The Legacies of 
Pictorial Phenomenology 
 
 
 
Space: that which is not looked at through a keyhole, not through an open door. 
Space does not exist for the eye only: it is not a picture: one wants to live in it. 
 
– El Lissitzky 302 
 
 
 
6.1 STYLE VERSUS VIEWING 
 
My argument in this thesis has largely focussed on the pictorial structuring of 
bodily space and not its implications for the history of art. Nevertheless, I would 
contend that these implications are broad and that they have not yet received the 
attention they deserve. This does not mean, of course, that various modern 
movements have not been considered in light of this phenomenological concept; 
we need only to think of the rhetoric surrounding Minimalism to know that this is 
not true.
303
 But it would seem to me that what is missing from these discussions 
is a sense of how this began as a pictorial concern and how it may even have 
                                               
302 „Proun Space, the Great Berlin Art Exhibition of 1923‟, reproduced in El Lissitzky 1890 – 
1941: Architect, Painter, Photographer, Typographer, ed. Jan Debbaut (Madrid and Paris: 
Eindhoven, 1990), p. 35. 
303 See for example, Robert Morris, „Notes on Sculpture 1 - 3‟, published in 3 issues of Artforum, 
4, no.6 (Feb 1966); 5, no.2 (Oct 1966); 5, no. 10 (Summer 1967); reprinted in Art in Theory 
1900-2000, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 828 – 835. 
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contributed to the picture‟s decline as a medium of art. My purpose in this 
concluding chapter is therefore to review this little considered tendency and to 
suggest how vital it has been to the development of modern aesthetics and how it 
may still be relevant to the art of today.  
 
Before commencing this discussion let me say a few brief words about 
how such a history might proceed if it were to be more fully worked out. So far I 
have suggested a continuity between the concerns of Cézanne and those of the 
Cubists and I have mentioned that this was never straightforwardly a matter of 
style. In other words, while Picasso and Braque clearly borrowed certain 
representational techniques from the master, their investigation of these was not 
launched for its own sake and extended far beyond the remit of formal concerns. 
If we are therefore to describe the nature of this connection, we should not speak 
of a style but of an aesthetic effect. And more precisely, we should not speak of 
the picture as something passively observed but as something that structures the 
activity of looking and which depends on this activity in order to be made whole. 
In short, we should consider the intercommunication between the artwork and the 
beholder, or what we might simply refer to as the viewing experience.  
 
 When we therefore speak of the subsequent history of this pictorial 
concern, we are not so much considering something that can be referred to the 
qualities of the artwork itself, even while it may be that certain methods of 
formal organisation are better at engendering it than others. Rather, the 
identification of this tendency will rest on our noting the kind of seeing an 
artwork gives rise to: what I have variously discussed as a „physicalised sight‟, 
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„enactive seeing‟ or „bodily phenomenology‟. Accordingly, the Cubists‟ claim to 
Cézanne‟s legacy was not strictly stylistic  (if we take this word to refer only to 
the compositional ordering of marks in a picture
304
). Instead, they might be said 
to continue his project by developing and differentiating aspects of the bodily 
thematic set in motion by his work. And equally, if there is tendency that carries 
on from this point then it may not be one in which a continuity is detectable at 
the level of form. 
 
 Perhaps then, if we were to go into detail about the post-Cubist 
development of this theme we would have to follow our noses in pursuit of a 
history of reception. That is, if an embodied phenomenology is the defining 
characteristic of this trend, then what people say about the artworks in question 
will be of vital importance. But it is far too late in the day to think about 
attempting such a historical survey. Instead, my purpose in the following few 
pages is simply to draw attention to some key examples of this tendency in the 
twentieth century and to broadly consider the relations between them and their 
debt to the art so far discussed. What I hope this will show is that pictorial 
concerns helped to shape later developments in three-dimensional media. Or to 
put this another way, what began as a aesthetics of pictures transformed into an 
aesthetics of real space. 
 
 
 
                                               
304 Of course, other interpretations of style are possible. For instance, when Wollheim speaks of 
the „individual style‟ of the artist he means a relation to the medium which is patterned through a 
set of psychomotor competencies and which, therefore, may develop and change while still 
retaining an invariable core. See Painting as an Art, pp. 26 – 36. 
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6.2 FROM COLLAGE TO CONSTRUCTION 
 
Taking my cue from Greenberg, I argued in the last chapter that certain of 
Picasso‟s collages have the effect of seeming to push pictorial space out in front 
of the literal surface. And indeed, in light of the actual protrusion of the papers – 
not only in terms of their corners and creases, but also in terms of their layered 
adhesion to the ground – they disrupt the surface in a way that is perhaps 
unprecedented in the history of art. But while these might be actual fragments 
seen in actual space and while, moreover, they might be nothing more than the 
detritus of everyday life – pieces of newspaper, tickets, bottle labels and so forth 
– the picture does not thereby become just another thing in the world.305 Instead 
it somehow transforms its surroundings and perhaps, more precisely, it makes 
real space seem more alive by drawing the habitual body out from its background 
of generality.
306
 I would suggest, accordingly, that it is the desire to increase (or 
perhaps to test) the scope of this aesthetic transformation by pushing the 
representational field ever further forward into real space that led Picasso to 
produce his first Guitar construction (fig. 51). In this sense, therefore, it may 
have been his interest in the shamanistic power of African masks and not just 
                                               
305 For a discussion of the relation between Cubist collage and popular culture see Poggi, In 
Defiance of Painting, chapter 5 „Cubist Collage, the Public, and the Culture of Commodities‟, pp. 
124 – 163 and Robert Rosemblum, „Picasso and the Typography of Cubism‟, in Picasso in 
Retrospect, ed. Roland Penrose and John Golding (London: Granada, 1981), pp. 32 – 47. For 
readings which attend to the written and political content of the newspaper fragments Picasso 
employed see David Cottington, „What the Papers Say: Politics and Ideology in Picasso‟s 
Collages of 1912‟, Art Journal, 47, no. 4, Revising Cubism (Winter 1988), pp. 350 – 359 and 
Patricia Leighton, „Picasso‟s Collages and the Threat of War, 1912 – 13‟, The Art Bulletin, 67, 
no. 4 (December 1985), pp. 653 – 672. 
306 The word „generality‟ is often employed by Merleau-Ponty to describe the nature of the pre-
reflexive life which subtends conscious thought.  See for instance, Phenomenology of Perception, 
p. 250 and p. 296. 
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their formal or semiological qualities (as Yve-Alain Bois has argued)
307
, which 
made them so vital to the development of his art (fig. 52).  
 
 In considering Picasso‟s assemblages such as Guitar Player of 1913 (fig. 
53), Bois predictably understands them as further evidence of the artist‟s 
semiological project. Thus he claims, that the actuality of the objects and the 
spaces incorporated by this artwork – the real guitar, the real table, the real 
newspaper and so forth – can hold their ground without „being swallowed up by 
the real space of objects‟ since they are embedded within a network of formal 
oppositions. In other words, they have been bracketed off from ordinary life and 
transformed into signs by being made to play a role in a system of differences. 
Thus empty space also becomes a „mark‟ and can be „formally‟ employed 
because it too has been incorporated into this symbolic matrix.
 308
 For Bois, 
therefore, this is what Tatlin learns from his visit to Picasso‟s studio on the 
Boulevard Raspail in 1913.
309
 And so – it is implied – begins „a new era in the 
history of Western sculpture.‟310 
 
 While this argument is compelling, I wish to suggest that Tatlin‟s debt to 
Picasso can be differently construed and that by rethinking this connection we 
might see a different historical trajectory emerge. Let us return to the Guitar 
                                               
307 In both „Kahnweiler‟s Lesson‟ and „The Semiology of Cubism‟ Bois argues that Picasso‟s 
Synthetic Cubism was born of a newfound understanding of the structural characteristics of 
African art. He traces this to Picasso‟s acquisition of a Grebo mask in summer 1912, claiming 
that this was the „epiphany‟ which led to the artist‟s first Guitar construction (October 1912) and 
which later determined his approach to papier collé. 
308 All quotes from „Kahnweiler‟s Lesson‟, p. 54. 
309 The date of Tatlin‟s visit to Picasso is not exactly known, however most authors assume, 
following the suggestion of Troels Andersen, that it was in spring-summer 1913. Accordingly, 
this would have meant that he saw the Guitar Player assemblage. See Margaret Rowell, „Vladimir 
Tatlin: Form / Faktura‟, October, 7, Soviet Revolutionary Culture (Winter, 1978), pp. 83 – 108. 
310 Bois, „Kahnweiler‟s Lesson‟, p. 38. 
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Player again and reconsider its supposed „transformation‟ of real space. In this 
instance, I would agree with Bois that space sheds its literality by becoming 
enmeshed with and inflected by the formal structure of the artwork. However, I 
would qualify this by saying that the transformation will never be complete, for 
any space which is encountered first hand – and particularly one that coincides 
with our zone of potential activity – will always in the first place belong to our 
bodies. Picasso‟s strategy, as I therefore conceive it, is to break open the 
compositional structure of the artwork so that actual and representational space 
will be bridged without allowing the latter to collapse into the former. Thus the 
experience produced will neither be literal and mundane nor purely formal and 
symbolic. Instead, it will seem that the real world adjusts itself to the imaginary 
world of Cubism and conversely it may invest the Cubist picture space with a 
more physical depth.  
 
I would therefore propose that Tatlin learned two things from his 
encounter with the works in Picasso‟s studio. First, having seen the collages and 
having noted Picasso‟s thematisation of the indexical mark, he may have 
understood that there is a human significance – and perhaps more precisely a 
motor significance – invested in literal materials which can be revealed through 
the very act of construction. And second, having witnessed the assemblages he 
may have understood that this aesthetic can be extended into – and indeed may 
disclose something latent within – the democratic and bodily zone of actual 
space. Thus it might be suggested that this understanding informs the open 
structures of his „corner reliefs‟ and their refusal to sit flat to the wall (fig. 54). In 
this case, they would neither make reality succumb to their formal organisation 
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and nor would they simply be incorporated into the fabric of the real. Instead, 
they would bind these aspects together and would come to function as animators 
of the lived dimension of bodily space. 
 
To see how this principle may have been adopted and further explored 
within the Russian avant-garde tradition, we might turn to the work of El 
Lissitzky and particularly to his „Proun Room‟ of 1923. This piece was produced 
for the Great Berlin Art Exhibition after the artist had been assigned a small 
gallery in which to display his work. However, unlike most of the other 
participants, El Lissitzky did not exhibit a discrete series of pictures in a 
conventional manner. Instead he distributed coloured, geometrical elements 
across the walls and ceiling thus encircling the spectator in a total „Proun space‟. 
As the artist therefore explained in his essay to accompany the exhibition, this 
was not the traditional space of passive and detached viewership which delivered 
itself only to the eye. Rather, it would facilitate movement and dynamic 
interaction: in his words it would „impel everyone to automatically perambulate 
it‟.311 And most importantly, it would be a transformation of reality for utopian 
purposes, or as the artist had earlier put it when describing his Proun drawings:  
 
Proun begins as a level surface, turns into a model of three-dimensional 
space, and goes on to construct all the objects of everyday life.
312
 
 
                                               
311 El Lissitzky, „Proun Space‟, p. 35. 
312 From De Stijl, Year V, no. 6 (June 1922) reprinted in Sophie Lissitzky-Küppers, El Lissitzky: 
Life, Letters, Texts (London: Thames and Hudson, 1980), p. 344. 
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But whatever utopian potential El Lissitzky saw in this project, it would soon be 
quelled by the proscriptions of the Soviet state. Thus, the dream to unleash the 
power of embodied spectatorship would inevitably have to be put on hold. 
 
 
6.3 THE AESTHETICS OF DIS/ORIENTATION 
 
It would seem at this point that the trail goes cold since few other artists of the 
post-Cubist generation appear to have espoused these phenomenological 
concerns. And indeed, I would suggest that there is a period of latency before this 
bodily thematic is taken up again. But while most art historians locate this point 
in the 1960s with Minimalism and consider it as the product of a different 
history,
313
 I think we might view Abstract Expressionism as a key inheritor of 
this tendency and therefore treat it as bridging the gap with Cubism.
314
 
Accordingly, my intention in this section is to make a few brief remarks about 
this line of phenomenological enquiry, taking the colour-field paintings of 
Barnett Newman as my main example. 
 
                                               
313
 For a consideration of the historical development of Minimalism see, Thierry de Duve, Kant 
after Duchamp (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), esp. „The Monochrome and the Blank 
Canvas‟) and for the most famous (or notorious) treatment of its bodily aesthetic see Michael 
Fried, „Art and Objecthood‟ in Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 148 – 172. 
314 Cubism has often been treated as a source of Abstract Expressionism. This may be largely due 
to the influence of Clement Greenberg‟s argument that the American avant-garde had extended 
the Cubist‟s articulation of literal flatness (See, for instance, „The Decline of Cubism‟, Partisan 
Review, no, 3 (1948)). However, a more concrete relation between these two movements might 
be established by way of the figure of John Graham, who was a key promoter of Abstract 
Expressionism and whose writings on art (and particularly on the work of Picasso) were widely 
read by many of the artists. Of key importance in this respect is the exhibition Graham organised 
at the New York McMillen Gallery in 1942 entitled „French and American Artists‟. This show 
included works by Picasso and Braque alongside those of soon-to-be Abstract Expressionists 
such as Jackson Pollock, Willem de Kooning and Lee Krasner.  See Megan McShea, „A Finding 
Aid to the John Graham Papers, 1799 – 1988‟ in the Archives of American Art, 
http://www.aaa.si.edu/collectionsonline/grahjohn. 
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 Interpretations of Newman‟s work have often focussed on the capacity of 
his paintings to produce spiritual or sublime experiences and in this respect the 
ideas of Romanticism, Existentialism and Jewish Mysticism have variously been 
invoked.
315
 Yet however we construe the expressive aims of his art, it seems 
clear from his own words on the subject that these ends were to be arrived at 
through the constitution of a particular kind of space. For instance, in a 1962 
interview he described his project in the following terms: 
 
Is space where the orifices are in the faces of people talking to each other, 
or is it not between the glance of their eyes as they respond to each other? 
Anyone standing in front of my paintings must feel the vertical domelike 
vaults encompass him to awaken an awareness of his being alive in the 
sensation of complete space.
316
  
 
Now, I would suggest that what Newman is talking about here is 
precisely a form of egocentric space, for as the first clause in his statement 
suggests, it is not the comparative relation between features per se that interests 
him, but rather the relationship between one body and another. (Remember, 
allocentric space involves the spatial relation between objects, egocentric space 
involves the relation between the perceiver and an object). Perhaps, then, this 
will remind us of El Lissitzky‟s emphasis on the bodily relation of the spectator 
to his „Proun Room‟ or maybe it will take us even further back to Braque‟s 
                                               
315 See for instance, Thomas B. Hess‟s discussion of Newman‟s „secret symmetry‟ in Barnett 
Newman (exh. cat, New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1971 – 2) and Renée van de Vall, „What 
Consciousness Forgets: Lyotard‟s Concept of the Sublime‟ in A Companion to Art Theory, ed. 
Paul Smith and Carolyn Wilde (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 360 – 69.  
316 „Barnett Newman Interview with Dorothy Gees Seckler‟ reprinted in Art in Theory 1900-
2000, ed. Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 783 – 84. 
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description of space as „the prolongation of [an] arm‟. But nevertheless, it would 
seem that Newman‟s conception of space operates at a different level of 
magnification. It will be vault-like or, as he further describes it, „a spatial dome 
of 180 degrees going in all four directions‟, something which recalls the 
experience of „walk[ing] the tundra.‟317 Therefore, this will not be like the 
tabletop space of a still life, nor the enclosed dimensions of a room, but rather it 
will call to mind the endlessly receding expanse of an open landscape. 
 
 In phenomenological terms how should we characterise the effect of this 
kind of space? What is it like to be surrounded by the empty plains of the 
Canadian tundra Newman imagined (fig. 56)? The first point to make about such 
a landscape is that it is invariably featureless and flat. Thus when one walks from 
one point to the next the view does not unfold in a continually changing pattern, 
or rather the perspective alters whilst essentially remaining the same. 
Accordingly, the horizon is increasingly felt as a ring around our body since 
every point on its circumference anticipates and reinforces the next. And equally, 
because there are few landmarks to enable us to gain our bearings we can easily 
become lost and disorientated. Space then becomes something that bears down 
upon us for there is no mediating term between our bodies and the open expanse 
of the plain.  
 
 Can we therefore invoke the ideas of Merleau-Ponty to describe this kind 
of space? Perhaps we can, but not in the terms that we have previously used, for 
this experience seems to undermine the usual bodily structuring of the 
                                               
317 Ibid, p. 784; p. 783.  
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phenomenal field. And more specifically, we might say that this is not the zone 
criss-crossed by the threads of motor intentionality that we normally encounter. 
Rather, since salient objects do not stand out from this field it will also contain a 
dearth of the perceptual „poles‟ that guide and orientate our actions. Therefore, if 
our bodies stand in stark comparison to the horizon and to this alone, then this 
relationship will come to characterise the entire physiognomy of the perceptual 
field. Or as Newman described the space he was seeking, „[it] is where I can feel 
all four horizons, not just the horizon in front of me or in back of me because 
then the experience of space exists only as a volume‟.318 The alternative to the 
„volume‟ would therefore be the „space-dome‟. 
 
 To get a rough idea of how Newman attempts to engender this effect let 
us consider his imposing eight-by-eighteen foot canvas, Vir Heroicus Sublimis 
(fig. 57). Now, it is quite evident that the monumental proportions of this picture 
mean that we cannot take it all in at one glance. And furthermore, since Newman 
recommended that this work be seen from a close viewing distance, this was 
clearly the effect he intended and wished to reinforce.
319
 What this means, 
therefore, is that the velvety red of the surface will saturate our visual field and 
the light that reflects off it will bathe us in a luminous glow. And so, if we 
become seduced by this field instead of attending to the „zips‟ or the materiality 
of the surface, then it may seem to wrap itself around us and permeate our skin. 
Unfocused staring such as this (comparable, perhaps, to our inability to fixate 
objects when we are tired) will accordingly set our bodies adrift as we fail to 
                                               
318 Ibid, p. 783. 
319 This work was first exhibited at the Betty Parson‟s Gallery where it was accompanied by a 
sign stating: „There is a tendency to look at large pictures from a distance. The large pictures in 
this exhibition are intended to be seen from a short distance.‟ Quoted in Barnett Newman (exh 
cat.), ed. Ann Temkin (Philadelphia Museum of Art, 2002), p. 178. 
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latch onto a determinate perceptual anchor – or perhaps a „pole of action‟ – 
outside of ourselves. This would then seem close to the experience of 
„dedifferentiation‟ described by the critic Anton Ehrenzweig whereby „the 
boundaries between the inside and outside world melt away and we feel engulfed 
and trapped inside the work of art.‟320 
 
 Nevertheless, a description of this kind does not do justice to the work 
since Newman never allows us to become fully immersed in this Zen-like state. 
Instead, the total effect of the picture depends upon a dialectical act of looking 
wherein the absorptive pull of the field is counterbalanced by the five intervals of 
the slender zips and the scumbled paint on the surface. In other words, there is 
always a tension between specific details and the womb-like background against 
which they are set. Therefore these elements might be described as things we 
encounter in a similar way as we encounter the horizon line and the few 
animating features of the tundra: they act as intentional poles we cast our 
attention towards in an attempt to give articulation to the space. Perhaps, then, 
since these details cannot quite be stabilised or „gripped‟ they throw us back onto 
the perceptual resources of our body and make us aware of it as the anchor of our 
experience or our „point of view‟ on the world. Indeed, Newman‟s own 
comments on his practice would seem to suggest something of this kind: 
 
One thing that I am involved in about painting is that the painting should 
give a man a sense of place: that he knows he‟s there, so he‟s aware of 
himself. In that sense he related to me when I made the painting because 
                                               
320 Anton Ehrenzweig, The Hidden Order of Art (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1967), p. 
135. 
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in that sense I was there. Standing in front of my paintings you had a 
sense of your own scale. The onlooker in front of my painting knows that 
he‟s there.321 
 
 Finally, then, we might ask what bearing this approach to painting and its 
attendant effects had on the future development of art? I would suggest that there 
are two ways in which artists have taken this particular aesthetic forward. On the 
one hand, there is the strand exemplified by Minimalism which extends 
Newman‟s concerns with bodily presence and the articulation of „place‟ and 
scale (fig. 58).
322
 And on the other hand, there is the strand which seems to take 
its lesson from the dissolving expanse of the colour-field and the promise (or 
threat) of entropy and absorption which it entails. This concern first becomes 
evident in the early 1970s work of West-Coast „Light and Space‟ artists such as 
James Turrell (fig. 59) and – as can also be said of the Minimalist aesthetic – is 
quickly absorbed into a more general vernacular of three-dimensional art.
323
 
Thus at this point we reach a juncture in the history of art, since in the wake of 
this explosion of new media the picture seems to become a moribund form.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
321 David Sylvester, „Newman, In Conversation with David Sylvester‟, The Listener, 88, no. 2263 
(10 August 1972), p. 169.  
322 For a discussion of these concerns see Morris „Notes on Sculpture 1 - 3‟ and Donald Judd, 
„Specific Objects‟, first published in Arts Yearbook, 8 (New York, 1965), pp. 74 – 82; reprinted 
in Art in Theory 1900-2000, pp. 824 - 828 
323 „Light and Space‟ was the West Coast‟s response to Minimalism. Instead of stressing the 
literality of the object, these artists produced dematerialised spaces in which the contingent 
effects of light and atmosphere become vital to the experience of the work. For a discussion of 
this movement see Claire Bishop, Installation Art: A Critical History (London: Tate Publishing, 
2005), pp. 56 – 60. 
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6.4 PHYSICALISED SEEING, PHENOMENOLOGY AND ART 
 
The suggestions made in the previous section no doubt leave much to be 
explained. But the point has not so much been to trace these developments in 
detail, but merely to outline a possibly continuity between the evocation of 
physicalised seeing through pictures and the concern with actual sensory 
engagement which has become so central to contemporary art. Evidently, 
Newman‟s work should not be considered the only source for this trend. Rather it 
was due to a confluence of interests, the most important of which was the 
translation of the Phenomenology of Perception into English in 1962. But since 
Merelau-Ponty considered Cézanne‟s art as a fully realised phenomenological 
project in itself, it could be said that we have come right back to the point where 
we began. 
 
 How, then, should we summarise this peculiar aesthetic? For a start, it 
should be observed that Cézanne did not simply „invent‟ it, even though he may 
have given it its first explicit expression. This is not only because it was already 
coming to life in the work of earlier artists (Courbet‟s art particularly springs to 
mind
324
). But more importantly there is a sense in which this was not something 
„made‟ but „found‟325, for it lay buried within the structure of vision itself. My 
argument has therefore been that Cézanne produced a „criterion‟ of sight, that is, 
he gave public expression to an aspect of vision which is experienceable by all 
but is generally hidden under the reified appearances of conceptualising sight. 
                                               
324 See Michael Fried, Courbet’s Realism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 
325 See Shiff, Cézanne and the End of Impressionism, esp. pp. 68 – 69 & pp. 223 – 230. 
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More precisely, this can be characterised as the enactive and physical relation we 
have with the world: the category of sight called „vision for action‟. 
 
But one last question still needs to be addressed: why did the expression 
of this mode of vision crystallise into an imperative at this particular moment in 
time? Why did Cézanne feel the need to drink in the natural world so profoundly 
that he became aware of this latent form of sight? When considering the changes 
that occurred in the nineteenth century art historians have often been noted that 
the onset of modernism brought with it an overriding tendency towards the effect 
of flatness in pictures. For T. J. Clark, therefore – whose explanation of this is 
perhaps the most well-regarded – this stress on flatness is due to the alienating 
effects of modern, spectacular society and it is essentially the thematisation of 
this non-substantial seeing in art that effects this change in style.
326
 I would 
suggest, however, that Cézanne‟s attempts to capture a different bodily form of 
seeing which is consistent with an attempt to re-invest the visual field with the 
„thickness‟ that it has lost through the spectacle of capital. Therefore, unlike the 
work of Manet and the Impressionists, his is not a style informed by the 
„generalised illusion‟ of the city. Rather, it is one developed through a profound 
meditation on nature. In short, it is a rejoinder and an antidote to the flattening 
experience of the modern, capitalist world. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
326 T. J. Clark, The Painting of modern life  (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
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